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Fraud, which has been defined as, “any crime which uses deception as its 
main modus operandi” (Wells, 2011, p.2), has a significant effect on society. 
Its effect may be second only to drug trafficking in the economic harm that it 
causes to the United Kingdom (UK). It is estimated to cost the UK economy 
more than £50 billion annually, of which £20 billion is attributable to the 
public sector (Attorney General's Office, 2006, p.9; National Fraud 
Authority, 2013, p.2).  
The UK government has announced its intention to decrease the losses due 
to fraud. The UK government’s declared ‘zero tolerance’ strategy for the UK 
public sector encompasses the following: a collaborative approach 
supported by improved information flows; fraud awareness and prevention; 
and the need for more effective enforcement activity where fraud is 
suspected. Diminishing police resources allocated to fraud mean that this 
approach will need to be delivered by both law enforcement and civilian 
counter fraud teams (Attorney General's Office, 2006, pp.128-129; Cabinet 
Office & National Fraud Authority, 2011a, 2011b). 
This research project sought to establish whether UK central government 
organisations have the legal powers, skills and regulation needed to tackle 
fraud effectively. It was concluded from the literature review that an effective 
legal framework, supported by a wide range of skills, is essential to the 
delivery of the UK government’s zero tolerance approach, and that both 
professional standards, and the civil rights of those subject to investigation, 
should be protected through some form of regulation.   
Empirical data, collected via a questionnaire and a semi-structured 
interview programme, suggested that the effectiveness of central 
government civilian counter fraud teams is hampered by a fragmented legal 
landscape and a lack of skills, and that further professionalisation and 
regulation is needed to protect professional standards and individual legal 
rights. 
(295 words)	
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Background 
Fraud, which has been defined as “any crime which uses deception as its main 
modus operandi” (Wells, 2011, p.2), “is a deceptively simple term covering a 
very broad territory” (Levi, 2012, p.7). It can: take place in real or virtual space; 
use genuine or false documents, PIN numbers and testimonies; be facilitated 
through genuine or bogus organisations; last from milliseconds to many years; 
be both organised and on-off in nature; and take advantage of both system and 
personal weakness (Levi, 2012, p.7). 
Fraud is an attractive form of crime to criminals because it offers higher rewards 
and lower terms of imprisonment than other forms of crime such as theft and 
robbery (Levi, 2012, p.7). This may at least partially explain why fraud is a 
phenomenon that has a significant effect on the UK economy. The Fraud 
Review Final Report, a review commissioned by the UK government into the 
management and prosecution of fraud, concluded that fraud is second only to 
drug trafficking in the economic harm that it causes to the UK (Attorney 
General's Office (AGO), 2006, p.9). This conclusion is supported by the 
National Fraud Authority (NFA), which estimated that fraud costs the UK 
economy around £52 billion annually, of which £21.3 billion is lost by the private 
sector, £20.6 billion by public sector, £9.1 billion by individuals, £0.15 billion by 
the voluntary sector and £0.9 million by others (NFA, 2013, p.2, pp.7-9). While 
Doig & Levi (2013, p.146) have reservations about the data quality underlying 
this, and previous estimates of the effect of fraud on the UK economy (for 
example those produced by National Economic Research Associates (NERA) in 
2000 and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in 2007), all 
estimates demonstrate that the losses to the UK economy due to fraud are 
substantial and need to be tackled. Indeed, Gee & Button (2015), in their review 
of the financial cost of fraud, estimated losses to the UK economy to be £98.6 
billion annually (p.8). 
Fraud is not a national policing priority (Home Office, 2004; AGO, 2006, p.7; 
Doig & McCaulay, 2008, p.186; Middleton, 2012, p.59). Levi (2014, p.234) 
notes that “a complicated and multi jurisdictional fraud involving people with no 
prior criminal records and untraumatised victims losing less than £1 million is 
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unlikely to be treated as a high priority in the United Kingdom". Levi (2014) cites 
several reasons for this, which include: poor productivity levels when compared 
to the investigation of other types of crime; police access to the skills needed to 
investigate fraud; and a failure to fully appreciate the social and economic harm 
caused by fraud (p.229). He concludes that “There is little political pressure on 
the police to do more about fraud, compared to other aspects of policing despite 
high anxiety over identity thefts and mass marketing swindles” (p.229). 
Gannon & Doig (2010, p.40), therefore, note the conclusion of the Fraud 
Review Final Report (2006) that, due to the decline in police resources 
assigned to fraud,  
A complementary policing resource must be maintained for frauds, 
which although not perpetrated by organised criminal networks, 
nevertheless cause serious damage to the economy and society. 
(AGO, 2006, p.9)  
This complementary resource includes a role for counter fraud specialists 
employed by civilian bodies. In 2006, the Fraud Review Final Report noted that 
there were more than 11,000 civilian counter fraud specialists in public 
organisations (AGO, 2006, p.9, p.130, p.142). Doig & Levi (2013, p.145) 
observe that, due to the large number of participating bodies, there is currently 
a fragmented institutional and legislative landscape within which responsibility 
for tackling fraud rests with both private and public sector institutions. 
In May 2010, the UK government published its strategy to tackle fraud in two 
principal documents, Eliminating Public Sector Fraud, published in June 2011, 
and Fighting Fraud Together, published in October 2011 (Cabinet Office & NFA, 
2011a, 2011b). Both documents signalled an intention to decrease the losses to 
the UK economy due to fraud, and in particular, to reduce the £20 billion lost to 
the UK public sector in 2010, 2011 and 2012 (NFA, 2011a, p.7; 2012, p.7; 
2013, p.8). They place a significant emphasis on fraud awareness and 
prevention, as recommended by the Fraud Review Final Report (AGO, 2006, 
p.8, p.116), and stress the need for improved information on fraud. This can 
include improved intelligence on fraudster behaviour and activity (Fighting 
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Fraud Together) and knowledge of the risks and threats faced by individual 
organisations (Eliminating Public Sector Fraud). 
Eliminating Public Sector Fraud also emphasised the need for a collaborative 
response to implementing a zero tolerance approach to fraud, while Fighting 
Fraud Together emphasised the need for more effective enforcement activity to 
detect those committing fraud and ensure that they receive appropriate 
sanctions. Limitations on police resources to tackle fraud, which have fallen 
significantly since 1990 (Gannon & Doig, 2010, pp.50-51), mean that this 
approach will need to be delivered by both law enforcement and civilian counter 
fraud teams.  
Research aims 
This research project is specifically focussed on the challenges faced by one 
sub sector of the UK economy, central government. The variety of frauds facing 
the UK economy are such that, assessing the effectiveness with which all of 
these are managed would be difficult to undertake to the depth required, while 
remaining within the parameters of a doctoral research project. Furthermore, by 
focussing on one large sector of the economy, which has experienced a 
number of fraud types to which all organisations are at risk (such as 
procurement and expense fraud), the report’s findings will have relevance to 
those in other economic sectors who have responsibility for the management of 
fraud. For the purposes of this study, central government activities are defined 
as “all communally provided goods and services that are paid for by taxation or 
other revenues raised by law” (Jones, 2004, p.23). 
Fraud is a subject that is constantly developing. To ensure that this research 
dealt with topical issues facing central government bodies, it was decided to 
focus primarily on the challenges they face in implementing the most recent 
initiatives instituted by the UK government to tackle fraud since 2010. 
Furthermore, to ensure currency with current issues, have relevance to the 
widest possible number of central government bodies, and give prominence to 
a less researched area of activity, this project excluded the management of the 
more specialist tax, benefit and immigration frauds. 
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Within the above context, central government faces a variety of organisational 
fraud risks that can be both external and internal to an organisation (Wright, 
2007, p.19). In addition to those posed by staff, fraud can be perpetrated by 
contractors, corporate partners, grant recipients, service users, third parties and 
organised crime. Consequently, if fraud is to be tackled effectively, central 
government organisations need to have the legal authority and skills to be able 
to deter and prevent fraud and, when it does occur, to detect in good time 
where this may be occurring and take appropriate investigative and other steps 
to deal with it. Civilian counter fraud activities, such as investigations, can be 
intrusive and thus should be subject to an appropriate degree of oversight. 
The aims of this research project are, therefore, to establish whether central 
government bodies have the powers, skills and regulation needed to tackle 
fraud effectively, by addressing four main objectives: 
(a) To identify the legal powers available to central government bodies and 
the likely effect on the management of fraud of any shortfalls; 
(b) To review the skills available to central government civilian counter fraud 
teams and the likely impact on the management of fraud of any 
shortfalls; 
(c) To assess whether changes to the current regulatory process over 
central government bodies’ civilian counter fraud teams are needed; and 
(d) To make recommendations for improvements to policy and practice. 
Outline of chapters 
The thesis is laid out as follows. Firstly, the literature review in chapter 2 
establishes the extent of the problems caused by fraud and the measures used 
within central government and elsewhere to tackle these. It concludes that 
effective counter fraud services are dependent upon having an appropriate 
legal framework and access to the skills needed. This chapter also concludes 
that there is scope for professionalising civilian counter fraud services further 
and for subjecting their activities to some form of regulation. 
Chapter 3 outlines the empirical research methodology and argues the case for 
a mixed methods approach. Primary research was focussed around a survey of 
all 32 counter fraud champions, for which there was a response rate of 50 per 
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cent, and a programme of semi-structured interviews with representatives of 26 
organisations drawn from three categories: counter fraud teams, the wider 
counter fraud community and policy and professional bodies. The chapter 
concludes with a section on how this research complied with the relevant ethical 
guidelines. 
Chapter 4 draws primarily on government documents, as well as other primary 
and secondary sources, to provide background information on the operation of 
civilian counter fraud services within the central government sector to give some 
context for the primary research results that follow. Specifically, it: gives an 
overview of counter fraud services within UK central government; notes the 
types of fraud perpetrated on central government (with examples); and outlines 
the UK Government’s current response to fraud. It also summarises the current 
legal, professional and regulatory environment within which UK central 
government civilian counter fraud investigators operate and concludes with a 
discussion on why further research into these areas is needed. 
Chapters 5 to 7 present the results of the primary research on a thematic basis. 
Chapter 5, on the legislative framework, concluded that the legislation 
supporting civilian counter fraud operations within central government is 
fragmented with many bodies having insufficient powers with which to deliver 
an effective counter fraud service. It is argued that this inhibits effective fraud 
investigation and undermines work undertaken to deter, detect and prevent 
fraud. 
Chapter 6 deals with those skills and competencies needed by civilian counter 
fraud staff. It concludes that many central government bodies do not have the 
skills and competencies needed and that some form of professionalisation is 
needed to deal with this. For this to work effectively, some interviewees 
reported that there needs to be a commonly understood list of counter fraud 
competencies, a base qualification for all working in this sector and the delivery 
of commonly accepted training routes. Key areas for development are risk 
assessment, tackling cyber crime and the further development of technical and 
legal knowledge. 
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Chapter 7 examines the need for the regulation and control over civilian counter 
fraud professionals. There was agreement, amongst most interviewees, that 
counter fraud teams should be subject to internal management control and be 
accountable to both audit committees and management boards. While two-
thirds of those interviewed were in favour of more external regulation of civilian 
counter fraud services, due to their potential to infringe civil liberties and inflict 
damage on the innocent, a third considered that self-regulation through internal 
management structures was more appropriate. 
Chapter 8 is the conclusion to the thesis. It summarises the research findings 
and concludes that significant changes to the way in which fraud is currently 
managed in central government bodies are needed. Considerable 
improvements can be made to provide a more workable legislative framework, 
promote and develop necessary skills in the civilian counter fraud workforce 
and improve the supervision and regulation of the sector. Ten key 
recommendations are presented, together with an assessment of the costs 
associated with their implementation. 
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Introduction 
This chapter examines the extent to which the research aims have been 
addressed by existing academic and other relevant literature. It begins with a 
brief overview of the literature search and selection strategy. Following this, it 
examines the nature of the problem, the activities employed by central 
government organisations to manage the fraud threat effectively and the extent 
to which these are dependent upon need for an appropriate legislative and skills 
infrastructure. Finally, it assesses the scope for the further professionalisation 
and regulation of civilian counter fraud activities within central government, and 
ends with a short discussion on the main findings. 
Literature search and selection strategy 
The search strategy that informed the literature review is outlined in Appendix 1. 
This strategy was based around a number of questions that needed to be 
answered in order to assess whether central government civilian counter fraud 
teams have the legal capacity and skills to deliver the programme of work set 
by the UK government for them in a measured and controlled manner. Initial 
research showed that the areas covered by these questions could be grouped 
into five key categories: 
(a) What is fraud ? 
(b) Who commits fraud and why? 
(c) How is fraud managed? 
(d) Should civilian counter fraud services be professionalised? and 
(e) Should civilian counter fraud services be regulated? 
These questions were further subdivided into more questions and from each 
defined question a number of key words were derived. These were then placed 
into a number of different search engines (for example Ebsco, Emerald, 
JSTOR, Nexis UK, Westlaw UK and Science Direct) provided by the University 
of Portsmouth, which are designed to scan a large number of bibliographic 
databases, of which the most important were defined in advance of the start of 
the search process. Use was also made of the Internet and a number of 
important websites were identified at the start of the literature review and 
searched for relevant material. Search engines, provided by both Google and 
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Google Scholar, were also used to identify relevant journal articles and other 
materials not covered by the University Library’s subscriptions. In addition to 
academic literature, government bodies and private companies have 
contributed significantly to recent research that has assessed the nature of the 
fraud problem within the UK and how this is dealt with.  A large number of 
reports, from all sectors of the UK economy, were therefore reviewed for 
relevant and up to date information on the delivery of counter fraud services by 
central government bodies. 
This search for relevant literature on fraud management uncovered a large 
amount of material that needed to be synthesised and collated together into a 
coherent thematically based review. However, there was less literature on the 
professionalisation or regulation of counter fraud professionals – in contrast with 
other professions such as teaching, healthcare and accounting. When 
undertaking this part of the literature review, therefore, the relevant literature on 
these professions was reviewed and then applied to a counter fraud context.  
What is fraud? 
This section of the literature review discusses what is meant by fraud to provide 
some contextual background to this thesis. The term fraud, which costs the UK 
economy £52 billion per year (NFA, 2013, p. 2), encompasses a large number 
of different crime types. These include bribery, false accounting, deception, 
corruption, collusion, insider dealing, forgery, counterfeiting, embezzlement, the 
improper use of intellectual property, tax evasion and offences under both the 
Companies and Insolvency Acts and the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 (HM Treasury, 2003, p.1; AGO, 2006, pp.23-24; Levi, Burrows, Fleming, & 
Hopkins, 2007, p.12; Fisher, 2010, p.8; NFA, 2013, p.2, p.8). The large number 
of offences covered by the term fraud have therefore led to a number of 
different definitions which range from the specific: acting dishonestly, through 
false representation, a failure to disclose information or an abuse of position, 
with the intention of making a gain for oneself or a loss for another (s. 2, s.3 and 
s.4 of Fraud Act 2006) to the generic: “any crime which uses deception as its 
main modus operandi” (Wells, 2011, p. 2).  
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Deciding on a suitable definition for white-collar crime, of which fraud can be 
considered a subset, is also problematic. Sutherland (1949), described fraud as 
“a white-collar crime committed by a person of respectability and high social 
status in the course of his occupation” (Sutherland, 1983, p. 7). However, this 
definition has been criticised on the basis that it:  
(a) Is vague and covers too broad a range of activities by, for example, 
including non-criminal acts such as “drinking on the job”, (Tappan, 1947, 
p.99; Friedrichs, 2002, p.243; Friedrichs, 2007, p.5); 
(b)  Is too restrictive in that it omits crimes undertaken outside a 
perpetrator’s employment (Edelhertz, 1970, p. 3);  
(c) Omits persons of lower social status who commit white-collar crimes, 
such as blue-collar workers and the middle classes, some of whom have 
high rates of recidivism (Clinnard & Quinney, 1967, p.131; Weisburd 
Chayet & Waring, 1990, p.353; Croall, 1992, pp. 9-10; Levi, 2014, pp. 
222-223);  
(d) Over simplifies white-collar crime, obscures its relationship with social 
organisation and omits the breach of trust associated with such 
criminality (Shapiro, 1990, pp.362-363); and 
(e) Omits societal attitudes to white-collar crime (Reed & Reed, 1974), 
which can impact on issues such as sanctions. 
What is clear, therefore, is that there is no agreed single definition of white-
collar crime or fraud. However, Edelhertz (1970, p. 4) argued that `’the 
character of white-collar crime must be found in its modus operandi and its 
objectives rather than the nature of the offenders” and thus focus on violations 
rather than violators. Shaprio (1990, p.363) concurred, defining white-collar 
crimes in terms of “their modus operandi and the ways in which they establish 
and exploit trust”.  
The breadth of opinion on what constitutes white-collar crime, the type and 
number of offences described as fraud, and the fact that both intent and 
deception are essential elements of fraud (Edelhertz, 1970, p. 12), militate 
towards a more generic definition for this term. Thus, the generic definition of 
fraud given by Wells (2011, p.2) “any crime which uses deception as its main 
modus operandi” has been used as the basis for this thesis. 
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Who commits fraud and why? 
Understanding the motivation (or mens rea) behind a crime is an essential part 
of fraud management. This is because the removal of those factors which have 
an influence on whether or not a crime is committed, for example a weak control 
environment, makes it more difficult for a crime to be committed (Gill & 
Goldstraw-White, 2012, p.20). Consequently, this section of the literature review 
briefly examines who commits fraud and why and, in doing so, provides some 
context for the later discussion on the effect of fraud and how this is managed.   
There has been a great deal of work on who commits fraud and why this 
occurs. Edelhertz (1970, pp.5-9), noted that vulnerability to white-collar crime 
and fraud is growing due to: rising levels of affuence which increase the number 
of potential victims; the move to faceless, rather than face-to-face, transactions; 
an increasingly complex society which is dependent upon regulation to protect 
the citizen; technical advances and the replacement of manual with  automated 
processes;  and the low visibility and high impact nature of white-collar crime.  
Button & Brooks (2009, p.231) note that the typical fraudster is male, aged 
between 36 and 55 and acts alone in committing a fraud against an employer 
for whom they have worked following six years of service. Two thirds are from 
top management although Wright (2007, p.21) notes that the threat from lower 
grade staff should not be underestimated. Edelhertz (1970, pp.19-20) goes 
further, noting that in addition to fraud committed by staff against their 
employers in the course of their occupation, white-collar crime can be 
committed by: organisations established for this purpose; by staff on behalf of 
the employing organisation in furtherance of its business objectives, rather than 
for personal gain; and by individuals external to an organisation, on a one-off or 
ad-hoc, basis. The reasons for fraudulent behaviour vary and include: 
unmanageable debts; blackmail; a search for status; boredom; a lack of life 
structure; temporary loss of balance or sanity; an organisational culture 
facilitating dishonesty; and the availability of opportunities (Gill, 2005, pp. 16-29; 
Gill, 2011, p.209).  
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Reflecting on more modern trends towards the public sector, Kemp (2010, 
p. 16) notes that fraud is likely to rise due to “recessionary fall out, continued 
cutbacks and the use of on-line services”. It is therefore important that fraud 
against the public sector, which the NFA (2013, p.8) estimate is costing £20.7 
billion per year in losses (Table 2.1), is tackled as quickly and efficiently as 
possible. 
Table 2.1: A breakdown of fraud committed against the UK public sector 
 £ billion 
Tax fraud 14.1 
Benefit fraud   1.9 
Fraud on central government   2.6 
Fraud on local government   2.1 
Total 20.7 
Note: The above estimates may understate the true value of fraud. For example, the estimate for local 
government excludes fraud in major services such as education and social care.  
(Cabinet Office, 2012, p.13; Audit Commission, 2014, p.9) 
The effect of fraud 
White-collar crime, including fraud, results in “vast economic and social harm” 
(Edelhertz, 1970, p.iii). The National Fraud Strategy therefore seeks to assess 
the harm caused by fraud using four key indicators: volumes of crime and 
financial loss; damage to public confidence; links to serious crime and systemic 
effects; and the impact on victims  (NFA, 2008, p.40).  
Assessing the volume of crime and financial loss attributable to fraud can be 
problematic (Edelhertz, 1970, p.9). Specific difficulties include: identifying if, and 
when, a crime has occurred; differing attitudes to fraud over the acceptability of 
certain types of behaviour; methodological issues including poor quality data 
sets; a failure to report to avoid embarrassment, upset external parties (such as 
shareholders) or expose serious control weaknesses; determining the total cost 
of fraud to an organisation, which can be as much as 14 per cent higher than 
initial losses; and an unwillingness to report colleagues (Mohammed, 2005, 
p.14; Shawyer & Walsh, 2007, pp.108-109; Doig & McCaulay, 2008, p.186; 
Fraud Advisory Panel, 2014, p.2). 
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Such difficulties need to be overcome, however, if management are to obtain a 
reliable assessment of their fraud risk. Such an assessment is essential as 
fraud (whether committed by managers or individuals) can lead to organisations 
being destroyed (e.g. Enron and Barings Bank) or, where this has not been the 
case, reputational damage, and financial loss (Button & Gee, 2013, pp.26-29).  
Button, Gee, & Brooks (2011, p.73) note that fraud and error losses to individual 
organisations are between 3 per cent and 9 per cent of total expenditure. 
However, a more recent review by Gee & Button (2015), which examined fraud 
losses identified by 382 loss measurement exercises conducted by 46 
organisations in nine countries between 1997 and 2013, assessed the loss to 
fraud to organisations to be between 0.02 and 22.1 per cent of total expenditure 
- with the average loss being 5.6 per cent (pp.4-5, p.9).  
In terms of public confidence, the UK Parliament expenses scandal illustrates 
the effect of fraud on public opinion. Martin (2014, p.1) notes that: 
Five years on, the row over what MPs can claim for travel and as living 
expenses when they are in London goes on. The after effects of the 
expenses crisis are still affecting the fortunes of the Government 
...."Expenses hang over this place" said a weary Tory MP last week. 
In terms of links to organised crime groups (OCGs), Gannon & Doig (2010, 
p.40), and Wright (2007, p.18), posit that these are behind a significant number 
of frauds whose purpose is to provide either personal enrichment or finance for 
other types of crimes such as terrorism. Unlike internal fraud, where the effect 
can be contained to losses suffered, external fraud has further costs that can 
have other effects (Watson, 2013). Watson (2013) notes that hacking, for 
example, can lead to data compromise and loss that may result in: regulatory 
penalties; legal action over compliance issues; a loss of reputation and 
customer confidence; and a loss of competitive edge. She cites, as an example, 
the case of the Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company which, following an 
external network breach in 2012, exposed 1.1 million people to identity fraud. In 
2011, the Cabinet Office concluded that “At least £9 billion of the £38 billion 
fraud losses in the 2011 NFA Annual Fraud Indicator is perpetrated by 
organised crime activity” and that “the organisers of fraud networks are often 
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violent criminals doing harm to our businesses, public services and 
communities” (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011b, p.10).   
Following interviews with fraud victims and counter fraud professionals, Button, 
McNaughton Nicholls, Kerr, & Owen (2014) noted that the growing prominence 
of the internet, ”has spawned multiple opportunities for frauds (and other 
crimes) to be perpetrated on an industrial scale” which has “created daily risks 
of victimisation to many people who previously would have been rarely openly 
targeted with such crimes” (pp.390-391). They also observed that, while 
individual losses were often small, the cumulative effect could be significant 
which, when coupled with limited law enforcement interest in discrete low value 
cases, made this activity particularly attractive to organised crime (p.400).  
Finally, the impact of fraud on individuals is significant. The Cabinet Office and 
NFA note that: 
The theft of taxpayers’ money on such a huge scale has a direct impact 
on reducing the resources that can be spent on frontline services. Every 
pound stolen from government means that there is less to spend on 
health, education, policing and defence (2011a, p.6). 
Moreover, the cost of fraud to individuals is not purely financial. Fraud in the 
private sector affects central government because the associated losses can 
lead to unemployment that, in addition to rising benefit costs, can significantly 
affect employees and their families. These effects include loss of income and 
self-esteem and a reduction in spending which adversely affects local business. 
It can also have a devastating effect on individuals, and particularly the 
vulnerable (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011b, p.6; Omerod, Ball & Morely, 2012, 
p.371). In one case, a fraud investigation against a professional, precipitated by 
a whistle blower, led to his career and reputation being damaged despite 
complete exoneration  (Baker, 2011, p.5; Hurrell, 2014).  
However, despite this, the investigation of fraud is less well researched than 
other forms of crime (Shawyer & Walsh, 2007, p.108). They attribute this to its 
non-violent nature and the perception that individual loss is not immediate and 
direct, so that it is often conceived as victimless.  
Professional	Doctorate	in	Security	and	Risk	Management																												Michael	Colin	Gilbert:	Student	440422	
August 2015 
						 Page 
 
26	
How is fraud managed? 
Fraud management, in both the public and private sectors, starts with effective 
corporate governance. Corporate governance can be defined as the means by 
which managers ensure that their employing organisation meet their objectives 
as efficiently and effectively as possible while remaining accountable to those to 
whom they ultimately report (Financial Reporting Council 2006, p. 5). The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2014), 
further notes that effective corporate governance should ensure that both 
strategic and operational risks are risks are understood, managed and 
communicated (p.7). 
Corporate failures, associated with financial misstatement and other forms of 
fraud, such as Polly Peck and Mirror Group Pensions, have led to an increased 
focus on corporate governance in the UK since the early 1990’s (Jones, 2004, 
p.35). This started with the Cadbury Report in 1992 and was followed by further 
work including: the Greenbury Committee Report (1995); the Hampel Report 
(1998); Turnbull’s guidance on internal control (1998); the Higgs Review (2003); 
and the Smith Review (2003) (The Institute of Chartered Accountants, 1999; 
Jones, 2004, pp.35-37; Financial Reporting Council, 2005; Financial Services 
Authority, 2009). In addition, the Major government established the Nolan 
Committee, in 1994, to look at standards in public life following allegations of 
sleaze in government (Jones, 2004, p.37). 
This activity led to the production of two key documents. The first, from the 
Nolan Committee, identified seven key principles of conduct for public service 
managers namely, selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, 
honesty and leadership (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 1995; Jones, 
2004, p.37). The second was the Combined Code of Corporate Governance 
which Kelly (2012) notes is a voluntary set of principles which guide how 
companies with a full listing on the London Stock Exchange should operate 
(p.394) and which “are used as a model for private and public sector 
organisations internationally” (ibid, p.397). This Code, which was first produced 
in 2003, has been regularly updated with the latest version being produced in 
2014 (Financial Reporting Council, 2014). 
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Corporate governance, in both the public and private sectors, centres on 
effective, but proportionate, checks and balances through: separating the roles 
of Chairman and Chief Executive; having an appropriate balance of both 
executive and non-executive directors on the board; strong and independent 
audit and remuneration committees; transparency in both appointments and 
remuneration; and annual reviews of how the organisation has performed 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2006). To make this process as visible as 
possible, public bodies are required to publish governance statements, which 
include this information, with their annual accounts (Home Office, 2014, p.60). 
The Fraud Advisory Panel (2014, p.1) notes that "Ultimate responsibility for 
fraud defences resides with the Governing body (the board). It needs to 
understand the risks and take measures to reduce them”. It goes on to say that, 
"as a matter of good corporate governance, the board must act in the best 
interests of the organisation by exercising due diligence and care to safeguard 
its assets, people and data". 
This due diligence, in terms of protecting an organisation from fraud, is realised 
through fraud risk management. Fraud risk can be defined as “the chance of a 
perpetrator (or perpetrators) committing a fraud which has an impact on the 
organisation” (Samociuk & Iyer, 2010, p.3). Fraud risk can be identified on two 
specific levels: at the organisational level and the departmental level. Risk 
management at an organisational level is commonly referred to as enterprise 
risk management; which has been described by Committee of Sponsoring 
Organisations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) as a process designed to 
provide reasonable assurance on the achievement of an entity’s objectives 
through the identification and management of potential risks and events 
(COSO, 2004, p. 2).  
As Slater & Brandel (2013) observe, enterprise risk management involves 
taking a holistic approach to all fraud and other risks to which an organisation 
may be exposed and assessing their potential impact on its overall reputational, 
financial and operational standing. This is in contrast to risk management at a 
department level where local managers will express risks relating to their 
individual part of operations such as credit management. Collating departmental 
risks to a single organisation-wide register does not, in itself, represent 
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enterprise risk management. Fraud risk assessments will usually involve asking: 
who can commit a fraud; what frauds can they commit; the motivations for 
committing the fraud; the means through which such frauds will be committed; 
and the opportunities for committing such fraud (Cave, 2012, pp.438-440). 
Managing fraud risk often involves: using a fraud typology to list all possible 
fraud types; the evaluation of the controls in place to manage each of these 
risks; an estimation of the likelihood and impact of each fraud type occurring; 
and deciding upon an appropriate management response to any remaining 
residual risk (Richards, Melancon, & Ratley, 2008, pp.18-26). In this context, a 
control can be defined as a policy, practice or act designed to manage risk 
(Information Systems Audit and Control Association, 1998, p.32; Giles, 2012, 
p.161). Table 2.2 gives an example of a fraud typology for pay and allowances 
and lists risks that must be controlled if fraud in this area is to be minimized.  
Table 2.2: A fraud typology for a business function 
Irregularities relating to pay and allowances 
These frauds often involve payment via the payroll process. For example: 
• The creation of “fictitious employees”; 
• Bogus documentation supporting applications for employment; 
• The diversion of salary and other payments to the wrong bank account; 
• The deliberate falsification of a salary in payroll records; 
• Claims for time not worked; 
• False claims for overtime and other allowances; and 
• The deliberate failure to repay salary advances or overpayments.  
(Source: Richards et al., 2008) 
What constitutes an appropriate management response to fraud risk will be 
driven by an organisation’s fraud risk appetite. This specifies the level of fraud 
that will be tolerated in order for business objectives to be achieved (Richards et 
al., 2008, pp. 19-22). The assessment of what fraud risk appetite is appropriate 
to a particular organisation is driven by their assessment of the size of loss, and 
reputational impact, should a fraud risk crystalize. Gee & Button (2015) note 
that fraud needs to be measured and controlled like any other business cost 
and that it is currently “one of the great unreduced business costs” of which a 
principal reason is measurement issues (p.3).  
Button & Gee 2013 (p.16) note that effective measurement is essential if 
management are to determine the type and level of resource needed to tackle 
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fraud, target this to the areas of greatest need and track progress in loss 
reduction. Button et al. (2011, p.66, pp.68-69) concluded that the most accurate 
measures of fraud arise out of fraud risk exercises that examine a statistically 
selected sample of transactions and then extrapolate the results of this 
examination to the relevant expenditure population. They note that following the 
completion of these exercises, which include payroll, procurement, transport 
and construction, fraud and error rates have been notably reduced. 
Fraud is controlled through procedures to detect, investigate, deter, sanction 
and prevent fraud (Button & Gee, 2013, p.6, p.63; Tunley, Whittaker, Gee, & 
Button, 2015, p.9). These are articulated in the fraud management model 
described in Figure 2.1 (Furlan & Bajec, 2008, p.99). The next section of this 
literature review examines what these may mean for public service 
organisations. 
How is fraud detected? 
To tackle with fraud effectively, and reduce resulting losses, it needs to be 
detected promptly. Fraud is hidden, and not immediate in impact, and thus 
needs activities to search for it when it occurs (Edelhertz, 1970, p.1; Giles, 
2012, p.244). There are three main ways to detect fraud: complaints; 
informants; and proactive searches for fraudulent transactions (Edelhertz, 1970, 
p.23). Each of these is discussed briefly in this section. 
One of the most common methods of detecting fraud is through complaints that 
are often manifested through the use of informants and whistleblowers. The 
difference between the two is that the former are implicated in some way in the 
allegations they make, whereas the latter are not (Friedrichs, 2007, p.18). Many 
organisations have both internal and external arrangements for dealing with 
whistleblowers (Tickner, 2010, p.310). Whistleblowing in the UK is covered by 
the Public Disclosure Act 1998 and a Code of Practice (British Standards 
Institute, 2008) and can be to an external body, senior management or to a 
specialist department. The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 provides 
protection for whistleblowers provided that they have acted in the public interest 
and not for personal gain (Tickner, 2010, p. 310). A charity called Public 
Concern at Work exists to advise individuals on whistleblowing dilemmas at
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work, support organisations with their whistle blowing arrangements and inform 
public policy and seek legal change (Public Concern at Work, 2015). 
Whistleblowers and informants are unlikely to be aware of all frauds within their 
organisations. Frauds not reported through these channels can be difficult to 
detect. This is principally because the perpetrators are often subject experts 
who take steps to cover it up and display behaviours which are compliant with 
accepted social norms when committing crime (Knapp & Knapp, 2001, p.26; 
Weisburd et al., 2001, p.146). Other reasons for difficulties in detecting fraud 
are: a lack of access to the skills, resources and time needed; potential conflicts 
of interest where senior managers are involved; under reporting; and the 
deceptive nature of fraud which may lead to a failure to recognise that a fraud 
has occurred at the point of inception (Button 2011, p.259; Krambia-Kapardis, 
2002, pp.266-267; Levi & Burrows, 2008, p.304, p.312, p.314; NFA, 2012, 
p.25). To deal with this, organisations proactively search for fraud (Button & 
Gee, 2013, pp.107-110). These proactive searches can take three forms: audit; 
the operation of controls; and the use of the routines to detect pre-defined 
transactions and anomalies.  
Audit can take two basic forms. External, the primary purpose of which is to 
provide an opinion on an organisation’s financial statements, and internal, the 
primary purpose of which is to check the operation of an organisation’s internal 
control systems (Matsumura & Tucker, 1992; Knapp & Knapp, 2001, p.27; 
Krambia-Kapardis, 2002; Financial Reporting Council, 2010, p. 3; Hutchison, 
2012, p. 411, p.413). While external auditors must have regard to any frauds 
that may have a material effect on the financial statements, internal audit has a 
greater role in the detection of fraud. This is because it has: a more in-depth 
knowledge of corporate procedures and information systems; is an obvious 
point of reference for whistleblowers; and is concerned with helping 
management implement effective corporate governance arrangements and deal 
with financial and reputational risk (Krambia-Kapardis, 2002, p.267; Kuhn & 
Sutton, 2006, p.76; Tickner, 2010, p.205; Hutchinson, 2012, p.411, p.413). 
Matsumura & Tucker (1992, p.754, p.777) found that; audit testing and 
detection deterred fraud; a lack of testing encouraged fraud; and that the higher 
the incidence of detected fraud the greater the testing levels. Consequently, 
Professional	Doctorate	in	Security	and	Risk	Management																												Michael	Colin	Gilbert:	Student	440422	
August 2015 
						 Page 
 
32	
surprise audits are often effective means of detecting and deterring fraud (Giles, 
2012, p.228). 
The continuous operation of controls also acts a means of deterring and 
detecting fraud. The most common forms of control used for this purpose are: 
“reconciliations, independent reviews, physical inspections and stock counts, 
variance analysis and audits” (Giles, 2012, p.224). However, while risks tend to 
be dynamic, controls are static and, for controls to have their maximum 
deterrent and detection effect, they must be effectively designed, in continuous 
operation and regularly reviewed (Giles, 2012, p. 25, p.158). 
Proactive routines to search for anomalous transactions include association 
rules; rule based detection; anomaly detection through data sharing, data 
matching and data mining; social network analysis; and the use of advanced 
analytics (Kemp, 2010, p.18; Tackett, 2013, p.15; Button & Gee, 2013, pp. 107-
110). However, different detection systems may be needed for different types of 
fraud. This can mean that they: can be expensive to implement and maintain; 
be difficult to operate as each has its own parameters, procedures, interfaces 
and features; and have metrics which can give conflicting results. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of the chosen detection method depends not only on the skill of 
individuals to interpret the results correctly (Knapp & Knapp, 2001, p.27), but 
also on an understanding of the techniques themselves and the underlying data 
(Spann, 2014, pp.8-9). 
Krambia-Kapardis (2002, pp. 267-268) notes, for example, that red flags, such 
as an employee displaying sudden and unexpected wealth, do not, in 
themselves, indicate the presence of fraud, merely that the conditions that 
facilitate it exist. To misinterpret such flags could not only lead to wasted effort 
and investigation cost, but also to reputational damage to those investigated. 
This in turn could lead to litigation and lost business thereby lessening their 
attractiveness. Krambia-Kapardis (2002) also makes the point that, while these 
flags raise awareness of fraud conditions and provide structure to the detective 
process, they can divert attention from other types of information that may 
indicate fraud (p. 268, p.271). This is because the output from such routines 
often contains high levels of “false positive” anomalies that, if acted on 
inappropriately, can bring such systems into disrepute. False positives are 
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particularly problematic for businesses where the incidence of fraud is low 
compared to total transaction costs and for these organisations, therefore, there 
may be a disincentive to invest in such technologies (Cahill, Lambert, Pinheiro, 
& Sun, 2002, p.3, pp.13-14). 
Thus, different models to improve fraud detection have been developed. 
Krambia-Kapardis (2002, pp. 270-271) developed the Eclectic Fraud Detection 
(EFD) model. This, she believed, would overcome the deficiencies of the earlier 
models by combining rationalisation, opportunity, psychological, sociological 
and criminological theories about criminal behaviour with feedback from 
auditing experience. The outcomes of the model are fed into a knowledge 
development process used to train staff and construct more complex tools and 
search engine rules thereby creating a virtuous circle. Indeed, HM Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) have used an automated detection tool, called the Fraud and 
Error Assessment System Tool (FEAST), to good effect when detecting 
anomalies in tax credit applications (Cabinet Office, 2012, p. 14).  
Vasarhelyi & Halper (1991) went further and developed a Continuous 
Processing Audit Methodology (CAPM) that captures continuous real time data 
to detect anomalies and inform the testing regime (p.114). Kuhn & Sutton 
(2006, p. 68) argue that this improves the focus and scope of fraud detection by 
focussing on three important issues: measurement, monitoring and analysis. 
This focus will: aid deterrence, as these are activities that internal audit will 
undertake routinely; improve governance; and provide cost savings since 
external audit fees can be considerably reduced as a resullt (Audit Commission, 
1996; Audit Commission, 2002).	
What does a civilian fraud investigation involve? 
Once detected, fraud needs to be investigated. An investigation can be defined 
as "cracking unsolved crime, identifying perpetrators, launching prosecutions, 
proving guilt at trial and bringing offenders to justice" (Roberts, 2007, p.95). Yet, 
this definition is incomplete as investigation also includes “victim and witness 
care, community reassurance, intelligence gathering, crime reduction, disruption 
of criminal networks and asset recovery" (Stelfox, 2009, p.17).  
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Civilian investigations include: case management; interviews; the search for, 
and seizure of, evidence; technical support; intelligence and information 
handling; and the preparation of files for police and CPS use (Doig, 2006, 
pp.192-193; Jolly, 2012, pp.143-145). The use of these activities is controlled 
through legislation of which the most prominent are: the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984; the Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act 1996; the 
Human Rights Act 1998; the Data Protection Act 1998; the Regulation of 
Investigation Powers Act 2000; the Telecommunications (Lawful Business 
Practice) (Interception of Communications) Regulations 2000; and the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Doig, 2006, pp.190-191; Armstrong, 2012, p.284; 
Barnes, 2012, pp.125-130; Trumper, 2012, pp.96-99). These acts are designed 
to govern the conduct of anyone charged with conducting investigations and 
therefore apply to both law enforcement and civilian investigators (Doig, 2006, 
p.192). Guile (2012, p.191) notes that a failure to comply with these statutory 
provisions can lead to an investigation having to be discontinued. 
The span of investigative activity, and its governing laws, require an often 
expensive, supporting infrastructure without which civilian investigators may 
struggle to meet their legal responsibilities. For example, the Fraud Advisory 
Panel (2011) note that the evidence collected in a fraud investigation can be 
vast and amount to “millions of gigabytes and roomfuls of paper and racks of 
lever arch files” (p.2). This can make the disclosure provisions laid down by the 
Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act 1996 difficult to apply. Similarly, 
appropriate facilities are needed to preserve continuity of evidence and may 
involve the custody of documents; physical objects (such as computers); 
interview records and transcripts; photographs; CCTV; electronic data; witness 
statements; contracts; telephone records; and e-mails (Jolly, 2012, p. 149).  
Controlling investigator conduct is important as their enquiries can be intrusive 
and infringe on the civil liberties of those involved. Jones (2004) noted that 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights specifies the right to 
privacy. Investigations, and particularly those involving surveillance, can intrude 
on this privacy and activities that encroach on this may be actionable in law. 
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 RIPA was put in place by the 
UK government to provide legal sanction “to what would otherwise be 
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challengeable investigatory practices” and provide a balance between respect 
for human rights and the need to investigate allegations effectively (p.13).  
Doig (2006, p.195) concludes “the issue of good practice – usually emulating 
that of a criminal investigation – is vital should the client or organisation choose 
to engage with the police at any time during an investigation”. Consequently, 
civilian investigations should be guided by an investigations manual which 
should cover issues such as: the production of written reports; informant 
handling; surveillance; searches; operational briefings; without prejudice 
payments; evidence handling and storage; safety; the interviewing of suspects 
and witnesses; constructing a prosecution file for use by the police and CPS; 
and the use of investigator notebooks (Jolly, 2010, pp.143-145).  
Is the current legislative framework conducive to tackling detected fraud? 
The only powers reserved for law enforcement are search, arrest and detention 
(AGO, 2006, p.143) and therefore civilian counter fraud teams have the 
potential to utilise a wide range of powers to investigate fraud. The NFA (2008, 
p.49) consider that fraud management in England and Wales has a solid legal 
foundation and that “It is essential the appropriate powers to prosecute fraud 
cases are placed with those best placed to apply them effectively and that 
necessary collaborative arrangements are in place” (Herdan, 2009, p. 20).  
Other research arrives at an alternative conclusion. Middleton (2005) notes the 
importance of investigative powers such as entry, search, arrest and 
compulsory questioning in the context of a fraud investigation and observes that 
their absence to civilian investigators may inhibit the ability to uncover 
“evidence of wrong doing” (p.829). However, he questions whether it is 
appropriate to provide quasi police powers to non-state agencies for both 
constitutional and regulatory reasons. He concludes that the use of such 
powers by civilians can be counter-productive if seen as oppressive (p.829). 
Similarly, the NFA (2011c) observed that local authorities lack the powers to 
investigate non-benefit fraud and do not have powers of search, seizure, and 
entry to premises, suggesting that access to some reserved powers is being 
questioned (p.11). Such limitations can have a significant and adverse effect on 
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investigation success rates, as document acquisition and examination are 
crucial to fraud enquiries. 
Consequently, there is a potential gap in the powers available to civilian counter 
fraud bodies that can prevent the timely and effective response to fraud – a 
conclusion supported by other research. In a survey of central government 
counter fraud teams, Button, Frimpong, Johnston & Smith (2009, p.35) found 
that, of 133 respondents, 26 did not possess any special legal powers to 
undertake their role, nine had such powers and four did not know. The 
remainder declined to comment on this issue. Research by the Fraud Advisory 
Panel (2011, p.4) confirms this finding. It shows that fraud is investigated by the 
HMRC, the National Health Service (NHS), the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) and the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), all of whom have 
different statutory frameworks and duties and thus powers. This supports the 
conclusion by Doig & Levi (2013, p.145) that “the institutional and legislative 
landscape is fragmented” which can inhibit collaborative working, the detection 
of the full extent of the fraud and thus the recovery of all sums owing (Doig & 
McCaulay, 2008, p.189; Fisher, 2010, p. 1,  p.4). 
How effective is the current investigative response to fraud? 
Such a fragmented institutional and legal landscape has significant implications 
for tackling fraud. The widespread effect of fraud has led the UK government to 
call for partnerships between law enforcement and others to tackle fraud. It 
sees stronger collaboration as a strength of the current arrangements (Cabinet 
Office & NFA, 2011b, p.7, p.14). Such an approach is consistent with that taken 
by the NFA (2008, p.15, p.17, p.21) and the Fraud Review Final Report which 
stated that “a multi agency approach encompassing both private and public 
sector organisations is required to establish an effective approach to counter 
fraud” which would have a strong deterrent effect (AGO, 2006, p.291). 
This may explain why, Button (2011, pp. 249-250) observes that few crimes 
have as many investigative bodies as fraud. In addition to the police, the 
Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) (now the National Crime 
Agency), the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) (now the Financial Conduct Authority) and the OFT, there are many 
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corporate fraud departments and private firms investigating fraud. The large 
number of bodies involved, coupled with the turbulence faced through 
organisational change such as closures (Audit Commission), mergers (SOCA), 
and reorganisations (corporate teams), creates doubt about the stability of the 
response to fraud and thus its capability and effectiveness. Button (2011) 
concludes that, despite its large cost to society, fraud is dealt with by 
fragmented organisations with varying degrees of competence and resilience 
which leads to differential justice (pp. 263-264). 
Lane (2011, p.201) posits that a co-operative approach between law 
enforcement and civilians is possible. Although civilians and the police have 
differing approaches to investigations, with the former being offence focussed 
and the latter suspect focussed, both types of investigation have much in 
common. They each gather intelligence on accepted cases, interview suspects 
in accordance with the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and preserve 
evidential continuity. In addition, both separate intelligence from investigations, 
employ trained and qualified staff, use credit reference and other publically 
available data, record their investigations in a computerised case management 
system and utilise interview rooms and evidence storage (NHS Counter Fraud 
Service, 2007; Shawyer & Walsh, 2007, p.105; Lane, 2011, p.202; Barnes, 
2012, p.130).  
However, despite these similarities, such collaboration has been problematic. 
The Fraud Review Final Report noted a number of barriers to collaborative 
fraud investigation which included: the diversity of bodies involved and their 
approaches; problems with quantifying fraud losses; a varying capability to deal 
with fraud; and the continuing decline in police resources. These disparities 
have led to an inconsistent response, limited economies of scale, differing 
flexibility in applying proportionate penalties and the absence of the means to 
target resources to areas of greatest need (AGO, 2006, pp.130-131; Doig & 
McCaulay, 2008, pp.190-191; Doig & Levi, 2009, pp.201-203). Furthermore, 
pressure to focus on: domestic cases; differences in legal powers; the lack of a 
critical mass in key skill areas; and differences in civil and prosecution 
procedures, also militate against inter agency co-operation and need political 
will to resolve (Gannon & Doig, 2010, pp.206-210). 
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A decline in the police resource to tackle fraud adds further to the pressures on 
effective collaborative working. Gannon & Doig (2010, pp.50-51) found that 
between 1998 and 2008, the number of fraud squads within 15 surveyed forces 
had fallen from 15 to two. The Fraud Advisory Panel (2011, p.2) further noted 
that police resources dedicated to fraud outside the City of London continue to 
decline. Competing pressures for scarce police resources, which have seen a 
20 per cent reduction in real terms between 2010-11 and 2014-15, has meant 
that there is still a limited police capacity to deal with reported fraud (Doig & 
Levi, 2013, p.148).  
However, following a series of Freedom of Information requests sent in 2013 to 
police forces in the UK, Button, Blackbourn and Tunley (2014) concluded that 
the police resource available for fraud and economic crime was greater than 
previously thought. Of the 48 constabularies that responded to these requests, 
only seven reported that they did not have an economic crime unit. The total 
resources dedicated to fraud and economic crime were estimated to be 703 
police officers and 280 specialist civilian staff which represented 0.27 per cent 
of total identified police resource. Despite this improvement, they nevertheless 
concluded that: 
police personnel dedicated to fraud/economic crime does seem 
rather thin, particularly when a force almost four times as big as the 
total specialist fraud/economic crime is dedicated to benefits fraud, 
which according to the National Fraud Authority’s last annual fraud 
indicator amounted to only £1.9 billion of a £52 billion fraud 
problem (p. 13). 
This is likely to present issues going forward for civilian counter fraud teams as 
the police have discretion about which cases they will investigate (Barnes 2012, 
p.122). Take up of reported cases by the police is low. The Deputy Mayor of 
London observed that, from a total of 81,631 reported cases to the National 
Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) in 2013-14, only 758 were deemed solvable 
and, of these, only 177 were referred to the police for investigation – of which 
nine led to a prosecution (Davenport, 2014, p.2).  
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Factors that will influence this decision include: the sums of money involved; the 
impact of such frauds and particularly the vulnerable; frauds committed by 
professionals and senior managers; frauds with a substantial impact or are part 
of a wider fraud; the extent to which organisations have appropriate crime 
prevention measures in place; and whether the fraud meets current police 
priorities (Home Office, 2004, p.3; Barnes, 2012, p.121).  However, such 
filtering is not new or confined to the UK. Edelhertz (1970, p.29) noted in his 
review of white-collar crime in the US, “it is not unusual for a complainant to be 
told [by the police] that he must come back with the evidence to support his 
charge and that allegations are not enough”. There is, therefore, a need for 
public sector departments and agencies to assume responsibility for tackling 
fraud and, in so doing, take on a quasi-law enforcement or investigation role 
(Doig & McCaulay, 2008, p.187). 
Do sanctions and recoveries through redress effectively deter fraud? 
Goldstraw-White (2011, p.9) posited, “one area that has been severely affected 
in the study of white-collar crime is the issue of losses”. Losses, she argues are 
not confined to victims. Those that fraudsters have to consider include a 
forfeiture of: liberty through imprisonment; social standing; professional status; 
money; and reputation. She noted, however, that few fraudsters considered the 
losses suffered by their victims. "Instead, mention of victims appeared to 
intimate more concern about who they would, or would not, consider committing 
crimes against“ (p.199). Where there was an element of remorse, and 
restitution, it was unclear whether this was genuine or driven by a desire to 
impress the courts to receive a lower sentence (p.195).  
Consequently, it is important that victims can look to others to ensure that 
fraudsters receive both an appropriate penalty and make effective restitution. 
Given that fraud is a criminal offence, it is reasonable to assume that most 
offenders would be dealt with by the criminal courts. However, a survey by 
Bussman & Werle (2007, p.1139) reported that only 51 per cent of fraudsters 
were charged in the criminal courts. There seems to be no sign of this situation 
being reversed. The NFA (2012, p.25) noted that fraud does not always lead to 
effective sanctions, a conclusion supported by the Price WaterhouseCoopers 
Global Economic Crime Survey (2011). This noted that four per cent of victims 
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did nothing, four per cent moved the individual to other duties and 18 per cent 
gave their employees a warning (p.23). This may be because there is no 
conclusive evidence that prosecution is seen as a deterrent to fraud (Shawyer & 
Walsh, 2007, pp.103-104).  Indeed, Tickner (2010, p. 288) notes:  
Criminal cases are rarely successful. For every high profile 
prosecution and conviction there are a whole mountain that never got 
past the Crown Prosecution Service when the police submitted the 
paperwork.  
Other reasons for not prosecuting crime through the criminal courts are: the fact 
that fraud is more difficult to prove than negligence; a victim focus on cost 
recovery rather than criminal sanction; the fact that proof of fraud can invalidate 
the insurance cover of the defendant thereby reducing the funds available for 
recovery; and the reputational damage, and associated costs, that can be 
associated by the publicity generated by a criminal trial (AGO, 2006; Shawyer & 
Walsh, 2007, pp.108-109; Middleton, 2012, p.59). Croall (1992, p.170) also 
notes that fraud and other white-collar crimes may not be seen as such and 
thus there is less focus on “issues of just desserts”.  Consequently, where an 
individual within an organisation has committed a fraud, employers often prefer 
to deal with the issue privately than risk public exposure (Brooks, Button, & 
Frimpong, 2009, p.501). Therefore, a range of sanctions are employed, outside 
of the criminal justice system, which include internal disciplinary action, 
suspension, dismissal, closure of accounts, notification to credit reference and 
other agencies and the recovery of assets.  
The penalties available for fraud offences may also act as a disincentive to 
prosecution. Fisher (2010, p.2) observes that penalties in the US are 30 times 
those in the UK. The Fraud Review Final Report came to a similar conclusion 
noting that the average sentence for fraud involving £1 million or more was 
three years imprisonment, less than for other types of acquisitive crimes of a 
similar value. The review also noted that the maximum sentence for fraud was 
ten years, four years less than that for money laundering (AGO, 2006, p.12).  
Fisher (2010) concludes that, for corporate bodies, there is a strong argument 
for pursuing financial remedies through the civil courts to avoid the cost of a 
criminal trial, if the offender admits the offence. Furthermore, the imposition of a 
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significant penalty inflicts a degree of punishment and is seen to act as a 
deterrent to others (pp.5-6). 
The civil law can present an attractive alternative to prosecution. It: has a lower 
standard of proof than criminal prosecutions; has a better chance of loss 
recovery; allows for a higher level control over the case; offers a range of 
outcomes options rather than just prosecutions; has more flexible rules relating 
to the admission of evidence; is quicker than a criminal case to bring to 
conclusions; and allows for pre-trial settlement and cost recovery. However, this 
route is also not without its problems. The cost of bringing a civil action can be 
expensive and especially if the case is lost and the other side's costs have to be 
paid. There is also: little opportunity for community penalties and rehabilitation, 
no punitive element outside financial recovery of losses; more work for the 
civilian investigator; and it may not be as good a deterrent as a criminal 
prosecution (Tunley et al., 2015, pp.209-211). 
Criminal and civil proceedings are not necessarily mutually exclusive and can 
be taken together although civil claims have to be pursued separately from the 
criminal process. Indeed, proving guilt or innocence in one set of proceedings 
"need not necessarily compromise the ability also to prove guilt in the other" 
(Phillips, 2012, p.82). However, the cost of civil proceedings, which need 
specialist legal and forensic support, can be expensive - sometimes costing in 
excess of £100,000. This needs to be weighed against expected recoveries  
(Phillips, 2012, pp.82 - 83). 
In conjunction with criminal and civil proceedings, organisations can use the 
discipline route to deal with staff found to have committed fraud. However, 
when doing so, investigators need to ensure that the timing of any action 
against staff does not compromise other routes. For example, hasty suspension 
could tip off those involved and compromise an investigation; and it may be 
necessary to delay any disciplinary action until any associated court action is 
completed. Thus any decision to pursue either a sole or parallel sanction route 
needs an effective control structure for this type of work (Phillips, 2012, p.83) 
Lewis, Brooks, Button, Shepherd, & Wakefield (2014) argued that victims of 
fraud should also make more use of private prosecutions under s.6 of the 
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Prosecutions Act 1985, for which there are precedents elsewhere (for example 
animal welfare, intellectual property and copyright). This is particularly pertinent 
where the police have declined to pursue a case, for example due to its 
technicality and complexity, because it increases the likelihood of justice for the 
victim and because the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) can take the case 
over if they deem that this is in the public interest (Lewis et al., 2014, pp.6-9).  
However, while the commission of a private prosecution can have advantages, 
for example re-igniting police interest in a case and cost recovery, it carries 
risks. Such prosecutions can be expensive to mount (in some cases in excess 
of £1 million) and can alienate both the CPS and the police. There is also a risk 
that poor quality cases will be brought before the courts and that core law 
enforcement principles, for example the separation of investigators from 
prosecutors, could be eroded. However, in the absence of police and CPS 
capacity to meet the needs of fraud victims, they conclude that, on balance, 
private prosecutions have a role to play in the management of fraud provided 
that appropriate safeguards are in place (Lewis et al., 2014, pp.12-14). 
Counter fraud investigations that conclude that a suspect has a case to answer 
are therefore taken forward with a view to management or a court imposing an 
appropriate sanction where the case is accepted as proven to the required 
standard. s.142 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 states that: 
“any court dealing with an offender in respect of his offence must 
have regard to the following purposes of sentencing: 
(a) The punishment of offenders; 
(b) The reduction of crime (including its reduction by 
deterrence); 
(c) The reform and rehabilitation of offenders; 
(d) The protection of the public; and 
(e) The making of reparation by offenders to persons affected 
by their offences.” 
 
Professional	Doctorate	in	Security	and	Risk	Management																												Michael	Colin	Gilbert:	Student	440422	
August 2015 
						 Page 
 
43	
Compensation for loss can be through compensation and confiscation orders 
made by the courts following conviction. Indeed, under the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002, a court is required to judge whether or not to make a confiscation 
order if a frauster has made a financial beenfit from their actions. Restitution 
orders for losses incurred can also be issued under s.148 of the Powers of 
Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 to which s.130 of this Act adds the 
award of compensation where an offence has led to personal injury loss and 
damage. Furthemore, to protect assets which can be made avilable for redress 
to the defrauded, an application can be made to a court to prevent a defendant 
dealing with their assets under s.71 of the Criminal Justice Act 1977, (Smith, 
Button, Johnston, & Frimpong, 2011, pp.117-118). 
Other forms of redress can be through civil and regulatory penalties provided 
that the relevant legislation provides the necessary legal authority to levy these. 
For example, the NHS are able, under the National Health Service Act 1977, as 
amended by the Health Act 1999, to levy penalties of up to 5 times the 
recoverable amount, on patients fraudulently claiming financial assistance, up 
to a maximum of £100. Regulatory bodies also levy fines and other forms of 
redress for those defrauded without recourse to the courts (Smith et al., 2011, 
p.118). Smith et al. (2011, pp. 128-129), also note that the FSA, HMRC and the 
Department for Business, Industry and Skills (BIS), have a variety of 
mechanisms to enforce compliance with their rules and to fine those who 
undertake technical violations. They cite the example of OFCOM, the 
telecommunications regulator, who fined television companies £3.5 million, up 
to February 2008, for abuse of premium rate telephone lines. 
How can fraud be deterred? 
Fraud detection and investigation can be expensive and time consuming; as 
can the levying of sanctions on those found to have committed this offence 
(Giles, 2012, p.192; Tunley et al., 2015, p.210). Smith et al. (2011, p.91), note 
that “deterrence is an important part of a prevention strategy” and that two of 
the most powerful deterrents are fear of getting caught and the likely 
punishment. Giles (2012) concurs, stating that deterrence is “the modification of 
behaviour by the threat of sanctions” and that the detection, investigation and 
sanctioning of fraudulent acts will act as a disincentive to fraud (p.224). 
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Furthermore, to maximise the deterrent effect, detected and investigated frauds 
should be publicised to discourage others from copying such behaviours (Smith 
et al., 2011, p. 91; Giles, 2012, p. 235).  
Giles (2012), identified four further ways to enhance the deterrence factor – 
which are surprise audits, including fraud related issues as a part of routine 
audit enquiries, on-going surveillance and monitoring and the enforcement of 
organisational policies through strong controls (pp.228-234). An issue of key 
importance is an understanding of the link between risk and controls (Jones, 
2004, pp. 50-54; Green, 2012, p.375). Those thinking of committing fraud must 
realise that any fraudulent activity will be detected through well designed and 
continuously operating controls and be subject to a robust response (Giles, 
2012, p.158, p.226). 
Fraud deterrence has much in common with fraud prevention. The design and 
implementation of controls to manage fraud (and other) risk, and the 
implementation of an appropriate fraud awareness culture, form part of the 
fraud prevention process. This is therefore considered in more depth below.  
How can fraud be prevented? 
Effective fraud prevention is an integral part of effective corporate governance 
because it minimises the risk of both financial loss and costs associated with 
dealing with fraud. Indeed, Giles (2012) notes that “many more organisations 
today understand that it is better for their reputations and their bank balances to 
take a more proactive stance against fraud” (p.192). The Fraud Review Final 
Report agrees stating that, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” 
(AGO, 2006, p.8). Thus, current central government policy is to place an 
increasing focus on prevention activity (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011a, p.4).  
However, despite this increased focus, Davis & Pesch (2013, p. 469) observe 
that, with the exception of the deterring role of audits, more research was 
needed to examine the effectiveness of various prevention mechanisms. The 
results of their modelling to address this suggest that, while the level of social 
influence has an effect on fraud levels, they found that fraud was reduced by 
effective sanctions (for example the termination of fraudsters ‘contracts of 
employment) and by an appropriate “tone at the top” (pp. 480-481).  
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Cave (2012, p.441) notes that without an appropriate tone at the top there is 
little incentive for staff to act with integrity and that the organisation “becomes 
reliant on the high moral standards of individual employees”. The Bingham 
enquiry into corruption at the Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
demonstrated the importance of this. It noted the dominance of one individual in 
the management of the bank’s affairs and commented that former staff now 
working for a different bank had told their current managing director that they 
were “not at all surprised by recent revelations and that there was certainly 
justification for them” (Great Britain, 1992, p.36, p.62).  Wright (2007), noting 
BCCI’s autocratic environment, “where neither workers nor firms were willing to 
voice concerns”, recommends that organisations have clear whistle blowing 
policies that encourage staff and others to report “corrupt, crooked or 
dangerous practices in confidence” (p.26). Such policies, Lines (2012) argues, 
should be complemented by a fraud response plan that articulates who is 
responsible for what to ensure that tipping off does not occur and that evidence 
is not compromised through inappropriate action (p.275). 
Consequently, Button & Brooks (2009, p.230) posit that one of the most 
prominent areas for improvement in organisations’ counter fraud prevention 
strategies is the creation of an anti-fraud culture. This is designed to lay down 
clear standards of ethical behaviour for staff, contractors and others to follow. 
These procedures are implemented through: robust pre-employment vetting; 
job rotation and mandatory holidays; anti-fraud policy statements and response 
plans; training courses, awareness events; employee support programmes, 
internal control reviews and continuous professional education (Button & 
Brooks, 2009, p.232; Giles, 2012, pp.205-220; Tunley et al., 2015, p.9).  
A well developed anti-fraud culture has a number of key advantages. In addition 
to acting as a deterrent to fraud it: leads to cost savings as fraud is cheaper to 
prevent than deal with; pays for itself through loss reduction and recovery; 
ensures that employees are more likely to recognise and report fraud; sets an 
appropriate moral tone for the organisation; reduces the risks of certain types of 
fraud being perpetrated; and generates information about current and potential 
frauds which allows for early intervention (Tickner, 2010, p. 308; Fraud Advisory 
Panel, 2014, p. 1). However, obtaining funds to achieve this can be problematic 
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as it is difficult to demonstrate the value in preventing something from 
happening. Metrics and other procedures therefore need to be in place to reveal 
the benefits of a robust counter fraud culture (Button & Gee, 2013, pp.145-163; 
Fraud Advisory Panel, 2014, p.1). 
Nevertheless, Brooks et al. (2009, p.495) found that in the organisations they 
surveyed, the implementation of those measures needed to achieve an anti-
fraud culture, was inconsistent. For example, only 27 out of the 32 
organisations undertook a fraud risk assessment, 26 had a counter fraud 
champion, 18 had a counter fraud strategy and only 14 provided training for 
their counter fraud staff.  This research shows that there is clearly a need for 
some industry wide standards to promote both consistency of approach and 
service quality (Brooks et al., 2009, pp. 498-499, p.503). 
This can have a serious effect on the level of fraud committed against an 
organisation. Marcus (1995), writing on the propensity to commit fraud, notes a 
phenomenon called the “10:80:10” rule. This posits that 10 per cent of people 
have an inbuilt propensity to fraud, 80 per cent of people will commit fraud if 
they consider that there is a good chance this will go undetected and 10 per 
cent of people have innate characteristics that mean that they will never commit 
fraud (p. 939). This rule supports Button & Gee’s (2013) four types of fraudster. 
These are: the career fraudster whose primary motive is to commit fraud; the 
occasional fraudster who is law abiding but will act dishonestly if the right 
circumstances are present; the fallen fraudster who is law abiding but will act 
dishonestly if motivated by personal circumstance; and the “Ordinary Joe” 
fraudster who will commit fraud if they think that they can get away with it 
(pp.34-36). This is why it is important that organisations regularly assess staff 
knowledge of fraud issues and the steps in place to deter fraud from occurring.  
However, the Audit Commission Changing Organisational Cultures Toolkit, a 
short survey designed to measure staff awareness, has had a low take up in 
central government despite a recommendation from the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life to the contrary (Tickner, 2010, p.308.; A. Bryce, 
Personal Communication, 20 July 2012).  This suggests that more needs to be 
done to influence both senior managers and counter fraud teams of the need to 
create and maintain an anti-fraud culture. This highlights the need for more 
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effective fraud risk management that should be integrated with an 
organisation’s risk management processes and be discussed by the 
management board regularly (Wright, 2007, p.25). 
All organisations will be subject to diverse pressures at different times and this 
affects their susceptibility to fraud. Barnes & Webb (2007, p.183, p.191) noted 
that susceptibility to fraud is also affected by industry sector, organisational 
size, organisational type, fraud methodology, susceptibility to collusion and 
grade of employee committing the fraud. However, they found that the nature of 
controls was not an important factor in determining both susceptibility to fraud or 
the size of loss. This is in contrast to work by Cressey, whose fraud triangle 
identifies opportunity as being a key factor in a decision on whether or not to 
commit fraud (Wells, 2002, p.2). It also conflicts with work by Goldstraw-White 
(2011, p.194), who, in her work in understanding fraudulent behaviours, noted 
“criminality was made possible by the weakness of organisational control 
systems and management monitoring procedures”. 
Weak controls provide both opportunity and the scope for rationalising that, 
when an employee or other stakeholder is under financial pressure or has some 
other motive to commit fraud, for example a desire to “beat the system”, the 
risks associated with a crime are outweighed by potential financial benefits. This 
observation is consistent with routine activity theory, which suggests that crime 
is committed when there is a likely offender, a suitable target and the lack of a 
capable guardian, in this case, controls (Farrell, Clark, Ellingworth, & Pease, 
2005, p.2). The differences between Barnes & Webb’s (2007) findings and the 
work of others suggests that the model on which their conclusions are based 
may need further refinement, particularly given the observation of Krambia-
Kapardis (2002, p.272) that companies most liable to fraud have a poor internal 
control system and lack a staff code of conduct.  
Organisations will never be able to ensure that all employees work both 
effectively and honestly at all times. This is why organisations need to protect 
themselves and their assets and reputation through the use of controls. A 
control system should be part of enterprise risk management and cover: the 
control environment, information and communication, risk assessment, control 
activities and monitoring (Shapiro, 2014, pp.33-34). Samociuk & Iyer (2010, 
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p.39) argue that appropriate levels of control are best achieved through a multi 
disciplinary approach, that involves staff from different specialisms which 
include: internal audit; security; corporate governance; finance; risk 
management; and legal and compliance. 
Jones (2004, pp.55-56) notes that there are six different categories of control: 
physical, accounting, authorisation, structural, supervisory, and a separation of 
duties. His short analysis of the preventative effect of such controls is provided 
in Table 2.3. However, if fraud and error is to be reduced to the lowest possible 
level a control framework needs to be supported by codes of ethics, moral 
boundaries, effective human resource management and assurance that the 
body has the right people in the right positions because rules and structures 
cannot cover every eventuality (Wright, 2007, p.27; Shapiro, 2014, p.37).  
Table 2:3 Analysis of the different control types 
Control Type Description Example Effectiveness 
Physical Control access to 
valuables 
A safe in which to 
store cash 
Reduced opportunities 
for theft 
Accounting Cross checks to 
detect fraudulent 
transactions 
Check HR 
records to payroll 
Detection of bogus 
employees 
Authorisation An audit trail to 
show involvement 
in transactions 
Approval to 
purchase goods 
Reduced opportunities 
for private purchases 
using employer funds 
Structural Clarity over who 
can undertake 
what duties 
Formal schedule 
of delegations 
Reduced opportunities 
for letting fraudulent 
contracts 
Supervisory Oversight of 
colleagues’ work  
Observation of 
post opening 
Reduced opportunities 
for stealing cheques  
Separation of 
Duties 
Spread of tasks 
associated with a 
transaction 
stream to more 
than one person 
Different persons 
ordering goods, 
receiving them 
into storage and 
paying the 
resulting invoice 
Reduced opportunities 
for procuring goods 
and services for 
personal benefit with 
corporate funds. 
Lower chance of theft 
Jones, 2004, pp. 55-56 
Finally, lessons learned from investigations should be used to inform the 
prevention process by dealing with those systemic, procedural and other 
weaknesses that led to a fraud being committed (Phillips, 2012, p.81).	
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Is there an integrated solution to fraud management? 
The need for a comprehensive counter fraud strategy led Furlan & Bajec (2008) 
to conclude, following a literature review, a series of semi-structured interviews, 
a case study and reviews of commercial fraud management systems, that 
organisations need an integrated fraud management system. Their system 
centred on a methodology which links awareness, prevention, investigation, 
sanctions, redress and deterrence to a series of fraud characteristics and 
activities. In applying this model they drew five key conclusions: that the 
majority of counter fraud activity was in areas other than fraud detection; there 
was limited counter fraud experience and no labelled data to enhance 
detection; the detection rule set needed to incorporate a large amount of sector 
based knowledge; more needs to be done to stimulate recoveries through 
improved detection rates; and decisions made at each stage of the investigative 
process need to be explained (Furlan & Bajec, 2008, pp. 110-111). 
Should counter fraud services be professionalised? 
This literature review has shown that civilian counter fraud teams are expected 
to deliver a complex range of services that draw upon a wide skills base within 
differing legal frameworks. This led Lane (2011, p.207) to conclude that the 
professionalisation of counter fraud services undertaken by civilians is essential 
to the delivery of an effective service. Yet as Vollmer & Mills (1996, p.46) have 
recognised, in any occupational discipline, “Professionalism is neither 
inevitable, universal or of any single type … and cannot be understood without 
taking into account certain aspects of the larger society in which it takes place”. 
This section of the literature review therefore presents a discussion of this 
concept, its associated literature and the ways in which its key themes can be 
applied to civilian counter fraud services. In particular, it defines: the term 
professionalism; discusses the characteristics of a professional; examines why 
professionalisation is important; considers the relevance of professionalism to 
civilian counter fraud activities; and draws conclusions on the relationship 
between professionalisation and regulation. 
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What is professionalism? 
There are many different definitions of professionalism. It has variously been 
described as “the transformation of an occupation into a profession” (Green & 
Gates, 2014, p.75); “the structural, occupational and institutional arrangements 
for dealing with work associated with the uncertainties of life in modern 
societies” (Evetts, 2003, p.397);  “a paid occupation that involves prolonged 
training and a formal occupation” (Everett, 2011, p.9); and “the occupational 
level of specialised theoretical knowledge combined with the existence of firm 
intra-occupational norms” (Andersen & Pedersen, 2012, p.57). 	
These different definitions imply that professions have characteristics that 
distinguish them from other occupational groups. These include: a defined 
occupation; knowledge; training; and some form of normative behaviour. 
However, the concept of what makes a professional is more complex than this, 
because it is as much a matter of perception as it is fact. Morrow et al. (2011, 
p.12), for example, argued that perceptions of professionalism are contextual, 
subject to wide variation and dependent on the application of innate personal 
qualities that are applied to many different situations. Professionalism can 
therefore be viewed on both a personal and occupational level. 
These personal qualities are seen to be linked to an individual’s view of their 
professional identity which, in turn, is influenced by upbringing, culture and life 
experience. These qualities include: personal appearance; empathy; highly 
developed verbal and non-verbal communication skills; a willingness to study 
and keep up to date; an ability to form constructive relationships with service 
users and colleagues; and adherence to ethical practice (Morrow et al., 2011, 
p.5, pp.14-18). Green & Gates (2014, pp.76-80) conclude, based on a literature 
review, that the defining characteristics of a professional are: service to the 
community; self-regulation according to a code of ethics which provides for a 
degree of accountability; the internalisation by the members of the profession of 
accepted behavioural and technical norms; autonomy of operation; a self-
organising exclusive membership based around a register of accredited 
members which has a reward system; a body of technical and specialised 
knowledge which is linked to higher education; and a lifelong commitment to 
learning. 
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What is interesting about these characteristics is that they require both 
organisational and individual commitment and input, will take different amounts 
of time and resource to deliver and are difficult to measure effectively; 
especially as the concept of what constitutes professionalism differs between 
individuals and organisations and changes over time. This explains why Green 
& Gates’ (2014) list of characteristics is far from complete. Other elements of 
professionalism include: the promotion of public confidence; the existence of a 
disciplinary mechanism for those that breach an established code of conduct; 
legitimacy through evidence based practice; a culture of innovation, 
collaboration and mutual support; and the existence of a recognised association 
supported by a formal certification programme (Button, 2005, p.3; Fyfe, 2013, 
pp.409-410; Gupta, 2011, p.71; Institute for Learning, 2009, p.9).  
Thus, professionalism is a phenomenon that is constantly evolving, and a 
subject that has been the subject of much academic research (McLellan & 
Gustafson, 2012, p. 105). The remainder of this section will focus on those 
aspects of professionalisation that are relevant to developing central 
government counter fraud services, and help to form the foundations from 
which the counter fraud service envisaged by the UK government can develop 
(Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011a; 2011b). 
Why professionalise? 
The academic and wider literature on fraud management makes it clear that 
civilian counter fraud teams are expected to deliver a complex range of services 
that draw upon a wide skills base, within differing legal frameworks. Undertaking 
these to a common standard, that protects the interests of employing 
organisations, those connected with investigations and partner bodies, is crucial 
if civilian counter fraud teams are to flourish in the future.  
One of the benefits of professionalisation is that it can be tailored to the specific 
needs of an occupation and manage the public’s perception of its members and 
their services. Consequently, professionalisation positively supports the 
services offered by a particular occupation through ensuring that consumers are 
provided with a promise of skill and competence which underpins public 
confidence (Andersen & Pedersen, 2012, pp.447-448; CIPFA, 2011, p.5). In 
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addition, the creation of a positive social discourse provides an occupation with 
the status and authority needed to deliver and develop their value added 
services and thus create a virtuous circle (McLellan & Gustafson, 2012, p.109). 
However, the benefits of professionalisation are not confined to consumer 
confidence. It brings significant benefits to the members themselves that 
include improved access to promotion and more rewarding work, which in turn 
can lead to higher salaries and reward systems (CIPFA, 2011, pp.5-6; 
Timmons, 2011, p.39). It also promotes the occupation itself through: the 
promotion of good governance; the cross fertilisation of ideas through facilitated 
movement between organisations and sectors; providing employers with 
greater levels of certainty of the capabilities of candidates when recruiting staff; 
balancing the conflicts between targets and standards; promoting both internal 
and external collaboration; and the promotion of continuous professional 
improvement which can, in turn, be used as justification for inward investment 
(Stronach, Corbin, McNamara, Stark, & Warne, 2010, p.110, p.115, pp.124-
127; CIPFA, 2011, pp. 6-9).  
Andersen & Pedersen (2012, pp.48-50) argue that in a public service context, 
professionals tend towards bureaucratic self-interest. However, a review by 
Everett (2011) on the information security industry, demonstrated the effect of 
an introspective approach to professionalisation where standards and working 
practices vary between both economic sectors and organisations. She 
concluded that this has led to a mixed quality workforce that provides 
employers with difficulties in hiring staff, as there is no standard method of 
assessing a candidate's knowledge and experience. It has also led to people 
setting themselves up as information security professionals with little training 
and experience which she observed, can be damaging to the way the sector is 
perceived by customers and the public. In these circumstances, she argued, 
there is a need to develop the professional, rather than professionalise the 
industry, because obtaining agreement to a common terminology, code of 
practice and knowledge base between the large number of organisations 
operating in this sector is some way off, despite the technical and economic 
benefits that this would generate. Thus, the academic literature conveys that 
achieving professional status is as much about collective attitude as it is about 
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technical delivery. If civilian counter fraud services are to professionalise it can 
be argued that they must obtain the right balance between these concepts.  
Is professionalisation appropriate for all occupational groups? 
This section assesses the extent to which professionalism might be applied to 
civilian counter fraud teams through a review of experience elsewhere. 
Comparisons with the police service are relevant, as Button, Johnston & 
Frimpong (2008), Lane (2011) and others have observed clear similarities in the 
work undertaken by the police and civilian counter fraud teams. There is also 
reference to professionalism in the health sector. This is because this sector 
has faced issues in dealing with emerging occupations which are similar to 
those applying to civilian counter fraud services such as member commitment, 
the adoption of voluntary standards and cost. 
 A review of the professionalisation of the police service within the UK 
concluded that the police in England and Wales have yet to transform into an 
independent profession. This is despite the fact that they meet many of the 
defining characteristics and that police officers see themselves as professional 
and act accordingly (Neyroud, 2008, p.674; Green & Gates, 2014, pp.77-80, 
p,83). A number of reasons have been put forward to explain this assertion, of 
which the most pertinent to civilian counter fraud operations are: disagreements 
on what constitutes good professional practice and the development of the 
existing knowledge base on which this is founded; top down command 
structures that inhibit flexibility; frequent leadership changes; budget reductions; 
a reluctance to engage in higher education or commit to lifelong learning; and 
doubts about the benefits of professionalisation (Fyfe, 2013, pp.412-413, 
pp.417-418; Green & Gates, 2014, pp. 78-80, p.87). 
Similar difficulties in professionalising are not confined to law enforcement. 
Timmons (2011) noted that attempts to professionalise operating department 
practitioners within the health sector foundered due to a gulf between those 
running the profession and their members. Despite being told that 
professionalism would lead to improved patient care, comparability with other 
professions, better pay and improved working conditions, members were 
opposed to this, due to fears about a loss of independence and autonomy and 
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the creation of registration costs and professional fees that some did not want 
to pay (p.338, pp.342-344).  
Thus, if any further professionalisation of civilian counter fraud services is to 
succeed, there are a number of factors that will need to be successfully 
addressed.  The most important of these is to ensure that the need for 
professionalism is accepted and understood by those working within civilian 
counter fraud. This means that a convincing case will need to be made that the 
benefits of such professionalisation outweigh the costs, in both financial and 
personal terms. To succeed, it is likely that professionalisation will need to be at 
least cost neutral for those involved. If they perceive that they will be worse off 
financially, by, for example, a switch from weekly to monthly pay or a loss of 
overtime, staff resistance may be forthcoming. 
Should civilian counter fraud services be regulated? 
Professionalisation is dependent upon delivering services to an accepted 
standard that meets consumer expectations. To ensure that all in an occupation 
maintain this standard consistently over time, some form of regulation and 
inspection of their activity may be needed. Evetts (2011) concurs, viewing 
professionalism as a top down arrangement with senior managers shaping the 
occupational standards and technical content of what is to be delivered, 
enforcing these through systems of discipline and control and, in so doing, 
aligning both occupational and state interests (pp.411-413). Fournier (1999, p. 
281) also agrees, stating that professionalism potentially allows for control at a 
distance through the construction of 'appropriate' work identities and conducts.  
Porket (2003, p.52) goes further noting that: “whether they are traditional or 
modern, societies need regulation if they are to survive and prosper. Hence 
regulation matters. More specifically, it matters who regulates what, when and 
why on the basis of what title, at what cost and with what consequences”. 
However, done poorly, regulation can be counter productive as it leads to over-
deterrence and increases industry costs. It is therefore important that those 
charged with regulation are independent from their appointees; have powers 
proportionate to their role; understand the activities they are regulating; employ 
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high quality staff that generate the respect of regulatees; and are accountable 
for their actions (Friedrichs, 2007, pp.259-260). 
The regulation of central government counter fraud services can be seen as the 
delivery of a professional service in the public interest, as it seeks to use a level 
of expertise to provide a specialist service to protect public funds (Button, 
Johnston, Frimpong & Smith, 2007, p.198). Regulation of this service could 
underpin quality services by: enforcing professional standards and modifying 
the behaviour of those who fall short of these; and by protecting others through 
placing regulatory findings in the public domain and removing wrong-doers from 
positions of trust (Middleton, 2012, p.60). Thus, the remainder of this literature 
review on regulatory principles defines the concept of regulation, examines the 
pros and cons of different types of regulation; and discusses, in a civilian 
counter fraud context, what makes for an effective regulatory regime. 
What is regulation? 
Regulation has been defined in a number of ways. Examples include “rules 
which try to control human behaviour” (Centre on Regulation and Competition 
2004, p.1), “the making, application and adjudication of rules governing human 
behaviour and interaction” (Porket, 2003, p.48), “the setting and enforcement of 
rules and standards relating to conduct” (Gupta & Lad, 1983, p.417), “any ‘rule’ 
endorsed by government where there is an expectation of compliance” 
(Australian government, 2007, p.XIII), and “controlling the use of a scarce 
resource through licensing which is rooted in law and supported by clear and 
concise rules that are enforced impartially” (Salomon, 2008, pp.9-10). 
What many of these definitions have in common is adherence to a particular 
rule set and code of conduct. Porket (2003, p.48) defines a rule as “a norm 
which prescribes or proscribes what a specified category of social actions 
should or should not do on all occasions of a specified kind or an all occasions 
without qualification”. He summarises that these rules can be formal (statutes 
and charters) or informal (common law, customs and conventions), applied 
permissively or restrictively and be either constitutive or controlling (pp.49-51). 
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Regulation can take a number of different forms. It can be provided: externally 
by government, for example the enforcement of requirements for criminal 
investigations in England and Wales through codes of practice rooted in law; by 
a combination of both government and the regulated part of the economy, for 
example the production of financial statements publicly quoted companies 
under Part 15 of the Companies Act 2006 (Companies House, 2014); or, by 
service providers themselves, for example the professions (Australian 
government, 2007, p.242; Gorman, 2014, p.491; Gupta & Lad, 1983, p.418; 
Richman & Richman, 2012). The Australian government, in their guidance on 
how to conduct regulatory impact assessments, noted different types of 
regulation: state control; co-regulation where occupational codes of conduct are 
given legislative authority; enforced self or (quasi) regulation on an economic 
group; self-regulation by an economic group; and internal control over 
operations (2007, pp.95-106). A summary of the pros and cons of each 
regulatory type is given in Table 2.4 and illustrates the complexities involved in 
choosing a regulatory regime for a particular sector, profession or body. 
Gorman (2014) observes that, "Professional and expert work represents an 
important and growing segment of employment" (p.491), a view consistent with 
earlier observations by Evetts (2003, p.396), who noted that “knowledge-based 
occupations are the expanding employment categories and the growth sectors 
of labour markets in developed, transitional and developing societies”.  This has 
a clear resonance with the emergence of the need for counter fraud staff and 
teams with the requisite skills and knowledge to tackle the fraud threats facing 
central government and others (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011a; 2011b). 
However, the optimal level of regulation over civilian counter fraud services will 
be a contextual trade-off between the costs and benefits of monitoring. For 
example, when verification costs are high, there is less incentive to monitor 
organisational activities, although the converse can be true in high-risk 
environments where problems can lead to higher levels of government 
intervention and/or litigation (Brick & Chidambaran, 2008, p.88, p.90, p.92).  				
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Table 2.4: The advantages and disadvantages of different regulatory types 
A/D Performance based self, quasi and co-
regulation 
Government Regulation through law 
A Lower government administration costs High degree of transparency 
A Lower compliance costs for business Universal standardised coverage 
A Innovative inducements for compliance Legal sanctions raise compliance rates 
A Sanctions for non-compliance Deals with high risk, high impact issues 
A Improved credibility as rules are devised by 
practitioners rather than government 
The greater levels of certainty associated 
with legislative rules can reduce 
compliance costs for regulated bodies 
A Enhanced flexibility, responsiveness, speed of 
implementation and rule modification 
Not beholden to any special interest group 
A Greater responsiveness to consumer needs 
and demands 
Little prospect of hidden regulation creep 
A Promotion of public confidence More efficient and focused inspections 
A Effective and inexpensive dispute resolution 
procedures 
The introduction of new and relevant 
technology 
A Promotion of effective corporate governance Coordination of related regulatory regimes 
   
D A lack of public transparency in the way in 
which the regulatory scheme works 
It can be standardised, inflexible and 
become quickly out of date 
D Restricted competition as work is restricted to 
amongst members of the occupation grouping 
It may generate additional regulation to 
deal with new situations that arise or a 
failure to achieve initial outcomes 
D Restrictions on consumer choice through the 
creation of minimum standards that do not 
allow for a low quality option 
The time lags between the need for 
change and the passing of laws inhibits a 
speedy response to issues 
D A failure to meet public and government 
expectations 
Legislation may be unsuited to certain 
types of regulation – e.g. the professions 
D Ineffective sanctions for non-compliance Legal complexities means that regulated 
bodies may not comply fully with the law  
D Greater confusion about regulatory 
requirements  
High compliance costs as the law does not 
always reflect accepted business practice 
D Implementation and running costs Costs and delays with the legal process  
D Undue influence from special interest groups Higher costs to government 
D A lack of independent scrutiny to challenge 
practices that are not in the public interest 
 
D Confusion as to the status and enforceability 
of  government regulatory regimes may lead to 
higher levels of non-compliance  
 
D Self-regulating schemes (and variants thereof) 
can impose significant costs on those 
regulated as they are based on best practice 
standards 
 
D There is a shift of the regulatory burden from 
government to regulated bodies 
 
 A – Advantage D – Disadvantage   
Sources: (Australian government, 2007, pp.102-104; Centre on Regulation and Competition, 
2004, p.2; Frankel, 1994, pp.1-2) 
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What makes for effective regulation? 
Effective regulation is a concept that is difficult to define and measure. This is 
because it is a term that has no single definition, as it is affected by issues such 
as: communication and trust; individual perspectives; the choice of comparator 
or measure; legislative and cultural contexts; the level of risk; and the period 
over which effectiveness is assessed (Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, & Shleifer, 2010, 
p.1046; Gupta & Lad, 1983, p.419; Wiig & Tharaldsen, 2012, p.3046). Where 
these are not present, sub-optimal performance and wasted expenditure can 
result and bring the regulatory process into disrepute (Centre on Regulation and 
Competition, 2004, pp. 3-4).  
Consequently, regulation should be proportionate, accountable, consistent, 
transparent and targeted. It should also: have purpose; be outcome focussed; 
examine issues from a user perspective; tailor inspection regimes to be 
proportionate to the risks they are evaluating; challenge managers’ self-
assessments; be impartial; deliver value for money for regulatees; and ensure 
that they adapt their processes to take into account their impact on the 
regulatees ability to improve – and thus be a part of a continual learning 
process (Better Regulation Commission, 2003). Thus, effective regulation is 
more than just the application of rules and standards to particular occupations. 
Despite these overarching principles, views on the effectiveness of regulatory 
operations differ. Clarke (1994), a co-director of the Unit for the Study of White-
Collar Crime at Liverpool University, posits that regulation is typically a largely 
ignored bureaucratic exercise because many regulated transactions are routine 
and honest, and it is with this expectation that all transactions are viewed. In 
consequence, many suspicious activities and transactions go unnoticed. He 
concludes that, where misconduct does come to light, there is a significant 
reaction and then matters return to the normal means of conducting business 
(pp.337-338). 
Samarajiva (2001, p.366), in his review of telecommunications regulation, takes 
a different view, positing that regulatory effectiveness can be defined through 
"the day-to-day work of building and maintaining legitimacy". This legitimacy 
comes from trust in an expert and supportive regulatory process that minimises 
the cost of compliance. This legitimacy is driven by independence, professional 
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competence and the delivery of lasting improvements. These improvements 
can lead to higher performance, reduced costs, increased communication, 
knowledge exchange, and enhanced mutual learning, all of which are 
fundamental to the delivery of an effective counter fraud service (Wiig & 
Tharaldsen, 2007, p.3044; Andrews, Boyne, Law, & Walker, 2008, pp.187-188; 
Gunningham & Sinclair, 2009, p.871). 
Clarke (1994, p.342) observed that a regulator’s effectiveness “lies in its 
capacity to penetrate the daily life of the regulated so that its ideas and 
expectations are constantly present in the minds of the regulated”. For this to 
occur, he posited that a regulator needs to be seen as an effective and positive 
resource who has ‘regulatory grasp’, over those regulated. To help achieve this, 
he identified 16 characteristics of ‘regulatory grasp’, as outlined in Table 2.5, 
which list the conditions under which both effective and ineffective regulation 
exist. He concluded that those with most or all of the characteristics signifying 
strong regulatory grasp are likely to be government based licensing bodies or 
powerful professional associations that have suitable levels of government 
support and funding (Clarke, 1994, pp.342-347).  
However, this list is incomplete. Andrews et al. (2008), in their review of the 
relationship between organisational strategy, regulation and public service 
performance in a number of Welsh Local Authorities, found that other 
organisational characteristics, for example whether an organisation is 
innovative, defensive or reactive, are also relevant and that external regulation 
is more supportive of accountability rather than service performance 
improvement (pp.196-197). 
Research by Joskow & Rose (1989, p.1453, p.1496) also suggests that defining 
regulatory effectiveness is more complex than Clarke (1994) suggests. Other 
issues they identified include: defining what constitutes optimal performance; 
taking account of a large number of different variables on which information is 
incomplete; comparing outcomes in regulated and unregulated environments; 
and comparing the performance of different regulatory regimes. It is also difficult 
to assess the intangible costs of regulation such as: its effect on innovation; the 
development of new ideas; and the delivery of efficiency improvements (Porket,  
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Table 2.5: Factors that influence regulatory grasp  
Strong Regulatory Grasp Weak Regulatory Grasp 
1 Few regulatees Many regulatees 
2 Agency well funded and staffed Agency poorly funded and staffed 
3 Good public awareness of the 
agency’s role and objectives 
Poor public awareness of the 
agency’s role and objectives 
4 High level of debate in trade and 
in public 
Low level of debate  
5 High level of training and quality 
of regulatees 
Low or variable level of training  
6 Clear established regulatory 
code 
Unclear regulatory code 
7 Prior approval of innovations 
required 
Approval of innovations after 
introduction 
8 Administrative discretion to 
sanction 
Due process and quasi criminal 
procedure 
9 Capacity to achieve legal 
sanction in selected cases 
Chances of success on legal action 
unclear 
10 Past successes in requiring 
changes by effective sanctions 
No record of dramatic success 
11 Capacity to move quickly Slow response to evidence of 
incompetence or misconduct 
12 Capacity to require production of 
evidence as necessary 
Capacity to criticize only 
13 Capacity to inspect randomly and 
regularly 
No inspection capacity 
14 Capacity to accredit regulatees No capacity to accredit 
15 Capacity to train regulatees Capacity to comment on training only 
16 Capacity to exclude from market No capacity to exclude 
Source: (Clarke, 1994, pp. 343-345) 
2003, p.50). Thus, developing an effective regulatory framework to support 
civilian counter fraud services will be complex. 
How should regulatory effectiveness be delivered? 
The Australian government Guide to Regulation (2014, p.5) notes that the 
challenge is to make regulation both effective and efficient, and that this 
requires a structured approach based around seven core questions: What is the 
problem you are trying to solve? Why is government action needed? What 
policy options are you considering? What is the likely net benefit of each 
option? Who will you consult about these options and how will you consult 
them? What is the best option from those you have considered? and How will 
you implement and evaluate your chosen option? In their review of regulation in 
developing countries, the Centre on Regulation and Competition (2004, pp.1-2) 
Professional	Doctorate	in	Security	and	Risk	Management																												Michael	Colin	Gilbert:	Student	440422	
August 2015 
						 Page 
 
61	
noted that the following were also relevant: the extent to which decisions are to 
be delegated; the independence of the regulated body; and the extent to which 
regulatory decisions will be subject to judicial scrutiny.  
There are two main regulatory approaches within which these principles can be 
delivered: the enforcement approach and the regulatory approach (Clarke, 
1994, pp.338-342; Wiig & Tharaldsen, 2012, pp.3044-3045; Gorman, 2014, 
p.497). The enforcement approach, which is reactive and triggered by complaint 
or activity monitoring, relies upon the application of highly specific rules and 
laws and the levying of pre-defined penalties to punish "wrongdoers". The 
problems with this approach are that it does not lend itself well to diagnosing 
what went wrong or the design of solutions to prevent recurrence and the 
development of more widespread prevention activities. It also suffers from the 
difficulties inherent in drawing up rules to the level of specificity needed to 
achieve the degree of required regulation. 
The regulatory approach, in contrast, is inclusive, and engages with those being 
regulated by encouraging them to implement best practice through education, 
training and the creation of an organisational culture that promotes the desired 
ethical values. This model therefore capitalises "on the goodwill of the honest 
majority and uses it to build a working culture in which misconduct is 
unacceptable and immediately evident to colleagues" (Clarke, 1994, p.340). 
Clarke points out, however, that this model also has limitations. It relies on the 
precept that a regulator is fully independent and able to define, with sufficient 
precision, what constitutes a breach of rules and norms and how these would 
be detected. Furthermore, it is dependent upon: acceptance by regulatees of 
the regulator's position; the promotion of the necessary behaviours; and the 
reporting of transgressions from acceptable behaviours and practices (1994, 
pp.340-342). While professional discipline is under researched, the evidence to 
date suggests that challenges to unacceptable behaviour are unlikely since 
professionals prefer to avoid confronting their peers (Gorman, 2014, p.499).  
Clarke (1994) concludes that there is no optimal regulatory approach and that 
often a hybrid of situational approaches that rely on detection, enforcement, 
prevention, cultural norms and values and routine procedures and controls are 
the best way to achieve desired regulatory outcomes (pp.341-342). However, 
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exactly, what approach should be applied to civilian counter fraud services 
within central government is a matter of opinion.  Gorman (2014, p.429) posits 
that self-regulation has been the traditional method of regulating the professions 
for many years. In this context, self-regulation in the US has been associated 
with "an industry level, as opposed to a governmental, or firm level, organisation 
(such as a trade association or professional society) [that] sets and enforces 
rules and standards relating to the conduct of the firms in the industry" (Gupta & 
Lad, 1983, p.417).  Porket (2003, p.48) goes further, noting that a group is self-
regulating if “it can make, apply and adjudicate the rules governing the 
behaviour of, and the interaction between, its members as well as its behaviour 
towards and its interaction with, its social environment”.  Thus, it can be argued, 
that for self-regulation to work effectively in a professional context, the following 
need to be present: trust between regulator and regulatee; shared ethical 
norms, the acceptance, or socialisation, of these norms, appropriate levels of 
control over deviant behaviour, and co-operation between organisations (Croall, 
1992, p.152; Gupta & Lad, 1983, p.419; Gorman, 2014, p.492).  
Research suggests that voluntary compliance with ethical standards has its 
roots in both psychology and market behaviour.  For those subject to regulation 
to comply with high ethical and procedural standards willingly, these have to 
conform to an internalised set of personal values that are: acquired through 
personal characteristics; rooted in training and organisational cultures; accepted 
as valid by peers; driven from the bottom up; and supported by informal 
systems (Albareda, 2008, p.433; Carver & Scheier, 2000, pp.287-289; 
Gunningham & Sinclair, 2009, p.869, p.896). This implies that some form of 
membership of an overarching professional institute may be required if those 
working in counter fraud are to adhere consistently to a set of common 
behavioural and technical standards. 
The weakness of the self regulatory approach lies in the fact that most, if not all, 
organisations must participate in the voluntary regulatory arrangements and 
subscribe to its main operating principles and rules (Albareda, 2008, p.437). 
There have been calls for the external regulation of professionals due to 
concerns that self-regulation is not fully effective (Gorman, 2014, pp.492-493). 
One example of this is the alleged behaviour of accounting firm Ernst and 
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Young, who paid the US Securities and Exchange Commission US$4 million to 
settle charges that its auditors illegally lobbied Congressional Staff on behalf of 
clients (Snyder, 2014). 
Gunn & Robertson (1976, pp.865-866), however, support the contention that 
self-regulation by management is preferable to those regulatory mechanisms 
normally associated with external regulation, namely prescriptive behavioural 
ideals and output based performance standards. Self-regulation is also seen as 
being cheaper and more flexible than external government regulation (Frankel, 
1994, p.1). Regulatory and control processes developed by management, 
supported by external audits and regulatory inspections, can provide a flexible 
least cost solution which can be applied to a wide range of circumstances and 
enterprises and go beyond compliance with minimal legal standards. Croall 
(1992, p.152) notes, however, that self-regulation is most effective through 
mechanisms that promote personal responsibility (for example whistleblowing) 
rather than through institutionalised audit and control systems, which create 
diffuse lines of responsibility. 
However, Gunningham & Sinclair (2009) found that, when applied to the 
Australian mining industry, several problems with self-regulation arose, which 
may have resonance with civilian counter fraud services. Their semi-structured 
interviews with mining staff identified the following short comings: a lack of 
direction and support from senior managers who lacked the relevant expertise, 
resource and capacity to engage; middle management inertia; a reluctance or 
inability of local managers to take responsibility for the implementation of the 
self-regulatory system; and workforce resistance due to a lack of trust with their 
managers (p.876, pp.882-883).  
Discussion 
Fraud is a complex crime involving a number of different offences and 
behaviours that can be difficult to prevent, detect, investigate and bring to 
justice. To tackle fraud effectively, the discussion of the different elements of the 
fraud management model suggests that government organisations need: 
developed risk and threat assessments; effective corporate governance and 
accountability structures; estimates of fraud and error losses; access to the 
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system analysis and audit skills needed to ensure that programmes, projects 
systems and procedures have the necessary controls to prevent fraud; 
information systems that flag issues of concern and which can be interrogated 
to detect new and emerging issues; the infrastructure and skills needed to 
investigate to the standards required by the criminal and civil courts; and the 
ability to obtain appropriate sanctions and redress. Jackson (2013) suggests 
that government organisations have some way to go to deliver a robust counter 
fraud service.  
It is also evident that the span of knowledge needed to deliver an effective 
civilian counter fraud service is specialised, significant and complex, requiring 
skills as diverse as policy formulation, psychological and behavioural analysis, 
system design, analysis and control, detection analytics, interpersonal and 
interviewing skills, evidence and case management, and investigative 
procedure. It therefore requires care in the selection of individuals to work in this 
sector, technical and ethical standards against which performance can be 
judged, and a great deal of training and experience to acquire the necessary 
expertise. Therefore the issue arises of whether civilian counter fraud teams 
can, and should, be professionalised.  
A further finding of this literature review is that the delivery of an effective 
“professional” counter fraud service requires appropriate legal authority to act, 
access to formal training courses, a body of work that keeps these skills alive 
and up to date and an adequate supporting infrastructure. For example, if data 
interrogation techniques are to be used to detect fraud civilian counter fraud, 
teams will need a detailed knowledge of statistics and data analysis. Similarly, if 
civilian counter fraud teams are to present cases to the police or civil courts for 
prosecution, or enter into collaborative arrangements with the police when 
investigating allegations made, they will need a working knowledge of the 
relevant investigative law and practice. However, the creation and maintenance 
of this level of expertise is expensive, and its justification can only be 
established through reliable estimates of the sums at risk from fraud and the 
legal authority to use this expertise proportionately. Jackson (2013) has 
concluded that professionalisation may be some way off.  
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This literature review has also shown that fraud investigations, either 
undertaken independently by civilian counter fraud teams or jointly with the law 
enforcement, have implications for civil liberties and individual privacy. They 
can also be reputationally damaging. There is therefore a need to consider 
whether civilians working in this area should have their activities regulated in 
order to ensure that they do not involve an abuse of position and provide 
redress for those who consider that they have been treated inequitably. 
However, regulation presents a number of key issues: the type of regulation to 
be used; cost; the inhibition of innovation and the development of new 
opportunities; and the realisation of efficiency improvements. This, therefore, is 
a subject that has been explored further by the primary research undertaken as 
a part of this research project. 		
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Chapter 3: Research methods 
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Introduction 
This chapter outlines the empirical research methods used in the preparation of 
this thesis, providing a justification for the decisions made in the design and 
delivery of the research, and an outline of the steps employed. It begins with a 
discussion of the research design, and then details the specific methods 
employed in the research. Researcher reflexivity and key ethical considerations 
underpinning the research are then outlined and the discussion briefly reflects 
on the effectiveness of the research methods used. 
Research design 
This research project sought to establish whether UK central government 
organisations have the legal powers, skills and regulation needed to tackle 
fraud effectively. It was concluded from the literature review that there was a 
need for research on the legal powers and skills available to civilian counter 
fraud teams within UK central government, and how their use is regulated. 
To be of maximum relevance to UK central government civilian counter fraud 
operations, an empirical realist approach was adopted. This means that, 
through the use of appropriate methods, reality can be understood through 
observable phenomena and events. Such an approach has been criticised on 
the basis that it fails to fully recognise the influence that underlying social 
structures have on these phenomena and thus the conclusions drawn from 
them can be superficial (Bryman, 2012, p.29). However, despite this, an 
objective approach to this research, based around observable facts, was 
considered appropriate because it is important to be able to reach practical 
conclusions and recommendations that resonate with those working in this 
sector. This led to a “mixed methods” approach that combines both quantitative 
and qualitative analysis (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007, p.113). 
“Mixed methods” is a growing area of research that now has its own journal, the 
Journal of Mixed Methods Research, which has been in existence since 2007. 
By combining both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the mixed methods 
approach allows for a rational, quantitative and scientific approach to the 
research topic while recognising the influence that qualitative issues, such as 
human attitudes, attributes, experience and expectation have upon it. In 
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adopting this hybrid approach, this research project has four objectives: 
contextual: identifying the form and nature of what exists; diagnostic: examining 
the reasons for, or causes of, what exists; evaluative: appraising the 
effectiveness of what exists; and strategic: identifying new theories, policies, 
plans or actions (Ritchie & Spencer, 2002, p.307). 
The mixed methods approach has other benefits. Firstly, it allows theories to be 
formed and tested with both breadth and depth (Mays & Pope, 1995, p.3). 
Quantitative techniques allow for observable material, in this case the legal 
powers and skills used by civilian counter fraud teams, to be identified and 
measured. However, qualitative techniques, through their use of inductive and 
less structured methods, give such measurements context because they take 
into account intangible, but no less important, issues such as organisational 
culture, risk appetite, investigative approach and attitudes towards regulation.  
Another advantage of mixed methods research is that it promotes research 
validity and reliability, because it provides a perception of increased rigour, 
generates new theories, develops new methodologies and provides for greater 
flexibility in the delivery of the research as the project develops (Bryman, 2006, 
pp.108-109; Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2011, pp.273-275). The most important 
benefit of this type of research, however, is that by using different, but 
complementary methods, it allows for corroboration that, in turn, can provide a 
deeper insight into the topic under review (Bryman, 2006, p.108).  
Often, mixed methods research types take place in sequential order with the 
qualitative techniques, such as semi-structured interviews and observations, 
being conducted first so as to better understand the phenomena under review. 
Quantitative techniques, such as surveys and statistics, are then used to 
explore certain issues that contribute to, and influence, the phenomena under 
review in more depth. Malterud (2001) further notes that: “multiple and diverse 
observations can enrich the description and analysis of a phenomenon” (p.487). 
Consequently, the semi-structured interview programme was designed to elicit 
the views from a broad range of groups involved in civilian counter fraud 
management, which included representatives from: counter fraud teams; policy 
makers; professional institutes; law enforcement; academia; and those bodies 
with regulatory functions. 
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The primary research for this project featured a survey of all 32 central 
government counter fraud champions and a programme of 26 semi-structured 
interviews. However, in this case, the survey was conducted first and then 
followed up by the semi-structured interview programme. The reason for this 
was that a survey was a quicker, and more cost effective option to test whether 
the research aims were suitable for a doctoral research programme, than a 
semi-structured interview programme. Furthermore, by conducting the survey 
first, the semi-structured interviews could focus more on the underlying reasons 
for the current situation, and on how any issues might be resolved going 
forward, rather than the gathering of facts. Therefore, this elevated the interview 
above a mere fact finding exercise and provided an opportunity to test the 
validity of the survey results and explore possible solutions to the current 
situation.  
Research methods 
This section provides background information on how the survey and semi-
structured interview programme were used. In particular, it examines how 
information was gathered on the legal, skills and regulatory framework, within 
which UK central government delivers counter fraud services, and why this 
presents a suitable basis for valid conclusions to be drawn.  
Surveys 
A survey is a means of systematically collecting a standardised data set to 
understand, or predict, the behaviour or characteristics of a defined population 
(Robson, 2002, p.230; Sukamolson, 2007, p.12). Surveys produce data on what 
is being measured through the use of questionnaires sent to an appropriate 
statistically based sample of participants drawn from the population. While no 
such sampling technique was used during this research, as all 32 UK central 
government counter fraud champions were included in the survey, its value lay 
in the fact that surveys can also be carried out for descriptive purposes as a 
part of a non-experimental fixed design study (Sukamolson, 2007, p.4; Robson, 
2002, p.228, pp.232-236). In this case, a quantitative survey met two core 
quantitative criteria. Obtaining descriptive statistics on powers, skills and 
regulation allowed for simple, numerically based categorisation for audience 
segmentation, and the quantification of opinions, beliefs and attitudes. 
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The survey was undertaken with permission from the government department 
responsible for creating and maintaining the counter fraud champions’ network. 
Indeed, this department sent out the questionnaire for the researcher by e-mail 
and asked all participants to complete it. The survey questionnaire was 
explicitly linked to the research objectives, to avoid perceptions of “fishing for 
information”, and designed to allow for ease of completion and return. It did this 
through a design that allowed the responses to be placed on the questionnaire 
(Appendix 2) next to the relevant question. The completed questionnaire could 
then be saved and e-mailed back to the researcher.  Other actions taken to 
maximise the response rate included the use of a covering letter (Appendix 3) 
and a follow up letter, where necessary (Appendix 4) (Robson, 2002, pp. 241-
253). In addition, all respondents were promised complete confidentiality of their 
responses prior to completing the survey. Some results have, therefore, been 
omitted from the quoted statistics because they would identify the relevant 
government body, and all results have been anonymised and aggregated to 
avoid identifying any one particular respondent.  
Representatives of 16 bodies (50 per cent) returned completed questionnaires 
and a further three responded to say that they were unable to complete the 
questionnaire. When these responses are considered, the response rate 
effectively rises to 60 per cent. Reasons for not completing the survey may be 
that: its completion was not a priority for counter fraud champions and 
particularly in a period of declining resources; a lack of focus on counter fraud 
activities; a lack of understanding of the issues involved and the powers and 
skills needed to deal with this; and/or, the absence of a fully developed fraud 
awareness culture.  
Surveys can take a number of forms that include telephone, postal, e-survey, 
observational and diary based questionnaires (Bryman, 2012, pp.232-233; 
Robson, 2002, pp.229-230). In this research project a postal survey was used. 
SPSS and MS Excel were used to codify and analyse the results.  The 
advantage of a postal survey over an e-survey in this instance was that it 
allowed the researcher to meet a UK government preference for all of its data to 
be retained within the UK.  
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The postal survey captured standardised information, free from any 
unintentional interviewer bias, in a consistent, efficient manner that could be 
applied directly to the research objectives. To deal with known difficulties in the 
reliability of survey data, which can be negatively influenced by researcher 
anonymity and the impact that an answer to one question can have on another, 
key conclusions arising from the results were tested and validated during the 
semi-structured interview programme (Robson, 2002, p.228, pp.230-235; 
Bryman, 2012, pp. 233-234).  
The design of the survey was informed by the initial part of the literature review. 
The importance of legal powers to the investigation of fraud, and the need to 
link this to different points of the investigative cycle, for example surveillance, 
interviews, evidence gathering, dealing with witnesses and offenders and 
sanctions and redress, drove the design of this part of the questionnaire. 
Similarly, concerns about the effect that civilian investigations, and particularly 
those undertaken to the criminal standard, have on the civil liberties led to a 
brief question on the control (or regulation) of counter fraud operations. The 
purpose of this was to elicit whether respondents considered current levels of 
control satisfactory, and if not, what might be done to complement existing 
supervisory arrangements. Finally, the literature review demonstrated that 
civilian counter fraud professionals conduct a wide range of activities for which 
a significant skill set is required. The survey was designed to establish the 
extent to which qualified counter fraud staff, who have been through some form 
of training and thus have had the opportunity to develop these skill sets, were 
being used within central government. 
The survey proved relatively straightforward to administer. However, despite 
care in the drafting of the questions, which were piloted with counter fraud 
colleagues prior to the survey being sent out, some ambiguities remained, for 
example in Q8.1 on how legal powers could be used more effectively. These 
issues were followed up during the semi-structured interview programme. 
Obtaining survey responses proved problematic and reminders needed to be 
sent to participating organisations. No complaints about the way in which the 
survey was conducted were received, and the analysis of the results was 
straightforward. 
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Interviews 
The research objectives underpinning this thesis needed to be informed by a 
wide range of views, as those working in this field may have diverse opinions of 
the issues raised. This was provided through a series of interviews. To provide 
comprehensive and reliable evidence from which valid conclusions can be 
drawn requires the interview process to cover a representative sample of 
opinion. Deciding on a representative sample of interviewees can be 
problematic. For this research, a representative sample was defined as 
obtaining information from a wide range of sources that included academia, 
central government, oversight organisations, professional bodies and 
regulators. Interviews were also held with those working outside central 
government to add a wider perspective.  
Interviewees worked for organisations which varied in size, from less than 10 to 
more than 10,000 employees, and brought both policy and practice 
perspectives to the issues covered by the research question. To ensure a 
maximum response rate, the confidentiality of the answers provided during 
interviews was guaranteed, although only 26 of the 35 organisational 
representatives contacted either responded or agreed to participate in an 
interview. A summary of those who participated in the interview programme is 
given in Table 3.1: 
Table 3.1: Interview summary 
Group  Number 
interviewed 
Group 1 Representatives from central government 
counter fraud teams. These participants are 
referred to as counter fraud practitioner 1 
through to 11. 
11 
Group 2 Representatives from the wider counter fraud 
community that included those working for 
regulators, law enforcement, academia and 
audit organisations. These participants are 
referred to as interviewee 1 through to 8 from 
the wider counter fraud community. 
8 
Group 3 Representatives from policy organisations, 
professional institutes and professional bodies. 
These participants are referred to as interviewee 
1 through to 7 from the policy and professional 
bodies group. 
7 
Total  26 
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Those interviewed had an average of 12 years experience in counter fraud 
management with the longest serving having 26 years experience and the least 
experienced having one year’s experience. The mean and modal level of 
experience was also 12 years. This span of experience allowed the researcher 
both to capitalise on a large amount of expertise and to elicit the views of new 
entrants to the specialism that could bring new perspectives. One interviewee, 
for example, was a former head of internal audit. While they had no direct 
experience of delivering counter fraud services, they had been responsible for 
their organisation’s counter fraud function, thereby bringing yet another 
perspective to this subject.  Finally, of the 25 interviewees who had counter 
fraud experience, 23 had experience of fraud awareness, 24 in fraud 
prevention, 20 in fraud detection, 18 in fraud deterrence, 21 in fraud 
investigation and 22 in the application of fraud sanctions. 
Consequently, the mix of organisations represented (as indicated in Table 3.1), 
together with the range of experience of those interviewed, suggests that their 
answers can be relied upon for the purposes of this research project. They can 
therefore be assumed to provide a valid viewpoint of the current issues 
surrounding the delivery of counter fraud services and their possible solutions. 
The type of interview selected was the semi-structured interview, which involves 
the use of structured topics that are explored through the use of an initial 
question and the probing of replies (Robson, 2002, p.278). This type of 
interview provided: the flexibility needed to explore the reasoning behind a 
particular viewpoint; separate out the factual from the perceptual; establish the 
extent to which any views are supported by empirical evidence; and build the 
rapport between interviewer and interviewee needed to encourage both parties 
to consider the wider implications of the answers provided. 
Questions were split into four areas: information about the interviewees, to 
ensure that they had the experience and knowledge to answer the remaining 
areas authoritatively, and then a section each on counter fraud powers, skills 
and regulation. The first questions in the legal powers section sought to 
establish whether there was a gap between the powers that should be, and 
actually are, available to counter fraud professionals and if so whether there are 
any significant constraints on the ability to fully investigate fraud allegations. 
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The remaining two questions in this section were designed to explore the effect 
of any gaps in powers and how these might be dealt with; as Middleton (2005) 
and others have noted that “investigative powers such as entry, search, arrest 
or compulsory questioning…. ha[ve] been recognized as important in the 
context of fraud investigation”.  
The first two questions on skills sought to establish the extent to which counter 
fraud services within central government have identified the competencies 
needed to deliver the wide range of tasks that the literature review has shown 
are inherent to fraud detection, investigation, sanctions, prevention, and 
deterrence. Given the breadth of these activities, and the skills and 
competencies needed to deliver them effectively, it sought to establish what 
their skill priorities were, where any gaps existed and how these gaps should be 
filled. The issue on skill gaps was seen as particularly important as the survey 
showed that some respondents did not have access to staff with any form of 
formal qualification.  
Finally, the questions on regulation focussed on both internal and external 
control over central government counter fraud operations. The first two 
questions sought to establish attitudes towards control over counter fraud 
operations and elicit views on how any regulatory needs might be met through 
internal supervision processes. This is because Phillips (2012 p. 79) noted the 
need for counter fraud managers to deliver a broad range of outcomes for their 
employers while, as Button (2011) notes, inappropriate senior management 
interventions can have a deleterious effect on the delivery of an effective and 
impartial service. Given the negative impact that inappropriate or inexpert 
management can have on counter fraud operations, and the possible impact of 
these on civil liberties, the potential for some form of external regulation was 
explored by the final two questions. If interviewees expressed a preference for 
external regulation, their views on the most appropriate form (for example state, 
co-regulation, quasi regulation and self-regulation) were sought, together with 
their views on what the functions of such a regulator might be in a civilian 
counter fraud context. 
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All interviews were undertaken face-to-face, and arranged with a maximum of 
two nominated representatives from the relevant organisations, although on one 
occasion, at the interviewee’s request, three people were present at the 
interview, as each had a particular specialism relevant to parts of this research. 
Each part of the discussion started with a single open question to which 
answers were sought and answers were then explored further as explained 
above. The interview schedule is shown in Appendix 5. All interviews were 
transcribed in writing and the record agreed with all interviewees. Interviews 
were not taped or videoed in order to encourage participation. Some 
respondents were very nervous about being interviewed and had to obtain 
permission from their employing organisation prior to doing so. Restricting the 
record of the interview to agreed written transcripts gave these interviewees a 
degree of comfort and control over the interview process. Without this, they may 
not have agreed to participate.  
Arranging interviews proved problematic. Few written requests to the contacted 
bodies resulted in a reply and many interviews were arranged through personal 
contact. It is unlikely that as many as 26 interviews could have been arranged 
had the researcher not worked for a central government department. To 
encourage participation, and minimise the risk of harm to participants, each was 
promised complete confidentiality. This included writing up the findings of the 
interview programme in a way that responses could not be tied back to 
individual interviewees. There are two principal reasons for this approach. The 
state of development of civilian counter fraud capabilities amongst respondents 
varied, and to identify those still building their service could increase their fraud 
risk. Furthermore, some of the issues discussed in this research project are 
sensitive from both a policy and operational perspective. To tie expressed views 
to individual respondents risks damaging their day-to-day relationships with 
colleagues and others. 
Moreover, early experience during the interview process led to an amendment 
to the way in which the two initial questions on legal powers were presented. 
This is because initial interviewees struggled to conceptualise which legal 
powers were needed to conduct effective investigations or the extent to which 
these were present within their organisation. This does not necessarily imply a 
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lack of knowledge or perspective of the part of interviewees. Experience from 
the interview process suggested that the question of legal powers is a complex 
issue that interviewees could not answer fully without some form of structure 
around which to frame their answer. To deal with this issue, the answers to the 
first two questions, on those powers thought necessary for effective 
investigation, were based around the list of powers used for the survey with one 
small difference. Q6.27 on the authority to level sanctions sent to survey 
respondents was split into two questions for the semi-structured interview 
programme. This was because the question, as originally stated, mixed the 
recovery of two different types of cost. The use of the list of powers in this way 
allowed for the identification of any gaps in the legislative structure and their 
effect on the delivery of civilian counter fraud operations. 
However, the early difficulties in coping with these two questions do not cast 
doubt on the integrity or validity of the information acquired from the interview 
process. Early interviewees were either from the policy field or were subject 
experts who were not undertaking investigations on a day-to-day basis. Later 
interviewees were those working within counter fraud within government and 
the necessary changes were introduced prior to their interviews taking place. 
Furthermore, the use of the list of powers used for the survey had a significant 
and beneficial effect. It allowed for some triangulation between the data 
acquired by both the surveys and interviews. It showed that between 2012 and 
2014, when the survey and interview programmes were carried out, the overall 
picture arising from both the survey and interview programme were consistent, 
in that both showed a variability in the powers and skills available to public 
bodies and that views on regulation were mixed.  
This indicates that the results of the earlier survey were still a timely picture of 
the investigative environment and that a consistent and pervasive issue had 
been identified. However, at a more detailed level, there were differences in the 
evidence obtained. These are principally due to dissimilarities in the two 
populations. The survey was restricted to public sector counter fraud 
champions, whereas the interview programme represents a more wide-ranging 
and detailed review that included policy makers, regulators, academics and 
others who are one step removed from front line service delivery. The two 
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populations also contained a different mix of counter fraud teams, thereby 
reflecting differences in their legislative frameworks. 
Research reflexivity 
This wide range of perceptions and viewpoints presented two significant issues 
for the researcher. The first of these was a duty of care to the author’s 
employing organisation. For a career civil servant there is a continuing need to 
ensure that the way in which this research was conducted and written up, met 
the highest standards of the Civil Service and did not bring any current policy, 
organisation or individual into any disrepute. Indeed, the employer’s permission 
to conduct this research was predicated on this basis, which is consistent with 
the need to ensure that research in the social sciences causes no harm. 
Therefore, issues relating to government policies and initiatives have been 
described and analysed with extreme care and all conclusions based upon the 
evidence collected. Pejorative opinions that could cause upset or 
embarrassment have therefore been excluded. The Cabinet Office was sent a 
copy of the draft research report and has commented favourably on it.   
Being an insider raised issues of possible management influence over the 
research process. However, following official permission to undertake this 
research, a clear demarcation line was taken between this academic research 
and the researcher’s day-to-day work. This meant that internal management did 
not seek to have any influence over the research process. Such a standpoint 
also presented issues in ensuring that an objective approach was taken and 
that the design and interpretation of the research instruments was not adversely 
affected by personal preconceptions. To guard against this, the design of both 
the survey and semi-structured interview programme were rooted in the findings 
of the literature review and both research instruments were adjusted following 
advice from others. Furthermore, any conclusions drawn from the primary 
research were only taken after this had been completed and the results collated 
and analysed. Care was also taken to ensure that all conclusions were 
supported by evidence collected through the research process. 
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Working in this field also presented the risk that the design of the research 
instruments, and the analysis of the results, could be skewed in favour of those 
parts of counter fraud management with which the researcher is most familiar. 
To deal with this, care was taken to ensure that equal importance was given to 
all aspects of counter fraud management that arose out of the literature review 
and articulated in the fraud management model.  In relation to the other areas 
examined by this research, professionalisation and regulation, care was taken 
to represent contrasting views expressed in both the primary and secondary 
research, so that a range of opinion informed conclusions on these complex 
issues. 
Being a civil servant also presented the risk that a closed and parochial 
approach was adopted that reflected current policies and practices and 
excluded a wider perspective on the issues examined. To ensure that this did 
not occur, a wide range of both academic and grey material, that reflected a 
number of different viewpoints and practices, informed the literature review. 
These sources also guided the design of the research instruments and, when 
analysing the results of the primary research, were used to triangulate the 
emerging findings.  
Great care to present a neutral stance was also undertaken when conducting 
the research. Semi-structured interviews involve dialogue between interviewer 
and interviewee and it is important that, when entering into such a discussion, 
that the researcher’s views do not influence an interviewee’s response to give a 
preconceived answer. To deal with this, all questions were open and interviewer 
comment was limited, wherever possible, to follow up questions. Furthermore, 
when asking follow up questions, care was taken to ensure that these flowed 
from the interviewee’s testimony and that they did not lead the discussion into 
confirming or contradicting any particular viewpoint.  In addition, great 
importance was attached to agreeing the transcripts of interviews with the 
participants, in order to limit the possibility that any researcher bias had crept 
into the written record of the transcript on which analysis would be undertaken. 
The wide range of differing viewpoints and opinions received suggested that 
researcher bias has not impacted significantly on the comments made or the 
value of the ensuing debate. 
Professional	Doctorate	in	Security	and	Risk	Management																												Michael	Colin	Gilbert:	Student	440422	
August 2015 
						 Page 
 
79	
Ethical issues 
The ethical issues associated with this research were considered throughout 
the entire process and particularly as this research involved the collection of 
primary data. Consequently, this project conformed to the British Society of 
Criminology ethical guidelines and the University of Portsmouth guidelines as 
reflected in the “Ethics Self-Assessment Form” at Appendix 6. The project 
gained ethical approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the University 
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences and the approval letter is at 
Appendix 7. The declaration of compliance with the ethical requirements for 
doctoral research projects is at Appendix 8.  
To minimise the likelihood of this research causing harm to participating 
organisations, explicit consent to interview was obtained from all participants 
through the completion of the consent form at Appendix 9, which was 
accompanied by the participant information sheet at Appendix 10. The guidance 
accompanying the questionnaire and interview requests stated that only the 
researcher and his tutor would have access to the completed material which, 
together with the associated SPSS file and interview transcripts, would be 
stored on a single PC and deleted once the thesis had been submitted and the 
examination process completed. Copies of the completed participant consent 
forms have been retained for inspection should this be required. 
Prior to sending out the questionnaire to central government counter fraud 
champions, written permission was obtained from the relevant government 
department. This meant that the response rate was higher than it might have 
been because the responsible authority sent out a pre-survey e-mail informing 
the champions of the research and asking them to complete the questionnaire. 
In this way, proper and established protocols were followed. In addition, the 
NFA was informed to ensure that this would not interfere with any research 
projects that they may be conducting. 
The research contains some risks to the survey respondents, interviewees and 
their parent organisations. Publicising that the response to fraud may be 
compromised, perhaps significantly, by a shortage of police resources and a 
complementary civilian response hampered by a lack of legal powers, 
regulation and investigative and technical skills could encourage more fraud. 
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However, the literature review has shown that disclosures of limitations in the 
investigation and management of fraud have already been placed in the public 
domain, thereby minimising this risk (AGO, 2006; Gannon & Doig, 2010; Fisher, 
2010; Button, 2011; Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011a, 2011b).  
Another ethical consideration is the fact that the researcher was employed as a 
counter fraud specialist by a central government department that was 
represented in the survey. However, the employer’s permission to undertake 
this research was obtained and the project itself has been conducted separately 
from the researcher’s official duties. The same procedures and considerations 
were applied to the researcher’s employer as to the other invited participants. 
Discussion 
The mixed method of research worked particularly well for this research project. 
While not without its difficulties, it allowed for: a comprehensive review of the 
subject; provided avenues for enquiry; and demonstrated that there is scope to 
add value to current civilian counter fraud practice, both within UK central 
government and on a wider basis – for example to both the private and 
voluntary sector counter fraud teams. While there were challenges with 
completing the survey and semi-structured interview programme, these were 
successfully overcome and the two primary research mechanisms met the 
objectives set for them and provided a significant amount of useful material. 
Consequently, the survey generated a volume of standardised information that 
the later interviews showed to be a reliable indicator of the current position of 
counter fraud services within central government bodies. It also provided the 
necessary data from which to design the semi-structured interview programme. 
The survey was simple and cost effective to administer, and the length and 
complexity of the questionnaire was such that a response rate of 50 per cent 
was achieved, which is sufficient to provide a reasonable approximation of 
current counter fraud practice and issues within central government. 
The semi-structured interview programme, in addition to corroborating the 
principal and overarching findings of the survey, provided a great deal of 
contextual information on which to base conclusions and recommendations. 
Great care was taken during the interview process to avoid interviewer bias and 
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allow interviewees freedom to express their views in full. Challenges were 
experienced in obtaining agreement to participate but, overall, a good cross 
section of views was obtained.	
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Chapter 4:  Counter fraud in central government 
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Introduction 
This chapter sets the context within which the primary research underpinning this 
thesis, which is contained in the next three chapters, has been conducted. It 
provides an outline of how civilian counter fraud services are delivered within UK 
central government and, in doing so, demonstrates the extent to which the 
principles of effective counter fraud management, outlined in the literature 
review, are present. Specifically, this chapter: provides an overview of counter 
fraud services within UK central government; identifies the types of fraud 
perpetrated on central government (with examples); outlines the UK 
government’s current response to fraud; and summarises the current legal, 
professional and regulatory environment. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion on why further research is needed into the legal powers and skills 
available to central government civilian counter fraud investigators and how their 
use is controlled. 
Overview of civilian counter fraud operations 
Excluding those engaged on tax, benefit and immigration fraud, there are 
currently around 1,300 staff working in central government civilian counter fraud 
services. This number rises to more than 50,000 when those working in tackling 
tax, benefit and immigration fraud are taken into account (Cabinet Office, 
2015e). Metadata on the extent to which this workforce reflects the different 
groupings within UK society was not collected. However, of the 12 survey 
respondents who provided contact details, eight were male and four female. 
Similarly, of the 30 people who were interviewed, 19 were male and 11 female. 
This suggests that both men and women have significant representation in the 
workforce. However, all but one of the interviewees came from a white British 
background although this does not necessarily imply that persons from other 
ethnic backgrounds are under represented in this type of work. 
The relationship between central government civilian counter fraud teams and 
law enforcement differs between organisations. A few, such as the Ministry of 
Defence, have their own police force whose Criminal Investigations Department 
“works to prevent and detect serious fraud and other losses impacting on our 
armed forces” (Ministry of Defence, 2015). For the remainder, their civilian 
counter fraud teams’ relationship with the police and other specialist law 
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enforcement organisations, such as the National Crime Agency, is the same as 
for anyone else. If a fraud is suspected, they can report this to them and their 
cases will be subject to review against the relevant acceptance criteria. If a case 
is accepted, co-operation between civilian and police investigators often 
depends upon the nature of the case. 
Types of fraud against central government 
The range of frauds to which central government is at risk is significant and 
each main department has a counter fraud champion, who is often a member of 
the senior civil service, to take responsibility for counter fraud operations. In 
addition to tax fraud, benefit fraud, immigration fraud and TV licence fee 
evasion (which are outside the scope of this thesis) frauds perpetrated on 
central government include: procurement and grant fraud (£2.0 billion), payroll 
and recruitment fraud (£177 million), NHS patients charges fraud (£165 million), 
pension fraud (£7 million), frauds related to debt management such as student 
loans (£31 million), and national savings and investment fraud (£0.39 million) 
(Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011a, p.17; Cabinet Office, 2015d).  Examples of some 
frauds on central government in recent years are given in Table 4.1. 
To help central government bodies manage the fraud risks they may face, the 
Cabinet Office (2015d) has produced a generic fraud typology for them to use. 
This is reproduced in Table 4.2 and shows, for each main area of activity, the 
principal types of fraud from both external parties and internal staff. This is, by 
necessity, set at an overarching level. The range of services delivered by UK 
central government are numerous, varied and, in some cases (such as the risks 
relating to savings, loans and pensions), require specialist knowledge to 
manage. Thus, the development of a more detailed typology is outside the 
scope of this research project due to the depth of work required to produce this. 
However, to demonstrate how such a typology might develop, as central 
government counter fraud services continue to mature, a more detailed 
typology relating to one area, expenses, has been produced at Table 4.3. This 
shows, for number of specific expense fraud types, the groups most likely to 
commit these offences. It is designed as a starting point for others to use as, by 
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its very nature, a generic typology cannot consider all organisation specific risks 
that flow from their individual operating environments and business pressures.  
Table 4.1 Examples of fraud on central government activities 
In 2005, an army private took advantage of slack controls over payroll to create a 
number of bogus (or ghost) employees and paid their resulting salaries, with the 
assistance of a number of colleagues, into private bank accounts Cost £2.5 million 
(Tickner, 2010, p. 244). 
A government agency recruited a clerk to support a busy legal department  – not 
realising that up to three different people had sent in the application, attended 
interview and sat written tests. On appointment, the member of staff diverted cheques 
sent to the organisation to his own bank account – and, following clearance of these 
funds through the banking system, withdrew the cash. When confronted this member 
of staff disappeared (Tickner, 2010, pp. 214- 215). 
A procurement officer at a North London Hospital took cash to over-order and dispose 
of supplies of surgical gloves that were not needed on a monthly basis for a period of 
18 months. Cost £400,000 (Tickner, 2010, pp. 194-195). 
A solicitor, (and more than 20 of his staff) defrauded the legal aid system of more than 
£17 million over a period of six years, for claiming legal aid work that they did not do 
(Doig, 2006, pp. 147-149). 
Individual Learning Accounts, introduced by the Department for Education and Skills, 
which allowed qualifying individuals to buy a course from a private sector provider, 
were subject to four different fraud types: genuine persons not attending courses; non 
existent courses; non-eligible courses; and eligible courses with inflated fees. The total 
cost of the fraud is estimated at £110 million and about 60% of ILAs were thought to 
be fraudulent (Doig, 2006, pp. 66-69). 
A registrar falsely created fake birth certificates for a gang who used these to create 
false identities so that the benefits system could be defrauded. Cost £4 million (note: 
although a local authority employed this person, central government has overall 
responsibility for the registration of births, marriages and deaths through HM Passport 
Office (Tunley et al., 2015, p. 27; HMPO, 2014, p. 7). 
In 2009, concern was expressed that some Members of the UK Parliament were 
claiming for expenses to which they were not entitled. Five Labour MPs and two 
conservative peers were jailed, a cabinet minister was forced to resign over their 
expense claims and others left the House of Commons after the scandal broke (Giles, 
2012, p.12; Martin, 2014). 
In March 2015, six employees of a recruitment company called A4E made up files and 
forged signatures to falsely claim they had helped people find jobs, enabling them to 
hit targets and gain government bonuses. Value £300,000 (BBC News, 2015). 
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Table 4.2 Central government fraud typology (Cabinet Office, 2015d) 
External Expenditure External Supplier External Income External -Third party Internal (Staff) 
Procurement - Collusion between 
contractors 
Exploiting assets and 
information 
Charge Evasion Cheque fraud Payment fraud 
Procurement – mis-selling Identity theft Fine and court costs evasion Mandate fraud Receipt fraud 
Procurement - other Post contract fraud Tax fraud - national Unsolicited requests for payment Exploiting assets and 
information 
Means-tested payments Computer hacking and 
unauthorised misuse 
Tax fraud - local Plastic card fraud Identity theft 
Means-tested payments - Childcare Other Other Computer hacking and e-enabled 
fraud 
Personnel management 
Means-tested payments - Income   Other Travel and expenses, pay 
and other allowances 
Means-tested payments - Disability    Procurement fraud - Staff 
collusion 
Means-tested payments - Carer's    Procurement fraud - GPC 
Means-tested payments - Education    Procurement fraud - other 
Means-tested payments - Working hours    Theft of assets 
Means-tested payments - Other    Management reporting fraud 
Grants - Fraudulent grant application    Computer hacking and 
unauthorised misuse 
Grants - Fraudulent application from 
charities 
    
Grants - Misuse of grant funding     
Grants - Other     
EU payments     
Loans     
Assets - Theft and misuse     
Assets - Written off     
Other     	
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Table 4.3 A generic fraud typology for expense management 
Risk Potential exposure 
Expenses  
  
Claims for allowances that are no longer 
applicable due to a change in work 
circumstances – such as London weighting 
Staff 
Claims for journeys not made Staff, Contractors, Grant 
Recipients 
Claims for overnight subsistence but staying 
with relatives for free 
Staff, Contractors, Grant 
Recipients 
Overstated mileage and time claims  Staff, Contractors, Grant 
Recipients 
Forged signatures on claim forms Staff, Contractors,  
Claims for allowances to which there is no 
entitlement 
Staff, Contractors, Grant 
Recipients 
Claims relating to circumstances that no 
longer apply such as excess fares  
Staff  
Forged signatures for payment authorisations Staff, Contractors 
Forged documentation supporting claims, for 
example hotel bills, and taxi receipts. 
Staff, Contractors, Grant 
Recipients 
Central government counter fraud policy and guidance 
Civilian counter fraud services are delivered by many of the bodies working in 
the central government sector. The Cabinet Office and the Treasury have 
responsibility for policy and operational guidance in this area; with the 
remainder of central government working within the framework set by these 
departments. The Cabinet Office have articulated the broad policy on counter 
fraud in three documents Eliminating Public Sector Fraud, Fighting Fraud 
Together and Tackling Fraud and Error within Government (Cabinet Office & 
NFA, 2011a; 2011b; Cabinet Office, 2012). 
The Cabinet Office approach to countering fraud in central government centres 
on promoting a better understanding of fraud and the harm that it can cause. 
This, it believes, will lead to improved fraud prevention through the 
implementation of more secure systems and procedures (Cabinet Office & NFA, 
2011b, p.7). However, it recognizes that not all fraud can be prevented and 
calls for a stronger response to fraud by disrupting those “instruments, 
processes and organisations that facilitate or assist in the opportunity to commit 
fraud” (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011b, p.7, p.10). It proposes new measurement 
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indicators that will demonstrate the success of this policy and improved 
governance arrangements to aid inter organisational collaboration and co-
operation (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011b, pp. 22-23). The Cabinet Office 
therefore proposed a raft of measures centred around greater collaboration and 
more intelligence and data sharing, improved fraud risk awareness and 
measurement, greater levels of fraud prevention and improvements to fraud 
investigation, all of which reinforce its zero tolerance approach to fraud (Cabinet 
Office & NFA, 2011a, p.4, pp.13-15).  
In addition to the introduction of their fraud typology, the Cabinet Office have 
implemented other initiatives to assist central government develop their civilian 
counter fraud services. For example, in 2013, they required all government 
departments and other large public bodies to submit an assessment of their 
capacity to conduct fraud risk assessments and prevent, detect, investigate and 
sanction fraud (Cabinet Office, 2015a; 2015b). They have followed this with a 
request that, in 2014-15, government bodies conduct small, targeted, random 
sampling exercises on two payment streams that are at the highest risk of fraud 
and error. These random sampling exercises are designed to provide additional 
assurance and evidence of loss levels and enable departments to make the 
case for improved controls where loss is identified (Cabinet Office, 2015c). 
Operational guidance and other support from HM Treasury are contained in a 
number of publications. There is a specific section on managing fraud, 
Annex 4.9, in their publication Managing Public Money, a guide for public 
bodies on how to handle public funds with probity and in the public interest (HM 
Treasury, 2013). This is supported by a number of specialist publications. In 
1997, HM Treasury published a specialist guide called Managing the Risk of 
Fraud that was reprinted in both 2003 and 2011 (HM Treasury, 1997, 2003, 
2011b). This emphasises the need for public bodies to have a counter fraud 
policy and fraud response plan. To help public bodies manage this process 
effectively prior to 2011, HM Treasury also produced annual fraud reports that 
analysed the nature of reported frauds (HM Treasury, 2007b; 2008; 2009). 
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The legal, professional and regulatory environment 
This section provides some background on the legislative environment within 
which central government civilian counter fraud teams operate and their current 
skill requirements and training arrangements. It also provides an overview of 
how central government civilian counter fraud teams are currently managed and 
controlled. 
The law 
Counter fraud services within public service organisations are delivered locally; 
and are usually responsible, through their management chains, to their 
Permanent Secretary or Chief Executive Officer and their Audit Committees. 
Although all are bound by the legislation governing investigations, for example 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act 1996 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, 
their ability to interpret and apply these in their day-to-day operations varies. 
Administrative Law regulates the activities of government bodies. One of the 
fundamental principles of Administrative Law is that a public body cannot 
exceed its legal powers. Any actions outside these powers are deemed ‘ultra 
vires” and can be challenged in a court of law. Central government bodies 
obtain their powers from one of three sources: statutes; the common law; or the 
royal prerogative. Statute law takes precedence over the common law and the 
royal prerogative – reflecting the sovereignty of Parliament (Department for 
Constitutional Affairs, 2003, p.3) 
Public bodies that are not central departments headed by a crown minister, for 
example the Inland Revenue, derive their powers, which can be either express 
or implied, solely from statute and must not act outside of these. Conversely, 
government departments headed by a crown minister, such as the Home 
Office, may use the common law and royal prerogative, in addition to their 
various statutes, in support of their activities. In this respect, the “RAM Doctrine” 
is relevant as this part of common law states that the Crown may do whatever 
an individual may do provided that this is not explicitly or implicitly prohibited by 
statute (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2003, pp.3-6). 
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Phillips (2012, p.75) notes that “there is very likely to be a natural tendency to 
regard work on fraud [by non law enforcement organisations] as being outside 
of normal activity ... In the same way, any work carried out on fraud by such an 
agency from outside the body concerned may be seen as intrusive and is, to 
some degree, inherently or potentially unsettling or even threatening". The 
extent of any such powers, therefore, can be a matter of interpretation and their 
implementation is often undertaken with a degree of caution by each individual 
government organisation.  
The consequence of the current legal position is that there is no one set of legal 
powers available to central government bodies within which to discharge their 
counter fraud responsibilities. While this is unlikely to have an effect on fraud 
awareness activities, since this is an administrative function carried out within a 
public body as a part of its normal day-to-day corporate governance and 
managerial functions, it can have an effect on fraud detection and investigation 
and, by inference therefore, fraud prevention, deterrence, sanctions and 
redress.  
The effect on detection and investigations varies depending on the type of 
perpetrator. For internal operations, such as expense management and fraud, 
this is likely to be small as the public body has the necessary access to the 
relevant people, processes and information to detect, investigate and sanction 
fraud where necessary. However, the effect of a lack of powers is more 
significant where the source of the fraud is a supplier, contractor, corporate 
partner, service user or external party where access to the necessary people 
and information is more difficult. Such access also depends on the co-operation 
of the party under examination, which may not always be forthcoming even 
where such access is specified in contracts and grant agreements.  
This is an important issue because, as Jones (2004) notes, the provision of 
some public services has shifted in recent years from being provided by state 
employees to being provided by private sector contractors in search of more 
effective service delivery at lower cost (p.32). This change, he argues, "has led 
to a dangerous increase in [the] risk of fraud or corruption or at least private 
exploitation of public good provision" (p.32). This is because private sector 
contractors are seen to have a different ethos from the public sector, in terms of 
Professional	Doctorate	in	Security	and	Risk	Management																													Michael	Colin	Gilbert:	Student	440422		
August 2015 
						 	 Page 
 
91	
primary motivation (profit rather than public service), operation (closed rather 
than open) and accountability (to shareholders rather than ministers). This shift 
of ethos has blurred the distinction between the private and public sectors and, 
according to Jones (2004), can lead to inappropriate conduct in the delivery of 
goods and services for which there is no competitive market (pp.33-34). This 
increased risk is illustrated by concerns associated with charges for tagging 
criminals where Serco and G4S have agreed to repay £68.5 million and 
£108.9 million respectively to the Ministry of Justice, an issue for which they 
were referred to the SFO (BBC News, 2013; Croucher, 2014). Gorman (2014, 
p.494) concludes that professional communities are "vulnerable to the incursion 
of ideologies and institutional logics from newer expert service organisations 
that lack a tradition of self-regulation". 
Skills and training 
In relation to skills and training, the Fraud Review Final Report notes that if 
collaborative investigations between the police and civilian counter fraud 
investigators are to succeed, “they will require a minimum level of training and 
some form of accreditation” (AGO, 2006, p.151). This is because Investigating 
fraud is complex, requiring knowledge of: the law; investigative techniques; 
computer and accounting forensics; interviewing skills; and experience of 
acquiring and managing evidence (Button et al., 2008, p.245). Done poorly, 
investigations can present some risk to public bodies. For example, the Serious 
Fraud Office paid a total of £4.5 million to the Tchenguiz brothers in 2014 for 
“errors for which we were criticised by the High Court in July 2012” (Serious 
Fraud Office, 2014a; 2014b). 
While formal accreditation exists, this is not compulsory, as the training 
provided to counter fraud staff is left to the discretion of individual bodies. 
Furthermore, the training on offer may not meet the full range of competencies 
needed. For example, the Counter Fraud Professional Accreditation Board 
(CFPAB) syllabus for the Accredited Counter Fraud Specialist (ACFS) 
Qualification lists just 11 competencies for fraud awareness, prevention, 
detection and deterrence whereas there are more than 140 related to 
investigations and sanctions (CFPAB, 2014). Thus, the delivery of the skills and 
competencies needed to successfully deter and prevent fraud, such as system 
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design, control and implementation, can be dependent upon a counter fraud 
professional’s background, local training provision and any joint working with 
complementary professionals.  
Regulation 
There is no requirement for central government counter fraud teams to be 
externally regulated. Parts of their activities are, however, covered by statutory 
regulators, such as the Office of the Surveillance Commissioner, if they engage 
in regulated activities such as covert surveillance. Control over civilian counter 
fraud activities often rests with their line management and with the 
organisation’s audit committee. There is, therefore, some form of self-regulation 
although, unless there are agreed professional standards that are enforced by 
senior managers who meet a pre-defined level of expertise, this can be difficult 
to apply to a consistent standard. 
Achieving control over civilian counter fraud services to a consistent, 
understood and accepted standard, is an issue that needs further research. 
This is because the increasing emphasis on sharing intelligence, enforcement 
activity and punishment, coupled with the very significant powers available to 
some bodies, provide the scope for such bodies to commit harm to the innocent 
(Baker, 2011) and yet there is no means of redress for the injured other than 
expensive litigation because many public bodies operating in this arena are not 
subject to any form of external scrutiny. This is surprising given the plans to 
submit private investigators to SIA regulation from 2015 and the fact that other 
organisations tackling fraud, for example the HMRC and the police, are subject 
to regulation by the IPCC (IPCC, 2011). 
Discussion 
Despite these positive steps taken by the Cabinet Office to develop central 
government counter fraud services, Jackson (2013) concluded, in a review of 
fraud risk management in the public sector, that significant improvements in the 
UK government’s response were still needed. Jackson (2013) further argued 
that public sector bodies needed: a greater awareness of the size and nature of 
fraud risks; either had no counter fraud strategy or that, where these existed 
they were inadequate; needed to make more use of fraud risk assessments and 
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particularly for large procurements; should place greater emphasis on data 
analysis to detect and investigate frauds and understand better their key 
drivers; needed to pay more attention to the protection of whistle blowers; and 
needed to do more to foster an anti-fraud culture  (p.7). If they fall short of 
appropriate standards, the UK may be in breach of its responsibilities to the 
European Union. This is because Article 280 of the European Commission 
states that all member states shall counter fraud and other illegalities affecting 
the financial interests of the European Community (White, 2010, p.81). 
To help address Jackson’s (2013) concerns, the primary research phase sought 
to provide more information on the extent to which the current legislative and 
skills position, was perceived by research participants to be consistent with 
achieving the improvements that Jackson has called for. In particular, it sought 
to establish whether the current landscape within central government is likely to 
have a similar effect to that commented on by Fisher (2010) when looking at the 
arrangements for fighting serious fraud, corruption and financial market crimes 
committed in the private sector. Fisher (2010) noted, “the haphazard 
development of the government agencies tasked with tackling these crimes has 
created a system of overlapping responsibilities for investigation and 
prosecution, a dispersion of powers and caused unnecessary duplication of 
manpower and specialist resources” (p.1). Furthermore, recognising that the 
exercise of powers in this area, and particularly by inexpert and inexperienced 
staff, can intrude on civil liberties and adversely affect those with whom it comes 
into contact, this research also sought additional information on the 
effectiveness with which counter fraud teams are currently overseen and 
whether some form of external control (or regulation) is needed. 
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Chapter 5: Legal powers: primary research results 
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Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the primary research into the legal powers 
available to central government bodies to prevent fraud, deliver effective 
investigations achieve the sanctions necessary to punish offenders 
appropriately, recover lost funds and deter others from committing fraud in the 
future (Middleton, 2005, p.829; Giles, 2012, p.224).  
The research started with a general question on the legal power to conduct 
investigations, as such activities may be seen as being outside normal day-to-
day operations (Phillips, 2012, p.75). It then sought to establish those legal 
powers available to central government bodies to deliver each of the key 
elements needed for effective fraud management, namely: surveillance (Tunley 
et al., 2015, pp.131-133); data sharing (Cabinet Office, 2011a, p.13; 2011b, 
p.15); interviews (Jolly, 2012, p.144); evidence collection (Middleton, 2005, 
p.829); the power to apprehend and detain ((AGO, 2006, p.143); and the ability 
to obtain approprate redress (Tickner, 2010, pp.287-290; Phillips, 2012, p.77).  
Low (2012, p. 30) notes that “The appraisal of fraud allegations: 
Invariably relies on banking material, accountancy working papers, 
correspondence, contracts and other documentary evidence of 
transactions.   ……   Thus, the absence of powers which allow 
access to these sources act as a barrier to effective investigation. 
The purpose of this part of the research, therefore, was to establish whether a 
gap existed between those powers respondents considered necessary to 
discharge their counter fraud duties effectively and those they believed to be 
available to them (perceived powers). Where such gaps exist, it then sought to 
establish: their effect; those areas most susceptible to change; the support for 
change; possible solutions; and the time needed to implement any solutions.  
What legal powers are available to central government bodies? 
This section of the report examines the legal powers research participants 
perceive as being available to them and, to assess whether a shortfall exists, 
compares these to the powers that interviewees saw as being desirable if they 
are to fulfil their role more effectively.  Table 5.1 summarises the information 
obtained according to the eight key areas identified by the literature review.  
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Table 5.1: Gap analysis of powers available to central government bodies 
No Question DESIRED 
(1) 
PERCEIVED SURVEY 
2012 
The power to investigate  
A.1 The power to conduct fraud and other investigations to the civil and criminal standard 100% 65% 50% 
The power to conduct surveillance  
A.2 The power to conduct directed Surveillance with and without RIPA registration 80% 61% 25% 
A.3 The power to monitor staff e-mails and phone calls while working in official premises 100% 100% 63% 
A.4 The power to monitor contractor e-mails and phone calls while working on official premises 
with or without a warrant or RIPA registration 
96% 91% 38% 
The power to obtain and share information  
A.5 The power to issue third parties with a notice under s29 (3) of the Data Protection Act 1998 
when seeking information in a fraud or corruption enquiry 
100% 83% 38% 
A.6 The power to share data with law enforcement and private sector security and civilian 
counter fraud teams 
100% 87% 68% 
The Power to Interview  
A.7 The power to interview and take witness statements 100% 96% 75% 
A.8 The power to interview under caution 80% 74% 19% 
A.9 The power to compel staff, contractors and other individuals to attend for interview with self 
incrimination safeguards 
80% 48% 19% 
A.10 The power to compel staff, contractors and other individuals to attend for interview without 
self incrimination safeguards 
32% 22% 6% 
The Power to Obtain Evidence  
A.11 The power to obtain a search and seize warrant 68% 22% 0% 
A.12 The power to obtain production / other information gathering orders 88% 43% 0% 
A.13 The power to obtain and review financial and finance related documents 88% 43% 38% 
A.14 The power to enter third party premises (e.g. contractor Head Office, Personal Homes) to 
seize documents, computers and other evidential material with a warrant 
60% 26% 0% 
A.15 The power to receive information and / or documents and / or evidence from a source when 
permission from the document / evidence owners has not been granted 
76% 22% 31% 
A.16 The power to compel staff and third parties (e.g. contractors) to supply documents and other 
required evidence with self incrimination safeguards 
76% 30% 13% 
A.17 The power to compel staff and third parties (e.g. contractors) to supply documents and other 
required evidence without self incrimination safeguards 
32% 9% 6% 
A.18 The power to search an individual while on official premises 72% 35% 25% 
A.19 The power to search an employee’s desk, locker, work bin etc. within official premises 
without a warrant / other court order 
96% 87% 56% 
A.20 The power to search a contractor’s desk, locker, work bin etc. within official premises without 
a warrant / other court order 
92% 83% 50% 
A.21 The power to forensically examine and copy an employees work computer without a warrant 
/ other court order 
100% 96% 69% 
A.22 The power to forensically examine and copy a contractor’s computer system without a 
warrant / other counter order 
88% 78% 6% 
The Power to Apprehend and Detain  
A.23 The power to arrest an individual when suspected of fraud and / or corruption against your 
organisation 
16% 4% 0% 
The Power to Prosecute  
A.24 The ability to bring prosecutions in the organisation’s own right for fraud and  
corruption cases – rather than through law enforcement and the CPS 
72% 35% 6% 
The Power to Obtain Redress  
A.25 The power to issue a formal caution 60% 17% 6% 
A.26 The power to make a compensation claim under the civil law for losses suffered 92% 78% 50% 
A.27 The power to make a compensation claim under the criminal law for losses suffered 88% 78% 19% 
A.28 The power to recover sums paid in salary and other benefits, while employed or on 
suspension, if the case against the accused is proven (2) 
84% 61% 13% 
A.29 The power to recover investigation costs (2) 84% 26% 13% 
A.30 The power to issue an administrative penalty 72% 17% 31% 
Note (1): One interviewee declined to offer an opinion on the powers that civilian counter fraud teams should have. 
Note (2) These items were included as one power for the survey. However, following further research, it was decided to split these into two separate 
powers for the interview programme as they represent recoveries from two distinct areas of recoverable expenditure. 
 
Professional	Doctorate	in	Security	and	Risk	Management																													Michael	Colin	Gilbert:	Student	440422		
August 2015 
						 	 Page 
 
97	
Table 5.1 lists 30 powers, identified by the researcher as being used by law 
enforcement and some regulatory organisations in tackling fraud, and 
summarises the extent to which these are perceived as being, or should be, 
available to those central government bodies participating in this research. The 
third and fourth columns reflect the responses obtained from the 26 
interviewees and the final column lists the views of the 16 central government 
counter fraud champions who responded to the survey. It demonstrates that a 
gap exists between the legal powers that interviewees considered that they 
needed to deliver an effective counter fraud service and those they perceive are 
available to them. The most significant gaps they identified were in the power to 
investigate, the power to interview and the power to obtain evidence; all of 
which are necessary for effective fraud management. The remainder of this 
chapter thus explores views, from both interviewees and survey respondents, 
on the effects of this disparity and what might be done to tackle this. 
What is the effect of the current legislative position? 
This part of the research examines the possible effects of the perceived 
shortfall in powers that is indicated by the data in Table 5.1. While answers 
provided by some interviewees demonstrate that the effect can be profound for 
the management of fraud, this is not a universally held view. Others consider 
that they have sufficient powers to conduct their roles effectively. The 
arguments put forward by both groups are discussed in this section. 
Table 5.2 summarises responses from interviewees who considered that a lack 
of powers was having a deleterious effect on their ability to manage fraud. 
These have been grouped into the following categories: Policy and Strategy 
Formulation; Risk Management, Detection, Investigation, Sanctions; Deterrence 
and Prevention. It shows that all major aspects of fraud management are 
affected. While investigation was seen to be the most affected area, as 
expected, the most significant effect according to interviewees lay in its impact 
on policy and strategy formulation.  Their accounts suggested that, by inhibiting 
their understanding of how and why fraud is committed, it is more difficult for 
those managing fraud in these organisations to identify what constitutes a 
proportionate response and justify appropriate levels of investment, as the full 
extent of the fraud problem may be understated. 
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Table 5.2 Identified effect of a lack of legal powers 
Policy and Strategy Formation 
It inhibits an understanding of how and why fraud is committed  
Risk Management 
It inhibits the development of business centred fraud typologies 
It impacts on the development of fraud risk assessments 
Detection 
It inhibits an understanding of how to tackle fraudster methods 
It inhibits proactive fraud detection 
Investigations 
It makes it difficult to apply a public interest test 
Easier investigations will be cherry picked which reduces recoveries and fraud 
prevention 
A sub-optimal number of investigations are undertaken  
It affects consistency of treatment when allegations are received 
It impacts on evidence collection 
It causes difficulties in referring cases to law enforcement as the evidence 
needed cannot be collected 
Frauds go uninvestigated as the police are reluctant to become involved 
Sanctions 
It has a deleterious effect on the administration of justice 
It affects the ability to levy effective sanctions and penalties  
Deterrence 
There is a lack of an effective visible response 
It impacts on deterrence and prevention 
It undermines counter fraud control systems / structures and detection 
mechanisms 
Prevention 
It is difficult to prove non-compliance with internal policies etc. 
It limits data sharing opportunities 
In total, 17 interviewees (65 per cent) considered that a lack of legal powers 
had a deleterious effect on civilian counter fraud operations within central 
government. The main points arising from their testimony are discussed below. 
Interviewee 2 from the wider counter fraud community posited that insufficient 
investigatory powers have an effect on the administration of justice. They 
observed that, if civilian counter fraud specialists cannot obtain the evidence 
needed to construct a case, the guilty walk free and keep their fraudulent gains, 
and the innocent are unable to demonstrate that they have no case to answer. 
Thus, the issue is not one of intrusiveness but of equity under the law. The 
same interviewee noted that: 
Professional	Doctorate	in	Security	and	Risk	Management																													Michael	Colin	Gilbert:	Student	440422		
August 2015 
						 	 Page 
 
99	
The investigative powers available to departments vary significantly 
and this leads to inconsistencies in who can investigate what and the 
sanctions to be applied. Therefore, whether or not someone gets 
investigated and caught, depends not on the illegal act but against 
whom it was perpetrated.  
The gap in legal powers was also seen as inhibiting counter fraud operations, 
as their legitimacy to investigate can be called into question. Counter fraud 
practitioner 10, for example noted that in their organisation: 
HR questioned the authority of the counter fraud and finance 
departments to conduct [investigations that they had commissioned]. 
In their view, only HR professionals should carry out such 
investigations the vast majority of which lead to misconduct hearings 
should a case to answer be found.  
Consequently, this interviewee concluded that the first step in dealing with any 
shortfall in legal powers is to foster a more collaborative approach between the 
different parts of the organisation that have a legitimate interest in counter fraud 
issues. This collaborative approach, they opined, needed to ensure that the role 
of the counter fraud team is both clearly defined and accepted and its 
independence protected. In the interviewee’s view, it is only when this has 
occurred that there will be acceptance of the need for more legal powers. 
Interviewee 4 from the wider counter fraud community noted that a lack of 
investigative powers has more wide reaching consequences. They posited that: 
An inability to acquire relevant evidence also undermines fraud risk 
assessment – if organisations cannot determine whether fraud has 
occurred, the default is to call this error. This means that 
organisations are not aware of their fraud risks and therefore unable 
to formulate and implement the appropriate strategic response to 
fraud. 
A total of 17 interviewees (65 per cent) stated that a lack of legal powers has a 
significant effect on investigations. Two participants, counter fraud practitioner 6 
and interviewee 5 from the wider counter fraud community, noted that a lack of 
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powers and skilled resources drives the selection of cases for investigation. 
Interviewee 5 from the wider counter fraud community observed that: 
Organisations may cherry pick those cases to be taken forward for 
investigation. The relevant decision criteria will focus on what is 
achievable within their legislative and organisational framework and 
for many departments, who have few legal powers to investigate 
fraud, this will lead to the easiest cases being selected – even though 
the more complex cases have potentially more value to add in terms 
of eventual recoveries and the identification, design and 
implementation of improvements to programmes, projects, 
procedures and control mechanisms. 
This participant concluded that a lack of investigative powers drives behaviours 
and thus: 
Departments may be reluctant to spend amounts of time and 
resource on larger cases which take a long time to come to fruition 
and whose benefits are uncertain.  
Interviewee 7 from the policy and professional bodies group shared this view, 
stating that it would not be cost effective to take on cases that have a poor 
likelihood of being brought to a successful conclusion. Indeed, counter fraud 
practitioner 10 questioned the UK government’s zero tolerance policy, stating 
that all allegations made should be subject to a public interest test to ensure 
that any investigation, and therefore the use of powers, was proportionate to the 
potential losses involved. However, this was not a universally held view with 
counter fraud practitioner 8 asserting that: 
If staff became aware of their [legal] limitations this may adversely 
affect counter fraud’s ability to deter fraud and could lead to an 
increase in fraud cases. 
A lack of legal powers was cited as a reason why allegations were not treated 
consistently and often took a long time to investigate.  Interviewee 4 from the 
policy and professional bodies group observed: 
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It causes unnecessary delays that can have an adverse effect on the 
preservation of evidence (e.g. it can be lost or removed) and in the 
consistency of treatment between the handling of investigations both 
within an [organisation’s] caseload and between [organisations in the 
same sector]. This is because other bodies with the necessary 
powers (for example the police) have to be called in to assist the 
investigation process. Such co-operation will depend on an 
investigation partner’s priorities, available resources and skills rather 
than on the merits of the individual case. 
In summary, interviewees’ accounts conveyed that a lack of legal powers 
constrains the ability to investigate, both individually and collegiately, and on the 
progression of a case from inception to completion. This can make it more 
difficult to bring investigations to a successful conclusion and recover monies 
lost due to fraud.  
Seven interviewees from counter fraud teams and the policy and professional 
bodies groups noted that effective investigation is also dependent on the 
willingness of others to provide assistance. Interviewee 1 from the policy and 
professional bodies group stated: 
Working with the police is not always a solution ….. as they are often 
unwilling to become involved in the investigation of fraud cases – and 
especially where low sums of money are involved.  
This interviewee also observed that investigations have had to be stopped due 
to a lack of external support and particularly where information is needed from 
the financial sector (for example banks). They observed that: 
There is no legal right to information from third parties and therefore 
investigators are reliant on the permission of these bodies to release 
the necessary information to them – which is often not forthcoming. 
The problem is compounded by limitations on data sharing. 
An inability to fully investigate was seen by two interviewees (counter fraud 
practitioner 2 and interviewee 5 from the policy and professional bodies group) 
as affecting their ability to levy appropriate sanctions and penalties and thus 
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deter and prevent fraud. Interviewee 5 from the policy and professional bodies 
group participant posited: 
If teams cannot conduct investigations properly this inhibits their 
ability to deter and prevent fraud (as potential fraudsters will know 
that there is a low opportunity that their activities will be successfully 
dealt with). Such attitudes also undermine the control systems and 
structures in place to prevent fraud and undermine detection 
mechanisms. This is because staff may be reluctant to come 
forward (for example through whistle blowing arrangements) if they 
do not feel that there is a sufficient likelihood that their concerns 
can be dealt with properly. Finally, it undermines the sanctions and 
redress strands of the fraud management model as fraudsters are 
not held to account and the monies stolen remain unrecovered. 
Difficulties caused by a lack of legal powers for fraud prevention, investigations 
and sanctions led interviewee 6 from the policy and professional bodies group 
to highlight the importance of a fraud awareness culture in government 
organisations. This, they argued, would help to ensure that all instances of 
fraud are detected as soon as possible thereby limiting damage and loss and 
helping to facilitate an inter and intra-departmental approach to tackling known 
cases. However, they observed that raising the awareness of fraud, in the 
absence of robust control frameworks and without the ability to mount a visible 
rapid and robust response, might increase the risk of fraud. This is because 
fraudsters may not consider that there is a sufficient probability that their actions 
will be detected and dealt with appropriately.  
However, nine interviewees (35 per cent) had an opposing view and stated that 
a lack of legal powers did not have a significant effect on their counter fraud 
operations. Table 5.3 lists the reasons given by interviewees for this conclusion, 
which can be grouped into one of two categories: Policy and Strategy 
Formulation; and Investigations.  These interviewees considered that the 
current legislative framework adequately supported their investigative 
programme and provided a suitable balance between the need to protect public 
funds on the one hand and individual civil liberties on the other. 
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Table	5.3:	Principal	reasons	for	no	increase	in	legal	powers	
Policy	and	Strategy	Formation	
The	legislative	framework	is	adequate	–	with	sufficient	powers	in	enabling	legislation	
Regulatory	powers	negate	need	for	fraud	powers	for	external	frauds	
Their	policy	is	to	undertake	internal	investigations	only	
Too	many	powers	may	lead	to	public	disquiet	
Civil	liberties	issues	lead	to	ministerial	caution	
Investigations	
Civilian	counter	fraud	teams	already	have	the	powers	they	need	
Common	law	powers	available	such	as	the	RAM	Doctrine	
Implied	powers	can	be	used	to	deal	with	fraud	
A	lack	of	powers	may	not	hinder	investigations	
Insufficient	work	volume,	skills,	resources	or	spread	of	work	to	justify	an	increase	in	powers	
A	lack	of	resource	to	make	use	of	additional	powers	in	respect	of	contractor	/	external	fraud		
The	police,	who	have	the	necessary	powers,	can	step	in	and	take	over	an	investigation	
This may be why only three of the 16 counter fraud champions who responded 
to the survey (18 per cent) stated that they intended to amend their working 
practices to make better use of the legal powers they already had. All three 
intended to make improvements to fraud awareness, prevention, detection and 
investigation and two planned improvements to fraud deterrence. However, 
none planned any improvements to their fraud sanctions and redress 
operations. This is surprising given that only two of these reported that they had 
powers to seek civil recoveries and only one could levy an administrative 
penalty. It is therefore surprising that the third was not seeking any 
improvements in these two areas. 
Thus, when interviewees stated that a lack of legal powers was not having a 
significant effect on counter fraud operations, the reasons for this were 
explored.  Counter fraud practitioner 4 noted that their enabling legislation 
provides them with the power to obtain information from third parties where 
fraud is suspected. Where their powers are insufficient to deal with the case in 
hand, they can: 
Negotiate the relevant resource from law enforcement agencies to 
compensate for their lack of powers. In one case, we are paying a 
local authority that has the necessary powers to investigate a 
particular case for us. 
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Counter fraud practitioner 3 shared this view, noting that their organisation was 
able to refer to the police any investigation that was being hindered by a lack of 
investigatory powers. Counter fraud practitioner 9 also argued that no change to 
legislative powers was needed as their organisation’s policy was to investigate 
only those internal cases referred to them by senior managers. Consequently, 
there would need to be a policy change that paved the way for investigations 
under PACE and allowed for a much greater degree of autonomy and 
independence than currently exists. There would also need to be adjustments 
to their code of conduct and discipline policy before this could be brought about.  
This interviewee accepted that there are fraud threats from external partners 
such as contractors, corporate partners, grant recipients, third party service 
recipients and external sources such as organised crime. However, they argued 
that if their counter fraud team were to be required to expand into these areas, 
significant change and up-skilling would be needed coupled with improvements 
to their governance procedures.  Interviewee 7 from the policy and professional 
bodies group concluded this section of their interview stating: 
Fraud awareness and prevention are key. In the absence of the legal 
powers needed to investigate complex frauds, and particularly those 
generated by external parties, steps such as the fraud proofing of 
new policies, systems, processes and procedures are essential. 
However, despite this, it should be remembered that effective 
investigations are a key component of a successful prevention 
programme. 
This comment shows the way in which the different parts of the fraud 
management model are integrated and that a lack of legal powers has a wider 
effect than simply on investigations and recoveries. For example, the lack of a 
visible response to allegations made; an inability to collect the evidence needed 
to prove or disprove the allegations made; and difficulties in referring cases to 
the police for further action due to the lack of available proof has harmful effects 
on both fraud prevention and deterrence. Counter fraud practitioner 10 
observed that a lack of deterrence means that: 
 There are too few disincentives to circumvent control procedures. 
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A second participant, interviewee 2 from the wide counter fraud community, 
noted that their legal powers are more reactive, rather than proactive, which 
affects their ability to produce fraud risk profiles and take preventative action. 
This may explain the statement made by interviewee 7 from the wider counter 
fraud community who argued that: 
To deal with fraud effectively, counter fraud professionals need many 
of the [evidence gathering] powers vested in a constable.  
Which parts of the gap in legal powers are most changeable? 
This part of the research report analyses the data in Table 5.1 in more detail to 
assess, using the interview data and survey responses, which parts of the 
potential gap in legislative powers are the most susceptible to change. This will 
then help to provide focus for priorities for future action. 
Figure 5.1 lists the responses gives by interviewees and survey respondents to 
the ten legal powers listed at Table 5.1 underpinning: fraud investigation; 
surveillance; data sharing; and interviews. It shows that more than 80 per cent 
of interviewees supported the need for nine of these powers although only 
between 6 per cent and 75 per cent of survey respondents reported that these 
were available to them. This suggests that they consider that increasing legal 
powers in this area may be of benefit to fraud management within their 
organisations. 
There was less agreement over some of the powers needed to obtain evidence. 
Figure 5.2 lists the responses gives by interviewees and survey respondents to 
the 12 legal powers underpinning this aspect of fraud management and shows 
a significant gap between desired and actual powers. 
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Figure	5.1:	The	power	to	investigate,	conduct	surveillance,	share	data	and	interview 
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Figure	5.2:	The	power	to	obtain	evidence 
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a contractor’s computer system without a 
warrant / other counter order 
The power to forensically examine and copy 
an employees work computer without a 
warrant / other court order 
The power to search a contractor’s desk, 
locker, work bin etc. within official premises 
without a warrant / other court order 
The power to search an employee’s desk, 
locker, work bin etc. within official premises 
without a warrant / other court order 
The power to search an individual while on 
official premises 
The power to compel staff and third parties 
(e.g. contractors) to supply documents and 
other required evidence without self 
incrimination safeguards 
The power to compel staff and third parties 
(e.g. contractors) to supply documents and 
other required evidence with self incrimination 
safeguards 
The power to receive information and or 
documents and / or evidence from a source 
when permission from the document / 
evidence owners has not been granted 
The power to enter third party premises (e.g. 
contractor Head Office, Personal Homes) to 
seize documents, computers and other 
evidential material with a warrant 
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Figure 5.2 shows that two thirds of interviewees believed that civilian counter 
fraud teams should be able to obtain search and seize warrants. Similarly, 
60 per cent of interviewees believed that they should be able to enter third party 
premises. However, only 22 per cent of interviewees reported that they could 
obtain search and size warrants and only 26 per cent stated that they had the 
power to enter third party premises. All survey respondents reported that these 
legal powers were not available to their civilian counter fraud staff. However, 
such a disparity between use and availability is unsurprising as these legal 
powers have significant civil liberties implications and require highly trained 
staff, supported by an appropriate infrastructure, to implement effectively. The 
widening of these could, therefore, be both controversial and expensive. 
Figure 5.2 also shows that there was wider agreement between interviewees 
over the need to obtain production and other information gathering orders 
(88 per cent), to be able to review financial documents (88 per cent) and to be 
able to receive evidence from third parties where fraud is suspected 
(76 per cent).  Despite this, more than half of interviewees, and many survey 
recipients, reported that such legal powers were not available to them. There 
was a greater degree of convergence, however, over the need for, and 
availability of, the legal power needed to obtain information and evidence from 
staff and contractors. More than 85 per cent of interviewees reported that they 
needed the power to search employee and contractor desks, workstations and 
computers, with the majority of interviewees and survey respondents stating 
that they were able to carry out these tasks. In this area the greatest gap was 
10 percentage points. This suggests that they consider that increasing legal 
powers in these areas may be of benefit to fraud management within central 
government. 
Figure 5.3 lists interviewee and survey respondent views on whether civilian 
counter fraud teams should have powers of arrest and detention.  This shows 
that there was agreement that powers of arrest and detention were not 
appropriate for civilian counter fraud teams although many (more than 70 per 
cent) would find being able to bring prosecutions in their own right helpful. 
However, on this latter point there is a significant gap. While 72 per cent of 
interviewees thought this necessary, only 35 per cent stated that this power was  
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Figure	5.3:	The	power	to	arrest	and	detain	
available. The gap was more marked from survey respondents, with only six per 
cent stating that they could bring prosecutions in their own right. Consequently, 
there is likely to be little benefit to be gained by acquiring powers of arrest and 
detention although an ability to bring prosecutions in an organisation’s own right 
may be of benefit. 
Finally, Figure 5.4 lists interviewee and survey respondent views on the six 
powers identified as being pertinent to the ability to obtain redress.  
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This demonstrates that there are some significant gaps between desired and 
available powers in this area. While more than 80 per cent of interviewees 
stated that they needed the power to make compensation claims under the civil 
and criminal law, and to recover sums from employees, survey respondents 
reported significant gaps in this area, although the gaps reported by 
interviewees were much smaller. Similarly, while there was also support for 
civilian counter fraud teams being able to issue cautions, recover investigation 
costs and issue administration penalties, most interviewees and survey 
respondents reported significant gaps in their ability to implement these. This 
suggests that they consider that increasing legal powers in this area may be of 
benefit to fraud management within their organisations. 
What is the support for change? 
This section of the research examines the extent to which there is likely to be 
support for closing the gap in legislative powers that is believed to exist. Work 
by Middleton (2005), Philips (2012), Tunley et al. (2015) and others suggests 
that practitioner support for such changes may be forthcoming, as these legal 
powers are needed if central government is to have the means at its disposal to 
discharge its counter fraud responsibilities effectively. However, some 
interviewees’ views suggest that such support would not be universal and their 
reasoning behind this is discussed below. 
Interviewee 7 from the policy and professional bodies group posited that the 
need for powers is dependent upon four issues: the type of fraud being 
investigated; the organisation’s functions; the information collected during the 
discharge of these functions; and the extent to which this information is 
retained. They observed that: 
It is important to distinguish between two different types of fraud – (i) 
where it has arisen as a function of delivering normal business 
processes and (ii) where there is an external threat – for example 
cyber crime by Organised Crime Groups (OGCs). Departments need 
more formal powers to deal with the latter – although external threats 
can still be tackled effectively if organisations define the information 
they need to deal with such risks and systematically collect and 
analyse this. However, tackling this type of fraud needs more legal 
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powers than process driven or internal frauds if these are to be 
tackled successfully. 
This participant considered that central government bodies should make the 
best use of the powers they already have through the development of a clear 
fraud typology and the design of management information systems to collect 
and collate data on those circumstances which give rise to fraud.  They 
concluded that,  
For organisations delivering services to many users there should be 
a significant amount of comparative data from which outliers, 
anomalies and problems can be identified and worked up to the point 
where a case can be made for police involvement. The situation is 
more complex for organisations that do not generate or retain such 
information. In these cases there is a case for more powers.  
Interviewee 5 from the wider counter fraud community agreed that better use 
could be made of existing powers. They observed that: 
There are significant differences between criminal and civil 
investigations. The criminal investigation process is undertaken to a 
common legal and professional framework that is understood by all 
working in that field and enforced by the courts and the legal process. 
This is not the case for investigations undertaken by civilians where no 
such commonly understood structure and framework [exists] and each 
organisation is working to a different model. This makes co-operation, 
and further action in the more serious cases, difficult. 
Instead, the interviewee argued, they could rely upon appropriate clauses in 
contracts and grant agreements and, where additional legal powers were 
needed, joint working with the police. This interviewee referred to an example 
whereby a whistle blower’s concern around charging a department for specified 
services led to an investigation in which the companies concerned co-operated 
fully due to the commercial impact of such investigations on their business.  
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Counter fraud practitioner 11 and interviewee 1 from the wider counter fraud 
community shared the view that additional legal powers (which would need 
ministerial approval and primary legislation) were unnecessary. Indeed, 
interviewee 1 from the wider counter fraud community posited that: 
Central government bodies will either have express powers in their 
enabling legislation or implied powers to investigate in order to 
maintain effective control over public services, finances, and assets. 
[They also have the option of using] the common law RAM doctrine 
where departments can do anything that an individual can do 
unless a particular act is prohibited by statute […and] the Royal 
Prerogative.  
They also made the point that where unacceptable behaviour has occurred, an 
increase in powers would make it easier to prove fraud, (rather than the breach 
of trust needed to institute disciplinary proceedings) although: 
The outcome would be the same - dismissal followed by a police 
referral that has a low probability of being taken forward to 
investigation.  
Furthermore, this interviewee noted that having increased powers might prove 
problematic because their organisation does not have: 
The volume or spread of work to acquire and maintain the skills 
necessary to investigate to the criminal standard. Consequently, if 
[we] attempted to do this, our cases may run into serious problems 
when they reached court. Furthermore, investigating to the criminal 
standard would lead to a cost that is disproportionate to the losses 
incurred. 
They went on to argue that the civil liberties issues associated with an increase 
in legal powers has led to ministerial caution and thus attention should be 
focussed on what can be achieved within the existing legal framework. 
Two interviewees, counter fraud practitioners 1 and 11, however, stressed the 
need for public sector bodies to know what their legal powers are and operate 
within these. Counter fraud practitioner 1 further observed that, if investigators 
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exceed their powers, there is a high likelihood that their cases will fail when they 
come to court. In this context, investigations done poorly can result in legal 
action. Counter fraud practitioner 2 noted that their employer was facing legal 
action, through which substantial damages were being sought, as the claimant 
is alleging that the investigation led to the failure of their business. 
How might any shortfall in legal powers be addressed? 
This part of the primary research programme examined how interviewees 
considered that the perceived shortfall in legal powers might be addressed. 
They suggested a number of different solutions that are discussed below.  
Figure 5.5 lists the possible solutions proposed by interviewees to close the 
legislative gap. This shows that thirteen (50 per cent) of interviewees noted that 
additional legislation would be required to provide them with additional powers. 
However, this was not seen as the only solution. 12 interviewees (46 per cent) 
observed that, in the new operating environment with more third party 
outsourcing, it is essential that relevant access clauses be built into supplier 
contracts. A further two participants (eight per cent), counter fraud practitioner 7 
and the policy and interviewee 1 from the policy and professional bodies group, 
noted that such access clauses should also be extended to grant agreements.  
	
Figure	5.5	Methods	for	dealing	with	a	shortage	of	legal	powers 
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Similarly, for staff, 12 interviewees (46 per cent) from all three groups observed 
that it is also important to allow for appropriate investigative techniques to be 
built into contracts of employment. Such clauses, it was posited, set out clear 
expectations and, in doing so, help enforce fraud deterrence. These participants 
noted, however, that there could be difficulties in enforcing such contracts. In 
addition, interviewee 3 from the wider counter fraud community noted that they 
rely on implied legal powers to protect their services, assets and finances from 
fraud. 
Interviewee 8 from the wider counter fraud community observed that: 
The first step is to ensure that counter fraud receives professional 
recognition – to give others confidence that fraud investigators will use 
any powers given to them responsibly and proportionately within some 
form of regulatory framework through which they are held to account. 
Once this was in place, it was argued, further legislation could be considered. 
Interviewee 4 from the wider counter fraud community posited that central 
government organisations could also use fraud awareness campaigns to make 
staff aware of fraud and the risks associated with committing it (e.g. mandate 
fraud). However, they observed that: 
If the profile of fraud is raised, and it becomes clear that there is no 
effective response, this undermines the anti-fraud culture within the 
organisation. Where fraud risk has been identified it must be 
accompanied by an appropriate response. 
There was also some support for a single fraud investigation service for central 
government. Eight interviewees, from both the wider counter fraud community 
and the policy and professional body groups, noted that investing powers in a 
collaborative investigative body, such as the Single Fraud Investigation Service 
(SIFIS), which has been established to tackle benefit fraud, is likely to be 
preferable to granting multiple bodies increased powers. However, they 
accepted that any development of this sort would require appropriate 
legalisation and thus any changes may well be some time away. 
Professional	Doctorate	in	Security	and	Risk	Management																													Michael	Colin	Gilbert:	Student	440422		
August 2015 
						 	 Page 
 
115	
Moreover, some participants called for a more creative approach to dealing with 
a shortfall in legal powers. Interviewees considered that much could be 
achieved through the research that forms the basis of a persuasive case that 
can be taken to the police, or others, for action. Counter fraud practitioner 4 
stated that: 
In one case, we are paying [another organisation] that has the 
necessary powers to investigate a particular case for us.  
Another, interviewee 1 from the wider counter fraud community, noted that, a 
solution to a lack of legal powers may require a different operating model than 
that presently used by civilian counter fraud teams. They might, for example 
follow that adopted by: 
The financial services sector who pay for dedicated police services – 
such as the plastic card fraud unit… [and].. set up arrangements with 
their local police forces or arrange for police secondees to their team 
Counter fraud practitioner 9 stated that their organisation is now looking at a 
different model by taking a holistic approach to counter fraud management. This 
included establishing a working group to review the scope of counter fraud 
operations and the way in which these are delivered across the entirety of their 
internal operations, their agencies and non-departmental public bodies. This 
interviewee reported that their organisation was considering establishing a 
single group-wide service that would prove a larger, more expert, pool of 
resources that could be deployed more flexibly than at present and allow for a 
more proportionate approach to allegations made. However, this would 
necessitate a change in legislation and the review, and convergence, of current 
counter fraud policies applied across the group as a whole. 
How long is any such shortfall likely to take to address? 
The final theme in this chapter is concerned with how long any changes to 
investigative powers are likely to take. Most interviewees, representing all three 
of the groups interviewed (Table 3.1), referred to the considerable slowness of 
the legislative process. Following ministerial recognition of the need for more 
legal powers, most who expressed a view on this, hypothesised that between 
three and five years would be needed for this to proceed through the 
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Parliamentary process and take effect. Figure 5.6 records interviewee 
assessments on the length of time needed to introduce the necessary 
legislative change. From this, it can be seen that the assessed timescale 
ranges from 1-2 years to more than 10 years.  
	
Figure	5.6	Estimated	time	needed	to	introduce	legislative	change 
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Interviewee 8 from the wider counter fraud community noted some problems in 
using this route to obtain access to the required information and people stating: 
(a) An individual or organisation may prefer to terminate their 
contract rather than be subject to an investigation; 
(b) Individuals (and particularly senior staff) may have sufficient 
influence to interfere with, and frustrate, investigations into 
their activities; and 
(c) It may not be possible to sack individuals or organisations who 
decline to co-operate fully with fraud investigations as they 
provide essential services that their employers or contract 
principals cannot do without in the short to medium term. 
They concluded that problems with ensuring the completeness and accuracy of 
evidence might lead to a sub-optimal use of investigative resources as 
investigations may focus on cases with a low probability of success. 
Discussion 
The findings suggest that some central counter fraud bodies may struggle to fill 
the gap caused by the lack of law enforcement capacity to tackle financial crime 
(Gannon & Doig, 2010, p. 40, pp.50-51). These findings also cast doubts on 
whether they can provide the complementary policing resource envisaged by 
the Fraud Review Final Report (AGO, 2006, pp.9-10). 
Fraud is not a national policing priority (Doig & McCaulay, 2008, p.186) and, 
with the current constraints on civilian investigations within central counter 
fraud, it is unlikely that the UK government’s vision as espoused in their 2011 
documents Eliminating Public Sector Fraud and Fighting Fraud Together can be 
fully delivered at present. Some public bodies do not have the legal power, or 
law enforcement the capacity, to meet the UK government’s expectation to 
“strengthen our response to be tougher on fraudsters by disrupting and 
punishing them more efficiently and effectively” (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011b, 
p.18; Gannon & Doig, 2010, p.40, p.56). 
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It is also difficult to envisage how some of these bodies can implement the ‘zero 
tolerance’ approach promulgated by ministers in Eliminating Public Sector 
Fraud. In particular, it is unclear how many of the respondents can take swift 
and effective enforcement action, and stem continuing losses (Cabinet Office & 
NFA, 2011a, p.4, p.15). The empirical findings from this research suggest that 
this may be difficult to bring about. More than 20 per cent of interviewees, for 
example, did not consider that they can make an application for compensation 
under the civil or the criminal law. 
In addition, access to financial information is not thought to be to available to 
more than half of those public bodies whose representatives participated in this 
research, making it difficult for them to investigate corruption allegations where 
the only tangible evidence may be cash deposited in bank accounts. The 
inability of some central government counter fraud teams to place suspects 
under surveillance, and observe receipt of corrupt payments, exacerbates this 
issue because such cases may have no paper based trails in either work or 
home based records. Thus, some public bodies may struggle to effectively 
investigate anything other than minor work based frauds leaving more major 
frauds by other groups beyond their reach. 
The UK government notes that the reciprocal sharing of intelligence is an 
essential fraud disruptor because many frauds cross departmental boundaries 
(Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011a, p.10, p.13). It is difficult to see how this is to be 
fully achieved when more than 10 per cent believe that they have insufficient 
legislative authority to share data with law enforcement and other bodies 
involved in the fight against fraud.  
Collaboration is at the heart of the UK government’s proposals to tackle fraud 
(Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011a, p.10, pp.12-13). However, having differing legal 
powers inhibits collaborative working, the detection of the full extent of the fraud 
and thus the recovery of all sums owing. This may be one of the reasons why 
the DWP and HMRC have sought separate legislation to establish their SIFIS 
(Department for Work and Pensions, 2011). In their supporting impact 
assessment, both departments acknowledge the inefficiency of investigating 
frauds spanning the tax and benefits system separately and note that this can 
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lead to unfairness, because certain types of fraud (for example tax credit fraud) 
have less chance of detection than others.  
The UK government have yet to announce plans to harmonise the legal powers 
available to central government bodies to allow them to collaborate more 
effectively and thus improve intelligence management, detection and 
investigation. This may be because such a move may conflict with citizen’s 
rights to privacy and a free society. Indeed, in 2010, the UK government 
abolished plans for a national identity database for these very reasons (Travis, 
2010).  
Despite the above analysis, views on whether civilian counter fraud staff have 
the necessary powers and legal framework within which to provide an effective 
counter fraud service are mixed. There are clearly differences in the legal 
framework within which individual public sector bodies deliver counter fraud 
services, which is consistent with the opinion expressed by Doig & Levi (2013) 
and Fisher (2010) that the current institutional and legislative position is 
fragmented.  
The results from the semi-structured interview programme suggest that central 
government bodies consider that they have many of the powers needed to 
tackle fraud by employees that remain within the disciplinary system. However, 
gaps in powers reported by some bodies suggest that they may find it more 
difficult to build a case for the police to take forward with minimal law 
enforcement assistance. An inability to interview under caution, for example, 
means that evidence collected from interview by these bodies may not be 
admissible in court (Home Affairs Select Committee, 2013, p.27). For these 
bodies, additional assistance from the police will be needed to take cases 
through the Criminal Justice System, which, due to a lack of resources, may not 
be forthcoming.  
Consequently, the main weaknesses appear to centre on those powers needed 
to tackle fraud from outside sources such as contractors, corporate partners, 
service recipients and third parties. Results from the survey suggest differences 
between organisations, however, with some bodies reporting a lack of powers 
to support internal cases. For example, some reported that they were unable to 
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monitor staff e-mails and phone calls while working on official premises. This is 
surprising since such a facility is required to detect when such facilities have 
been used inappropriately.  It may be, therefore, that some respondents were 
unaware of the legal powers actually available. 
Finally, 17 interviewees (67 per cent) concluded that perceived issues with legal 
powers to conduct fraud investigations have a wider effect on counter fraud 
management. If teams cannot conduct investigations properly this inhibits their 
ability to deter and prevent fraud, as potential fraudsters will know that there is a 
low opportunity that their activities will be successfully dealt with. Such attitudes 
also undermine the control systems and structures in place to prevent fraud and 
undermine detection mechanisms. This is because staff may be reluctant to 
come forward (for example, through whistle blowing arrangements) if they do 
not feel that there is a sufficient likelihood that their concerns can be dealt with 
properly. It also undermines the sanctions and redress strands of the fraud 
management model (Figure 2.1) as fraudsters are not held to account and the 
monies stolen remain unrecovered. 
Those who considered the current legal framework to be appropriate cited civil 
liberties, skills and resource issues as reasons for leaving the current 
framework unreformed, and accepted that there are limitations on the extent to 
which they can tackle certain types of fraud and particularly those perpetrated 
by external parties. They sought to protect their organisations through ensuring 
that programmes, policies, systems and procedures were properly ‘fraud 
proofed’ and by relying on others, most notably the police, to carry out these 
enquires for them. The answer may lie in a solution which provides government 
organisations with some additional investigative powers to combat fraud but 
with their use being strictly controlled, and does not extend into more 
contentious areas such as arrest, detention and the levying of cautions and 
legally binding penalties. 				
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Chapter 6: Counter fraud skills: primary research results 
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Introduction 
This chapter examines the extent to which counter fraud skills and 
competencies are present within central government. This is because: ”staff 
engaged on investigative duties need all the training, qualifications and 
authority that are appropriate and these may be imported or developed anew 
within the body itself” (Phillips, 2012, p.77). These skills include: knowledge of 
the law; investigative techniques; computer and accounting forensics; inter-
personal and interviewing skills; experience of acquiring and managing 
evidence; internal staff rules; and wider security and stakeholder needs (Button, 
et al., 2008, p.245; Lines, 2012, p.275). The same applies to other aspects of 
counter fraud work. Krambia-Kapardis (2002, pp.266-267) notes the 
significance of appropriate skills to the detection of fraud and Giles (2012, pp. 
29-30) emphasises the importance of fraud training for internal auditors whose 
work on internal control mechanisms “help improve the overall environment 
within which fraud prevention works” (Hutchinson, 2012, p.413). 
Button & Gee (2013, p.195) note that fraud investigations are often undertaken 
by HR managers, auditors, accountants and general managers, none of whom 
have the training needed to support a case that may merit criminal prosecution. 
They see a dedicated team of counter fraud specialists as the most effective 
way of managing fraud as their remit covers all elements of the counter fraud 
management model. This conclusion presupposes that counter fraud 
professionals within central government have the training and experience to 
undertake their role both competently and effectively, Consequently, this part of 
the primary research programme addresses whether competency reviews are 
regularly carried out, identifies the key competencies needed to discharge 
counter fraud services effectively and examines whether appropriate 
arrangements are in place for acquiring and maintaining these. The chapter 
closes with a discussion of the operational effects of the current skills position 
on the delivery of an effective counter fraud service. 
The interviewees identified a large number of competencies. To help draw out 
key themes each competency has been grouped into one of four categories: 
innate skills; technical skills; organisational skills; and professional skills. These 
categories have been designed to reflect the different ways people learn and 
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acquire knowledge. Innate skills are acquired by individuals over a long period 
of time and are often recruited into the business and continually developed. 
Technical skills can be acquired through appropriate training courses, and if 
supported by adequate levels of practical experience, can be learned fairly 
quickly. Organisational skills relate to a particular organisation and are acquired 
through in-house courses and work experience, are often specific to the 
employer and form an integral part of service development. Finally, professional 
skills are often externally determined, learned through a period of study, and 
require technical experience to discharge effectively. 
The ways in which knowledge is acquired and the different training approaches 
drove the allocation of specific competencies into each category. Where a 
competency could fall into more than one category, such as cyber security, 
which could be classified as both technical and professional skills, a judgement 
was made about which was likely to offer the most applicable learning 
environment for a counter fraud specialist. 
Are competency reviews regularly carried out? 
The first theme in this chapter is concerned with the extent to which central 
government organisations have identified the core skills and competencies 
needed to deliver an effective counter fraud service. When asked if they had 
conducted a counter fraud competency review, most participants stated that 
they identified skill needs by category, such as interviewing and case 
management, rather than competencies, such as the ability to take a witness 
statement or an understanding of the difference between used and unused 
information. 
Figure 6.1 summaries interviewee responses as to whether a specific 
competency assessment had been carried out. Only five interviewees (20 per 
cent) reported that their organisations had carried out some form of counter 
fraud competencies requirement, of which only one worked for a counter fraud 
team, and only five had some form of training plan. 
Professional	Doctorate	in	Security	and	Risk	Management																													Michael	Colin	Gilbert:	Student	440422		
August 2015 
						 	 Page 
 
124	
	
	
Figure	6.1:	Number	of	competency	reviews	undertaken 
This reflects the views of interviewee 5 from the policy and professional bodies 
group who noted that: 
Such [competency] reviews are uncommon within the public sector. 
A large number of reasons were provided to justify the absence of a 
competency analysis, of which the most prevalent were a lack of time and 
resources, and joint working with other parts of their organisation, such as 
internal audit. However, while the latter reason makes the best use of skills 
already available to counter fraud teams and prevents an unnecessary 
duplication of training expenditure, only three participants offered this as an 
explanation. Interviewee 7 from the wider counter fraud community noted: 
The system analysis and audit skills needed for fraud awareness and 
prevention are significant and take time and expense to acquire to 
the standard needed by many organisations. Such services may also 
overlap with internal audit who have the necessary skills.  
Interviewee 5, from the policy and professional bodies group, gave the absence 
of a basic operating template, and a single training process around which to 
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priority. Counter fraud practitioner 9 observed: 
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Counter fraud is a part of the internal audit function and is seen as a 
“secondary” function. As such it has not been seen as a priority for 
investment or development. 
Organisational culture was also cited as an influence. Counter fraud 
practitioners 2 and 9 reported that fraud management is seen as a low priority, 
‘Cinderella’ service, that it is not properly understood by senior managers and 
that, as a consequence, fraud is not seen as a significant issue. Interviewee 5 
from the policy and professional bodies group, who shared this view, observed: 
No one within central government has owned the issue / problem. 
There is a lack of consistency in the approach to delivering counter 
fraud services within the public service and this drives their attitude 
toward skills definition and delivery.  
Some participants noted that investment in counter fraud competencies has 
been hindered by difficulties in proving the cost-effectiveness of counter fraud 
training and particularly when trained staff are lost to other organisations. 
Interviewee 8 from the wider counter fraud community posited: 
Fraud is not taken seriously enough by organisations and there is 
therefore a lack of willingness on their part to spend the resource 
needed to acquire and maintain the skills needed to effectively 
manage fraud risks and recover sums lost. These problems are 
compounded by difficulties in proving the cost effectiveness of counter 
fraud operations. Fraud proofing new programmes, systems and 
processes requires expensive audit, systems analysis and security 
skills – and yet it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of such 
activities as it is difficult to identify what has been prevented or 
deterred from happening. 
Furthermore, interviewees from counter fraud teams also noted that they found 
it difficult to find courses that meet their needs and, where training does take 
place, it is focussed on key operational priorities such as investigations and 
providing evidence in court. Others, from the policy and professional bodies 
groups, noted that there is little point in investing in training and competency 
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acquisition in the absence of an appropriate legal framework within which to use 
these. Interviewee 7 from the policy and professional bodies group noted that: 
There is little point in investing in skills: used rarely; in skills that take 
years to develop; or, in skills which require legal authorities that may 
be unavailable to many departments. 
Interviewees from all three groups also put forward organisational reasons for 
the absence of a competency analysis. The scale of the competencies needed 
to implement the fraud management model is such that: skilled resources are 
bought in when needed; counter fraud awareness, prevention and activities are 
seen as stifling innovation; and fraud is not seen as a major organisational 
problem that needs an expensively trained resource to tackle. For example, 
counter fraud practitioner 8 observed that: 
The appetite for fraud awareness, identification and prevention has 
yet to be fully defined. This is because such activities are seen as a 
stumbling block to progression of new and innovative services. 
Finally, interviewees from the wider counter fraud community and the policy and 
professional bodies groups opined that a competencies analysis, and the 
delivery of linked training, had either not occurred to counter fraud managers or 
that such an analysis was not applicable to their organisation. Interviewee 3 
from the policy professional bodies group further noted that the greater the level 
of deskilling of the counter fraud process, and particularly investigations, 
through the use of highly structured processes reliant on check list completion, 
the lower the need for training and competency acquisition. They concluded: 
Many parts of the investigative process are centred around a series of 
questions to which there is a “Yes / No” answer and the role of an 
individual investigator is to obtain the information needed to answer 
these questions prior to passing the case onto someone else. 
What are the key competencies that are needed? 
This part of the primary research programme examines those competencies 
that specialists and other interested parties consider as being essential to the 
delivery of an effective counter fraud service. As Phillips (2012, p.77) notes: 
“investigative work in general within the business of [a non-law enforcement 
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body] will be practically indistinguishable from investigation in a law 
enforcement environment and will require all of the same training and authority”. 
In addition, public sector and other bodies need the skills to be able to detect 
and prevent fraud through, for example, knowledge of risk management, 
internal control and corporate governance (Krambia-Kapardis, 2002, p.266-267; 
Green, 2012, p. 275; Giles, 2012, p. 89, p.156).  
Interviewees from all 26 organisations were asked to list their top ten core skills 
and competencies and, between them, identified 66 different skills and 
competencies that, in their view, need to be employed to deliver an effective 
counter fraud service based around the fraud management model at Figure 2.1. 
Many settled on identical and similar competencies and skills, suggesting that 
there is a common understanding of personal characteristics and knowledge 
needed to deliver an effective counter fraud service. A full list of all 66 
competencies and skills is presented in Appendix 11. Table 6.1 lists the top 25 
competencies, according the number of interviewees who mentioned each of 
these, in their interview.  Figure 6.2 summaries the number of skills placed in 
each of the four categories mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. 
	
Figure	6.2:	No	of	identified	competencies	by	category 
The most interesting aspect of interviewees’ answers is the prevalence of 
innate skills in the list of the most popular 25 competencies. Given the 
importance of these personal qualities to counter fraud teams, it is surprising 
that some interviewees report that these are either absent or only partially 
developed in their staff. Interviewees also reported that counter fraud teams 
lack some of the practical skills needed. Interviewee 2 from the wider counter 
fraud community noted: 
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Table 6.1: 25 most commonly sought counter fraud competencies 
No Skill Core? % Absent? 
Innate Skills 
1 Well developed analytical skills Be able to work with, and analyse meaningfully, qualitative and quantitative data 23 88% 5 
3 Objectivity and independence Work must be free from bias, reflect the facts and lead to balanced conclusions 17 65% 5 
6 Tenacity and resilience Tactfully follow through all tasks to completion without being deflected by others 15 58% 2 
7 Influencing skills Ability to present views to senior managers and represent organisation credibly 14 54% 8 
11 Judgement and proportionality Recognise where fraud risk is in organisational priority and devise apt response 5 19% 0 
12 Honesty / integrity / impartiality Evidence based work which from which personal bias is absent 5 19% 0 
13 Excellent written skills The ability to write reports and other documents clearly, concisely & persuasively 5 19% 2 
15 Commitment to ethical values All work must subscribe to the seven Nolan Principles of Public Life 4 15% 0 
16 Communication skills Ability to bond effectively with all –e.g. managers, victims, witnesses & suspects 4 15% 1 
19 An enquiring mind and intensive critical thinking Ability to know where fraud exposures are / will be and devise workable solutions 3 12% 0 
20 Innovative mind set Ability to think of new ways to tackle both current and new issues 3 12% 2 
21 Adaptability Ability to apply personal and professional skills to a variety of situations 3 12% 1 
Technical Skills 
2 Interpersonal and interviewing skills The ability to strike positive relationships with others and interview effectively 22 85% 6 
5 Technical and legal knowledge The ability to progress tasks according to the law and best industry standards 17 65% 7 
9 Strong process mapping and analysis skills Ability to document, analyse and assess systems and processes 8 31% 2 
18 Accuracy in record keeping and attention to detail Keep meticulous and accurate file records and notes in a methodical manner 4 15% 0 
24 Ability to pull together and summarise evidence Ability to present evidence in a logical, coherent, consistent and objective manner 3 12% 0 
25 Case building and management skills Taking ownership of a case from start to finish which meets pre-set objectives 3 12% 1 
Organisational skills 
10 Collaborative working Ability to work in partnership with other internal and external departments / bodies 6 23% 3 
14 Awareness of legal and technical limitations Knowing what is legally and technically allowed and remaining within these limits 5 19% 1 
22 Understanding data sources and applying detection techniques Knowledge of MIS systems and how to interrogate these for anomalies 3 12% 1 
23 Knowledge of the fraud landscape Knowledge of the organisation’s business and likely fraud exposures  3 12% 1 
Professional Skills 
4 Strong risk assessment and management skills Ability to identify, assess and assist others to control fraud risks 17 65% 6 
8 Strategic assessment Ability to see the big picture and draft strategies to deal with identified fraud risks 9 35% 7 
17 Well developed IT and cyber security skills Understand IT fraud risks and the measures needed to detect and combat these 4 15% 2 	
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The key reason is a poor understanding, by the organisation’s senior 
management, of the threats posed by fraud and corruption and the 
skills needed to combat these. A possible reason for this is that fraud 
investigation is seen as a mature function (as it has been present for 
a number of years) and that there is now a good understanding of 
what does and does not work. 
While interviewees from counter fraud teams stated that some of their staff 
lacked interpersonal, interviewing, technical and legal skills, all reported that 
their staff had well developed analytical skills. Such a view was not, however, 
shared by the organisations in the wider counter fraud community and policy 
and professional bodies groups. This suggests that there may be a divergence 
of internal and external views on the quality of some aspects of counter fraud 
work. This does not necessarily imply poor analytical skills. It may be due to an 
expectation gap and the way in which counter fraud teams are perceived when 
discharging their responsibilities. 
Those interviewees who placed importance on organisational skills report that 
key issues such as: knowledge of the fraud landscape; an awareness of legal 
and technical limitations; and an understanding the different data sources and 
being able to apply appropriate detection techniques to these, were largely 
being met. The issue of most concern was collaborative working where 
50 per cent of interviewees, who saw this as a key skill, reported that their staff 
either fully or partly lacked this ability. This lack of collaborative working may 
extend to allied skill groups and partly explain why counter fraud managers are 
reporting a lack of access to professional skills such as strategic assessment, 
risk assessment and management and IT and cyber skills. Interviewee 7 from 
the wider counter fraud community noted: 
It may well be that the most cost effective way forward is for both 
teams [counter fraud and internal audit] to undertake joint 
programmes of work to avoid expensive training (which may not be 
fully utilised due to the demands of the investigative programme) and 
duplication of capability. 
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The delivery of essential competencies and skills is critical to any effective 
counter fraud service. There are a large number of such skills and 
competencies. One interviewee commented that: 
Our counter fraud team has conducted a detailed review of more 
than 200 competencies needed to deliver an effective counter fraud 
service and linked these to the fraud risk management model, 
different staff grades and different training types. 
However, participant testimony suggests that there is no single place where 
they can go to obtain a full list of expected competencies and training 
opportunities. Counter fraud practitioner 1 observed that they would: 
Benefit from more practical training in the delivery and management 
of investigations and its associated documentation and evidence. … 
… [but] … … they have not been able to identify courses that would 
meet their current needs. 
Interviewee 6 from the wider counter fraud community shared this view, noting: 
In the absence of a commonly accepted syllabus and competency 
set, there are many different training providers offering courses in 
counter fraud skills – with each offering the acquisition of different 
skill mixes and delivering their courses to different standards. … … 
This is a serious issue – because when recruiting civilian counter 
fraud specialists, many organisations are not sure whether those that 
they hire have been trained to the required standard and have the 
skills and experience needed.  
What training methods are being used to acquire key 
competencies? 
This part of the primary research programme examines how civilian counter 
fraud staff are trained. Figure 6.3 shows that most interviewees use a range of 
training methods that include: external and internal training courses; desk 
training; mentoring; and continuous professional development (CPD). 
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Figure	6.3:	Training	methods	employed 
Figure 6.4 records the responses given by survey respondents to the 
qualifications held by their counter fraud staff. This showed that, where counter 
fraud staff held qualifications these were mostly awarded by external 
organisations such as: the CFPAB; the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners (ACFS); the Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies 
(CCAB); and the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA). This may at least partially 
explain the prevalence of external training as a training vehicle as shown in 
Figure 6.3.		
 
Figure	6.4	Qualifications	held	by	survey	respondents’	staff 
In addition to the above, to compensate for skills gaps, counter fraud 
practitioner 5 stated that their organisation had used secondments to other 
organisations, such as banks, while three reported that they bought in skills 
when these were needed. Interviewee 3 from the wider counter fraud 
community also reported that their organisation was in the process of liaising 
with an external training provider to provide a bespoke training course, although 
it was proving slow to obtain the necessary senior management approval. This 
may be why interviewee 4 from the policy and professional bodies group noted 
that for the relevant training to be delivered:  
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There needs to be a clear lead for counter fraud at a senior level 
within the organisation. This will typically be either the Director of 
Finance or the Head of Audit … who provide a clear endorsement of 
their work and overt support. 
Such challenges have led interviewee 2 from the wider counter fraud 
community to conclude that the way forward is to perform a gap analysis to 
identify missing competencies and support this through the provision of a 
resourced training plan. They posited: 
There needs to be a systematic review of how counter fraud teams 
are currently operating and a comparison made with how they should 
operate. The gap between the two needs to be identified and dealt 
with through an identification of training needs and the delivery of 
these through a variety of mechanisms. 
When asked how the skills and competencies gap could be closed, 
interviewees held a variety of views that are summarised in Table 6.2.  
Table 6.2: Interviewee views on closing the skills and competencies gap 
Area Action 
Inter-organisational development 
Training Strategy The professionalisation of counter fraud training  
Qualification A new qualification that crosses between investigators and other counter 
fraud activities  
A unifying syllabus that addresses the current disparity around the various 
professional qualifications such as those awarded by: Business and 
Technology Education Council (BTEC); ACFS; ACFE; and the 
International Economics and Financial Society (IEFS), 
The provision of a common training and qualification regime based around 
an agreed set of competencies. 
Standards  The continuous review of counter fraud standards and linking these to 
personal development plans. 
Guidance The issue of guidance to understand better where the fraud risks lie and 
how to prevent, detect and deter for each fraud risk type. 
Co-operation 
between counter 
fraud teams 
In parts of government the level of counter fraud resource and skills is 
small and some bodies would find it useful to draw on more developed 
expertise established elsewhere. Thus, there would be merit in exploring 
whether the inter-departmental collaborative arrangements for internal 
audit, now being put in place, should be extended to counter fraud. 
Intra-organisational development 
Culture Changing organisational culture by emphasising personal responsibility 
and that tackling fraud is a positive activity. 
Mentoring The implementation of effective CPD and mentoring activities for counter 
fraud staff. 
Case reviews The identification of cases from which lessons can be learned. This may 
involve master classes on core processes and issues. 
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This suggests that significant reform is required at both an inter-organisational 
and intra-organisational level to training strategy, qualifications and standards, 
co-operation, guidance, organisational culture and training delivery. 
Interviewee 7 from the policy and professional bodies group confirmed that 
central government has work streams in place to deal with the issues 
surrounding competency and skill acquisition. They concluded: 
A key component of the policy is to drive awareness of the skills 
needed through the departmental capacity assessments and counter 
fraud champions. … … [They] are strong supporters of collaborative 
approaches to working that help to overcome such difficulties such 
as the Single Fraud Investigation Service. 
There was also support for tying in competency and skills acquisition to PDPs. 
Eight interviewees from across all three groups stated that they delivered core 
skills and competencies through this process. Counter fraud practitioner 5, for 
example, ensure that: 
All staff have personal development plans which reflect both their 
personal and professional training needs. On an organisational level, 
[this public body] has well developed succession planning, 
recognised methods of assessing staff potential (e.g. the use of the 9 
box grid) and informal desk training and mentoring. [They] also use 
Civil Service Learning (CSL) e-learning packages and would 
consider two-way secondments to improve the skills base.  
Counter fraud practitioner 5 also stated that, if their organisation decides to use 
third parties to conduct investigations, they would ensure that their in-house 
staff acquire any necessary skills to enable their organisation to conduct these 
in-house in the future. Interviewee 6 from the policy and professional bodies 
group linked operational competencies to PDPs and counter fraud practitioner 2 
stated that that their organisation held master classes in topics of interest. 
However, whatever training method is chosen, interviewees noted that flexibility 
is needed because different people learn in different ways. Interviewee 1 form 
the policy the professional bodies group observed that some staff: 
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Learn better from books and e-learning while others respond better to 
more practical “on-the-job” training. What is crucial is “the right training 
environment, at the right cost with the right outcome” and this can 
differ between individuals. 
Interviewee 5 from the wider counter fraud community concluded this part of 
their interview by stating that: 
There should be further professionalisation of counter fraud within 
government and all departments should have access to fully trained 
and accredited counter fraud specialists. 
Interviewee 3 from the policy and professional bodies group went further. They 
saw the first step is “to ensure that the right people with the right skills and 
competencies are recruited, through properly defined job descriptions and role 
profiles.” They further argued that: 
These skills need to be maintained and developed through the 
performance review process, which in turn should be informed by the 
quality review process ….. consistency in supervisory standards is 
essential to this process.  
Discussion 
Fraud management needs: skilled staff with knowledge of the law; the ability to 
manage evidence and exhibits and take witness statements; and the capability 
to provide interview transcripts and surveillance evidence (Button, Johnson & 
Frimpong, 2008, p.245).  They also need access to specialist skills such as 
computer forensics, especially as information technology presents significant 
fraud risks (Watson, 2013; Button et al., 2014). Similarly, fraud prevention 
needs staff skilled in system design and control, so that appropriate action can 
be taken to identify and counter potential threats and control weaknesses which 
could lead to theft, data loss or corrupt activity (Jones, 2004; Richards et al., 
2008; Giles, 2012).  
However, it appeared from both the interview programme and survey that there 
was inconsistency in skills between teams qualified in these areas. At least one-
half of all survey respondents reported that their counter fraud teams 
possessed no staff with any form of relevant qualification. It is also a matter of 
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some concern that six interviewees (23 per cent) felt that interviewing and 
interpersonal skills were in need of improvement and that seven (27 per cent) 
considered that staff technical and legal knowledge needed development.  
Professional skill acquisition is also a matter of some concern with six 
interviewees (23 per cent) stating that risk assessment and management skills, 
essential to fraud prevention and deterrence (Shapiro, 2014), were in need of 
improvement. Furthermore, given the increasing prevalence of cyber fraud 
(Button et al., 2014) it is perhaps surprising that only four interviewees (15 per 
cent) put this in their top 10 list of skills and, where this was the case, only two 
of these felt that their skills in this area were adequate. These findings suggest 
that some counter fraud teams may struggle to keep pace with the movement of 
fraud into new, and high technology, areas. This risk is perhaps further 
exacerbated by the fact that three of the six of those that put collaborative 
working in their list of top 10 skills, felt that improvements in this area was 
required. 
The situation with innate skills is more encouraging. All teams who noted that: 
judgement and proportionality; honesty, integrity and impartiality; and a 
commitment to ethical values were in their top ten skills reported no gaps in 
these areas. However, it is a matter of some concern that: five interviewees felt 
that counter fraud staff lacked objectivity and independence; that eight 
interviewees reported that those working in this area had insufficiently 
developed influencing skills; and that five interviewees felt that innate analytical 
skills were in need of improvement. 
The reasons for this are complex. Work by Frimpong & Baker (2007, p.132) 
suggests that this may be due to the low status afforded to counter fraud staff, a 
lack of resources, inadequate training, poor pay, poor career prospects, 
management apathy and out of date legislation. The primary research above 
adds to this list. The interview process elicited 39 different reasons for a lack of 
skills and training. Of the five reasons mentioned by representatives from more 
than one organisation - two said there was no reason to provide training; three 
cited a lack of time and resource; three cited reliance on other professionals; 
two reported that counter fraud is a low priority area; and two said that they 
bought in skilled resource as and when it was needed. 
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Another reason may be that the UK government’s proposals for tackling fraud in 
the UK are silent on the need for staff with an appropriate skills mix. While their 
proposals for eliminating public sector fraud refer to the need to train all staff 
and change organisational cultures, there is no mention of the skills, training 
and retention issues for the front line specialist staff who are to deliver these 
proposals. The same is true for their proposals for tackling fraud in the UK 
economy (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011a, 2011b).  
To deliver and maintain the requisite skills, this primary research indicated that 
public service bodies need to give their counter fraud staff transferrable skills 
based around an agreed knowledge base and set of competencies. This is to 
ensure that a pool of skilled talent is available to draw on when an individual 
leaves an organisation, and to promote consistency in the quality, breadth and 
depth of skill acquisition and training across the counter fraud community.  
Collaboration along these lines would also improve organisational confidence in 
the recruitment process and cut the costs incurred by individual organisations in 
developing and delivering the necessary skill sets. Furthermore, some 
departments, their agencies and non departmental public bodies might wish to 
develop this collaboration further through specialisation in specific areas of 
counter fraud management and form partnerships with other organisations that 
have complementary, but different skills. Such partnerships, while difficult to 
manage according to specific individual priorities, offer greater scope for cost 
reduction, the improved use of specialist services and greater expertise, as 
scarce skills are utilised more often than in a single organisational setting. For 
this to work effectively, some interviewees reported a need for: a commonly 
understood list of counter fraud competencies; a base qualification for all 
working in this sector; and the delivery of commonly accepted training routes. 
Training vehicles used by interviewees included: external and in-house courses; 
continuous professional development; mentoring; and desk training. Rather 
than training for, and maintaining all the competencies required two counter 
fraud teams directly bought in other skills from contractors when needed, and 
three collaborated with other public service organisations, sharing skills and 
resources as required. There is significant scope for such practices to be 
developed further with central government as a whole. 
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Samociuk & Iyer (2010) argue for a multi disciplinary approach to fraud risk 
management that involves staff from different specialisms including internal 
audit. This approach was reflected in interviewee testimonies that cited overlap 
with internal audit as a reason for the skills gap within counter fraud teams. 
Reliance on internal audit may not, however, present a full solution to the skills 
and competency issue. This is because the internal audit competency 
framework for central government bodies makes no reference to fraud 
management, suggesting that these issues are not at the forefront of their 
training, governance and assessment arrangements (HM Treasury, 2007a). 
Similarly, Government Internal Audit Standards make it clear that internal 
auditors are not expected to have “the expertise of a person whose primary 
responsibility is detecting and investigating fraud” (HM Treasury, 2011a, p.17). 
This may explain why the National Audit Office (NAO) 2012 review of internal 
audit effectiveness mentioned fraud just once in their report (NAO, 2012, p.19).  
Interviewee 6 from the wider counter fraud community commented that, in the 
absence of a commonly accepted syllabus and competency set, there was no 
obvious training process that works for all those in the sector. To assist any 
future development of counter fraud training and development, the list of more 
than 200 competencies prepared by one interviewee has been reproduced at 
Appendix 12. An additional 39 competencies have been added to their list as a 
result of this research to give a total of 250 competencies in all. Each 
competency has been linked to the principal means through which they might 
be obtained to provide guidance on how organisations might acquire those 
competencies that they currently lack.  
This list, to which others may add further competencies, might form the kernel 
from which an agreed knowledge base for civilian counter fraud operations 
could be developed. When linked to the fraud management model and grade 
structures (Appendix 13) these competencies may deal with the issues raised 
by interviewee 3 from the policy and professional bodies group and support 
improved counter fraud services through more informed recruitment and 
assessment processes. 
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Chapter 7: Counter fraud regulation: primary research results 
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Introduction 
Civilian counter fraud investigations can be intrusive and lead to harm (Phillips, 
2012, p.77; Hurrell, 2014). This chapter therefore examines participants’ 
attitudes to ways in which civilian counter fraud services within central 
government should be overseen and controlled to minimise this risk. It 
considers both self-regulation, in the form of internal management supervision 
over counter fraud operations, and whether some form of external regulation, 
such as state control, co-regulation (where occupational codes of conduct are 
given legislative authority) or enforced (or quasi) self regulation might be 
appropriate (Australian government, 2007).  
The decision on whether to regulate or not, and the choice of regulatory 
mechanism, is complex. Effective regulation can have a positive influence over 
service standards and individual and corporate behaviours and reduce costs 
(Samarajiva 2001; Wiig & Tharaldsen, 2007; Andrews et al., 2008; Gunningham 
& Sinclair, 2009). However, it can also have high compliance costs, lead to sub-
optimal performance by regulatees due to inflexibility in regulatory processes 
and stifle innovation (Porket, 2003; Centre on Regulation and Competition, 
2004; Australian government, 2007). In addition, regulation through external 
bodies, such as professional institutes, does not always guarantee appropriate 
behaviour in all circumstances (Snyder, 2014). 
This chapter therefore seeks to: address the extent to which fraud management 
within central government is subject to internal supervision; explore the 
governance arrangements currently in place; assess if some form of external 
regulation is needed; and, if so, what form this might take and the functions that 
it may perform. It closes with a discussion of the operational effects of current 
oversight mechanisms on the delivery of an effective counter fraud service.  
Should counter fraud be subject to internal supervision? 
This part of the primary research programme deals with the extent to which 
those who hold senior positions within their organisations oversee their counter 
fraud services. There was widespread support from interviewees for being 
subject to some form of internal supervision with all 26 believing this to be 
necessary. Figure 7.1 lists the main reasons given for this view. 
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Figure	7.1	Principal	reasons	for	the	need	for	internal	supervision	
Furthermore, of the 14 survey recipients who expressed an opinion, eight (57 
per cent) considered that the current regulatory arrangements were satisfactory 
and of the remaining six, five (83 per cent) were in favour of an approach based 
around self-regulation. Therefore, there appears to be significant support for 
internal supervision within the central government counter fraud community. 
Of the reasons provided in Figure 7.1 the most striking are: the need to prevent 
an abuse of position; the development and maintenance of appropriate quality 
and professional standards; and having the right employees with the 
appropriate skill mix. These, coupled with the need to ensure that counter fraud 
teams remained within their legal and regulatory frameworks, suggest that the 
issues covered by this research resonate with others working in this field. 
Counter fraud practitioner 2 observed that external confidence in the counter 
fraud process was important. They noted that:  
It is important to answer the question “who investigates the 
investigator” to help underpin external confidence in the counter 
fraud process. An individual who was the subject of an investigation 
has taken legal action, claiming significant damages, because they 
allege that the investigation led to the failure of their business. 
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External confidence in [the] counter fraud profession, transparency, 
robust processes and effective governance and supervision help to 
prevent such situations and, where they do occur, to mount an 
effective defence.  
Interviewee 3 from the wider counter fraud community echoed this sentiment 
and noted that:  
Policies and processes can be subject to tribunal scrutiny and it is 
therefore essential that these are applied correctly. 
Six interviewees, from all three groups, thought that effective supervision 
helped to ensure that necessary policy, project, process and procedural 
improvements flowed from counter fraud work. Of these, three saw senior 
managers as having an important role to play in the dissemination of lessons 
learned, and others saw it as a vehicle for encouraging improved governance 
over services, assets and finances, for promoting improved data sharing and for 
the support of collaborative working. Two further interviewees, from the policy 
and professional bodies group, noted that independent senior management 
review of counter fraud activities was needed to prevent managers putting 
undue pressure on counter fraud teams to overlook serious issues. 
What forms of senior management governance are in place? 
This part of the primary research programme deals with how senior 
management govern their counter fraud services. All the counter fraud 
practitioners interviewed stated that they reported to line managers and all but 
two of these (eight per cent) reported that they were also responsible to both 
their executive management boards (EMBs) and their audit committees.  Of the 
two that did not report to their EMB and audit committee, one reported to a 
specialist fraud management board and the other had no formal supervisory 
arrangements in place. However, in this latter case, the EMB received copies of 
all returns to the Cabinet Office and the latest update of the counter fraud 
team’s threats, weaknesses and vulnerabilities assessment.  
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This interviewee emphasised that this level of oversight is appropriate for the 
operational context within which their team operates. Their organisation had 
delegated responsibility for counter fraud management to individual localities 
and, in this decentralised environment, their team’s remit was: 
To work with each of [these areas] to help prevent and deter fraud 
and, where this does occur, to provide an expert detect, investigation 
and recovery service. 
It was reported that in this organisation, governance was supported by robust 
controls over recruitment, training and oversight arrangements within each 
locality. However, the interviewee noted that, while providing decentralised local 
counter fraud services had advantages, in that it allowed for a client centric 
service delivery centred on individual needs, it had one major drawback. They 
explained that there was a risk that local teams became too close to the 
management that they served and that, consequently, their objectivity and 
independence was compromised, and especially when such services were 
provided commercially. 
In order to ensure that management supervision over counter fraud was 
effective, interviewee 8 from the wider counter fraud community stated that they 
would like to see more control over: 
The direction of the counter fraud team and operations, the approval 
of their objectives and budgets, and the measures used to control 
“red flag” items when problems arise.  
They argued that senior managers should exercise this control through an 
understanding of the issues involved, the regular receipt and review of relevant 
management information, being kept informed of high profile investigations, and 
being supported by effective risk management. However, interviewee 5 from the 
policy and professional bodies groups cast doubt on the effectiveness of senior 
management oversight. They concluded that counter fraud activities remained 
largely uncontrolled within government because very few senior managers 
understood the subject and the context within which it operates. The same 
interviewee noted that there was: 
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Rarely someone on an audit committee who is interested in fraud 
matters and, when this occurs, they usually ask for more research, 
rather than using results and outcomes to hold the counter fraud 
team accountable for the way in which they have discharged their 
duties. 
This interviewee also posited that many public bodies did not enforce the ‘zero 
tolerance’ approach advocated by the Cabinet Office & NFA (2011a, p.3) 
because: 
It is impractical, in terms of resource and staff numbers, to do so, and 
is ultimately unachievable.  
To some extent, in their view, fraud was seen as “as a cost of doing business” 
in much the same way that the banks view fraud and therefore, a risk to be 
managed. They illustrated this by noting that, historically, benefit applications 
are not scrutinised in detail prior to award, as the time that this would take 
would cause undue hardship to vulnerable people, even though it is known that 
a small percentage of all benefit claims are likely to be fraudulent. They also 
observed conflicts between government priorities that hinder the fight against 
fraud. For example, they noted that the “check now/pay later” approach 
espoused by the Cabinet Office (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011a, p.11) can be 
inconsistent with the need to pay suppliers quickly under the “prompt payment” 
policy.  
Is there a need for some form of external regulation? 
This part of the primary research programme deals with interviewees’ views on 
the need for external regulation. 17 (65 per cent) were in favour, in principle, of 
some form of external regulation. Interviewee 8 from the wider counter fraud 
community commented:  
Counter fraud teams need to be subject to scrutiny and oversight to 
prevent an abuse of the powers invested in them and to ensure that 
management, cost and performance pressures do not lead to serious 
issues being overlooked. 
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Other common reasons cited by interviewees for the need for some form of 
external regulation included the maintenance of quality and the prevention of 
poor and illegal practices (4 interviewees), and the provision of an externally 
validated framework that underpins independence (3 interviewees). Interviewee 
2 from the policy and professional bodies group also noted that:  
Any team invested with formal powers to conduct investigations into 
others should be subject to scrutiny by a competent authority to 
ensure that these powers are used proportionately, appropriately and 
only when necessary.  
Accountability and transparency were also issues raised by participants. 
Interviewee 4 from the wider counter fraud community posited that increases in 
accountability and transparency in recent years had led to an improvement in 
public confidence in the police. Interviewee 2 from the wider counter fraud 
community considered that the need for transparency and accountability also 
extended to the civilian counter fraud teams. They noted that: 
Counter fraud staff must build and maintain public confidence – and 
this means transparency in the way they operate and clear 
accountability for their actions – which can, in extreme 
circumstances, lead to damage to their professional and personal life 
and ultimately, cause those found guilty of fraud to lose their liberty.  
Redress for those who have suffered damage or loss following civilian counter 
fraud activities was also cited as a reason for some form of external regulation 
by nine interviewees drawn from all three groups. Interviewee 8 from the wider 
counter fraud community noted: 
There also need to be frameworks in place to allow those affected by 
investigations, or other counter fraud activities, to complain and for 
errant counter fraud professionals to be prevented from practising, 
where this is appropriate. 
12 interviewees (46 per cent) from all three groups posited that the need for 
external regulation increased with the growth of legal powers. Thus, they 
believed that the larger the number of powers, and the greater the potential for 
intrusiveness, the greater the need for external regulation. 11 interviewees 
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(42 per cent) from all three groups also observed that an anomaly exists at 
present whereby the way in which traditional law enforcement use their 
investigatory powers is externally regulated (for example by the IPCC), but 
civilian counter fraud professionals are not. Counter fraud practitioner 9 noted 
that: 
The situation is not dissimilar to private investigators who are now to 
be regulated by the Security Industry Authority.  
Interviewee 7 from the wider counter fraud community posited that this 
discrepancy might be because, unlike public sector employees, private sector 
counter fraud and investigation firms are not accountable for the way their 
services are provided to ministers and Parliament.  
Counter fraud practitioner 9 summed up the position for those in favour of some 
form of external regulation. They concluded that: 
Civilian counter fraud is not a profession in its own right and should 
be. This will mean: limiting entry to those who pass a defined training 
course (based around examination and practical experience); having 
a registration scheme backed up by a code of conduct and 
disciplinary process; and defined and commonly understood levels of 
competence that are universally accepted and relied upon. 
However, for external regulation to work effectively, interviewee 4 from the 
wider counter fraud community observed that it must be independent of those 
who it is supervising and have a universally accepted remit. Six interviewees 
(23 per cent), spread across all three groups, also recognised that a poor 
regulator can have a detrimental effect, for reasons such as the imposition of 
significant costs on those it regulates and, if seen to be under performing, 
bringing the services it regulates into disrepute. These participants also noted 
that external regulation can inhibit flexibility of operation and synergy between 
different organisations and parts of organisations, be overly prescriptive, be 
behind operational practice, and raise barriers to entry.  
Furthermore, interviewee 3 from the wider counter fraud community noted that 
increasing regulation in the present economic climate can be difficult. They 
explained that: 
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In the current climate increasing regulation can be difficult. It is 
likely to lead to some resistance…. Under current government 
polices if [we] want to introduce a new regulation [we] have to scrap 
two more (although a business case can be prepared, if necessary 
to dis-apply this rule when necessary). 
This may explain why counter fraud practitioner 9 concluded that, while external 
regulation is necessary to promote two-way confidence between the police and 
civilian counter fraud teams, and between counter fraud teams themselves, 
there are a number of issues to be addressed if this is to be accepted by all 
within this specialism and be fully effective. These include: obtaining agreement 
between the different bodies on the form and level of regulation; deciding on the 
roles and responsibilities of the regulator; dealing with opposition to what is 
being proposed; and being prepared for any increase in litigation, which may 
flow from a more transparent and controlled counter fraud process. This 
respondent also observed that it could take some time to effect the necessary 
legislative change. Furthermore, if the necessary changes to organisational 
cultures and working practices become overtaken by events (as the counter 
fraud environment can be fast moving) the case for improved standards and 
regulation may be lost. 
Given these issues, it is therefore unsurprising that nine interviewees 
(33 per cent), representing counter fraud teams and the policy and professional 
bodies group, were against the external regulation of counter fraud services. 
They cited three key reasons for this: a lack of investigative powers meant that 
this level of external oversight was unnecessary; its predominant focus on 
internal matters, many of which end with disciplinary hearings and contract 
sanctions; and adequate levels of internal management oversight. Counter 
fraud practitioner 5 went further, arguing that: 
Civilian counter fraud should be, and remain, business as usual for 
public administration. [They] noted that professional bodies already 
regulate many of the individuals who work in the counter fraud space. 
For example, many of those who work in the counter fraud already 
belong to accountancy or internal audit institutes. 
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Interviewee 7 from the policy and professional bodies group further posited that: 
The key issue now is to raise the profile of the need for effective 
counter fraud services across departments and obtain effective 
engagement with each of the six areas of the fraud management 
model – and, in so doing, achieve a switch away from reactive 
detection and investigation to more proactive awareness, prevention 
and deterrence. 
They doubted whether, in the current fiscal climate, departments and other 
public sector bodies would see professionalisation of the counter fraud service, 
a necessary precursor to effective regulation, as a priority because the 
increased costs this will bring about may deter some from taking the full range 
of actions needed. Despite this, the interviewee recognised that an “unregulated 
approach” has risks and that some inappropriate behaviours might surface. This 
is simply because public bodies are keen to tackle the fraud issue and some 
working in this field may not fully understand the need for proportionality and 
tact. If more legal powers are given to central government to tackle fraud then 
the regulatory needs would need to be assessed at the same time.  
However, the same interviewee concluded that deciding on which form of 
regulation is appropriate will need further consideration and consultation. It is 
unlikely that departments and others would want their counter fraud teams 
discouraged from taking the necessary and proportionate steps to tackle fraud 
by high entry, training and maintenance costs and particularly as: 
The involvement of the police and CPS for all cases going beyond 
disciplinary action acts as a control in this area as they will need to 
ensure that all work is undertaken to certain standards prior to moving 
a case through the criminal justice system. 
Counter fraud practitioner 4 shared this view, stating that aggrieved parties 
have recourse to the courts if they feel that a central government counter fraud 
team has exceeded their powers, through either an action for damages or a 
judicial review of the counter fraud team’s actions. 
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When discussing internal governance, interviewee 7 from the policy and 
professional bodies group argued that an organisation’s monitoring, information 
and internal reporting systems should alert senior managers to the need for 
change and / or improved control in specific areas of their business, including 
counter fraud. Furthermore, they stated that the need to reduce losses, deliver 
higher standards of service with decreasing resources and satisfy customer / 
public expectations should provide the necessary business drivers to bring 
about beneficial change about when it is needed. Another, interviewee 6 from 
the wider counter fraud community shared this view, noting: 
The risks associated with organisations that properly vet employees 
prior to employment, and ensure that they are properly trained and 
supervised, carry less risk of abuse of position and poor quality 
services, than those who do not implement these procedures. The 
issues of whether a common set of competencies and training will 
meet the needs of the entire sector exacerbate the problems in 
enforcing common standards. 
However, not all appeared to conform to this standard of governance. Counter 
fraud practitioner 1 reported that their organisation had no counter fraud code of 
conduct and no formal approval mechanism for such investigations, because 
the counter fraud team had complete autonomy. This is despite the fact that 
some investigations result in allegations of bullying and can lead to disciplinary 
outcomes, not only for the suspect but for their managers as well where it is 
considered that poor oversight is partially or wholly responsible for the fraud.  
Interviewee 5, from the wider counter fraud community, concluded that a 
resolution to the regulation issue was for a convincing case to be made for it. 
They saw this as being the need for a professional and effective service to 
counter the £20 billion lost to fraud [by the public sector] annually and to 
underpin effective governance and financial regulation. They also observed: 
With frauds now spanning both private and public sectors (as private 
companies provide services to departments), there is a need for a 
central regulator to span all counter fraud operations that should be 
financed accordingly. 
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What form should any external regulation take and cover? 
This part of the primary research programme deals with the type of regulation 
that might be most appropriate and the areas it might cover. Research results 
demonstrate that the choice of regulatory regime is complex. Interviewee 4 from 
the policy and professional bodies group posited that, of the four main options, 
regulation by government, profession, organisation or self-regulation, counter 
fraud teams would prefer the fourth option. In their view it was the: 
Easiest and cheapest to implement and gives teams the greatest 
amount of operational latitude. 
This is borne out by the survey results. Figure 7.2, which summarises survey 
respondent views on their preferred form of regulation, shows a marked 
preference for self-regulation where such a preference was expressed. 
	
Figure	7.2	Survey	respondents'	regulatory	preference 
However, Interviewee 3 from the policy and professional bodies group noted 
that: 
This [position] is likely to be criticised on the basis that it is the least 
effective option, lacks transparency and accountability, and will 
promote inconsistency between organisations, as each will differ in 
the standards set and the way these are applied. The effect of these 
shortfalls, over time, might be to undermine public confidence in the 
regulatory process. 
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Counter fraud practitioner 10 shared this view observing that:  
Self-regulation has been found lacking in other areas (e.g. the 
financial sector) and there is no reason to suppose that it will work in 
the counter fraud arena. Furthermore, self-regulation is open to 
abuse by senior staff who can overrule counter fraud professionals. 
Such criticisms were not reserved for self-regulation, however. Interviewee 4 
from the policy and professional bodies group observed that, while regulation by 
government deals more effectively with organisational accountability to pre-set 
standards, it tends to downplay personal accountability. Conversely, they saw 
professional regulation as being centred on personal accountability thereby 
giving less prominence to organisational responsibility. This is because a 
parochial approach to the enforcement of standards by organisations can make 
it more difficult to achieve consistency in the quality of service delivery. 
Consequently, this interviewee concluded that regulation by organisational type 
and sector may prove the more effective option. This is because such an 
approach will be tailored by the specific needs of their members and be 
enforced by people with relevant knowledge and experience. 
There was significant support from others for these views with 20 interviewees 
(77 per cent), representing all three groups, expressing support for external 
regulation on two levels. The first of these was the personal level. These 
interviewees considered that counter fraud staff should have a professional 
code of ethics and take personal responsibility for acting in accordance with 
professional, educational and technical standards. 
The second was the organisational level. The same interviewees felt that there 
needs to be some oversight as to how organisations exercise their counter 
fraud responsibilities corporately. One interviewee from the policy and 
professional bodies group noted that the CIPFA Voluntary Code of Conduct for 
counter fraud operations, published in May 2014, is an attempt to meet this 
need (CIPFA, 2014). 
Interviewee 4 from the policy and professional bodies group posed the key 
question: as to “who should set professional and behavioural standards?” 
Interviewee 5 from the policy and professional bodies group argued that: 
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Government should take steps to address the disparity around the 
various professional qualifications (BTEC, ACFS, ACFE, IEFS) and 
provide a common training and qualification regime based around an 
agreed set of competencies.  
Interviewee 6 from the wider counter fraud community agreed, noting that this 
would help to address recruitment difficulties for employers who: 
Are not sure whether those that they hire have been trained to the 
required standard and have the skills and experience needed. 
An external regulator was seen as having one other key advantage: to ensure 
that different organisations work together when this is in the public interest. 
Interviewee 3 from the policy and professional bodies group concluded that:  
The role of an industry wide regulator is to bottom out both 
organisational and industry wide problems and implement solutions 
that are accepted by all as effective. If this does not occur, there will 
be a downturn in confidence that will affect organisations’ ability to 
work together to tackle fraud, and other problems effectively. 
Those interviewees who expressed an opinion felt that any external regulation 
should include one or more of the functions listed in Appendix 14.  Figure 7.3 
lists the most prominent of these in terms of the number of research participants 
who mentioned each of these areas during interview. From the roles listed in 
this figure, it can be inferred that there was some support from interviewees for 
the greater involvement of professional institutes in counter fraud regulation.  
The prevention of abuse by counter fraud staff is of particular interest. This is 
because externally imposed regulation, through the enforcement of professional 
standards, may help limit public service organisations’ risk and exposure to 
challenge. When asked, more than 90 per cent of respondents to the survey 
stated that liability for their actions lay with the employing organisation rather 
than individual members of staff. 
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Figure	7.3	Principal	tasks	for	external	regulation 
Discussion 
The UK government has alluded to the need for improved governance over 
counter fraud activities (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011b, p. 22). To achieve this, it 
proposes that different organisations and sectors come together under some 
form of umbrella arrangements such as the Cabinet Office Fraud, Error and 
Debt Task Force (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011b, p. 22). However, it is silent on 
how those bodies that have at least some legal powers to counter fraud, should 
have their activities regulated, despite the fact that, in using these powers, 
civilian counter fraud bodies can cause harm (Baker 2001; Hurrell, 2014). This 
may be because internal management control over civilian counter fraud teams 
is deemed adequate.  
To gauge the effectiveness of the current regulatory regime, the results of this 
research have been compared by the researcher to Clarke’s (1994) concept of 
regulatory grasp in Table 7.1. The assessments made apply only to civilian 
counter fraud operations within central government, and reflect the researchers 
opinion on the current state of affairs that has been based upon interview 
responses. 
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Table 7.1: Regulatory grasp over central government counter fraud 
activities 
 Strong regulatory grasp Weak regulatory grasp Civilian CF? 
1 Few regulatees Many regulatees Weak 
2 Agency well-funded and 
staffed 
Agency poorly funded 
and staffed 
Weak 
3 Good public awareness of the 
agency’s role and objectives 
Poor public awareness 
of the agency’s role and 
objectives 
Strong 
4 High level of debate in trade 
and in public 
Low level of debate  Strong 
5 High level of training and 
quality of professionals being 
regulated 
Low or variable level of 
training  
Weak 
6 Clear and established 
regulatory code 
Unclear and established 
regulatory code 
Weak 
7 Prior approval of innovations 
required 
Approval of innovations 
after introduction 
Strong 
8 Administrative discretion to 
sanction 
Due process and quasi 
criminal procedure 
Strong 
9 Capacity to achieve legal 
sanction in selected cases 
Chances of success on 
legal action unclear 
Strong 
10 Past successes in requiring 
changes by effective 
sanctions 
No record of dramatic 
success 
Weak 
11 Capacity to move quickly Slow response to 
evidence of 
incompetence or 
misconduct 
Midway 
12 Capacity to require 
production of evidence as 
necessary 
Capacity to criticize only Weak 
13 Capacity to inspect randomly 
and regularly 
No inspection capacity Weak 
14 Capacity to accredit 
regulatees 
No capacity to accredit Weak 
15 Capacity to train regulatees Capacity to comment on 
training only 
Midway 
16 Capacity to exclude from 
market 
No capacity to exclude Weak 
Source: (Clarke, 1994, pp. 343-345)  
Table 7.1 shows that regulatory control over civilian counter fraud services in 
central government is, on balance, weak, despite strengths in some areas. 
Priorities for action include: the development of a clear and established 
regulatory code; the capacity to require the production of evidence; the capacity 
to accredit regulatees; and the capacity to train regulatees. 
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This primary research found that most fraud teams in central government 
organisations work through their line management chains, although this can be 
problematic if senior management do not act with integrity and independence 
(Button, 2011, p. 259). The management chains report, often quarterly, to audit 
committees and management boards although some have questioned their 
effectiveness in managing counter fraud operations. Given these reservations, it 
is unsurprising that Giles (2012) and Matsumura & Tucker (1992) both reinforce 
the importance of audit.  
Attitudes to external regulation were mixed. While two thirds of interviewees 
favoured some form of external regulation one third did not, which conflicted 
with the survey results that showed a clear preference for self-regulation. The 
reasons for both views were varied and those for external regulation included: 
the need to underpin public confidence in civilian counter fraud operations 
through defined standards; restricted entry through the acquisition of a defined 
body of knowledge and expertise; and the need for some form of accountability 
and discipline mechanism. Those against external regulation cited: their lack of 
investigative powers and internal focus; the existence of strong internal 
management control mechanisms; and the fact that counter fraud staff already 
belong to professional accounting and internal auditing professional bodies. 
This divergence of opinion within the counter fraud community on the need for 
regulation, demonstrates that work remains to be done to obtain a consensus 
on the way forward on this issue.  Self-regulation, if applied effectively, can be 
used in support of: a drive to greater professionalism; personal responsibility; 
and a sense of professional identity, all of which support the delivery of high 
quality services (Carver & Scheier, 2000; Samarajiva, 2001; Gorman, 2007; 
Wiig & Tharaldsen, 2007; Andrews et al., 2008). However, done poorly, this can 
be self-defeating and fail to lead to the envisaged improvements as shown by 
Gunningham & Sinclair’s (2009) review of the Australian Mining Industry. Their 
study found that the effectiveness of self-regulation was compromised through: 
a lack of direction and support from managers; a lack of knowledge and 
resource; and workforce resistance.  
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The case for external regulation is no less problematic. Its advantages include: 
greater independence from the inappropriate managerial influence identified by 
Button (2007); less risk of undue influenced by sectional interests (Gorman 
2014); inspection powers and a visible form of redress for those who consider 
they have suffered unjust adverse outcomes including reputational and financial 
damage (Baker, 2011; Hurrell, 2014; counter fraud practitioner 2, personal 
communication, May 2014). It can thus be inferred that, when present, these 
factors can provide a greater degree of accountability and transparency in 
service delivery. This in turn can lead to an increase in public confidence, 
principles that were mentioned as being important by some interviewees. 
Confidence between the public and service providers and between service 
providers themselves lead to greater levels of trust – a concept which Wiig & 
Tharaldsen (2012, p. 3043) note has a “strategic impact on aspects such as 
organisational performance, communication and knowledge exchange”. In 
particular, it has the potential to encourage joint working both within the counter 
fraud community and with external law enforcement. This can lead to a pooling 
of resource, expertise, roles and talent, in a way that reduces overall costs to 
government and increases effectiveness. However, the reasons given by those 
opposed to external regulation, such as increased compliance costs, the stifling 
of innovation and sub-optimal performance, are also valid (Porket, 2003; Centre 
on Regulation and Competition, 2004; Australian government 2007). When 
present, these factors can elicit resistance and risk nominal, rather than real, 
compliance a risk that may require expensive monitoring to control. 
The consequence of this uncertainty is that there is no single answer to the 
issue of how to achieve regulatory benefit (Clarke, 1994). Achieving an effective 
and trusted service that meets both provider and stakeholder needs is 
dependent on a number of different factors which include: widespread 
acceptance of the need for, and form of, regulation; compliance with accepted 
technical and behavioural norms; a properly performing regulator (where this 
occurs); and high levels of co-operation (Gupta & Lad, 1983; Albareda, 2008; 
Aghion et al., 2010; Interviewee 2 from the wider counter fraud community, 
personal communication, June 2014). The current divergence of views 
suggests that a consensus on the way forward on these issues is some way off.
Professional	Doctorate	in	Security	and	Risk	Management																													Michael	Colin	Gilbert:	Student	440422		
August 2015 
						 	 Page 
 
156	
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Summary of findings 
This research project sought to establish whether UK central government 
bodies have the legal powers, skills and regulation needed to tackle fraud 
effectively. It was concluded from the literature review that an effective legal 
framework, supported by a wide range of skills, is essential to the delivery of the 
UK government’s zero tolerance approach to fraud, and that both professional 
standards and the civil rights of those subject to investigation could be 
protected through some form of regulation.  The findings of the empirical 
research, based on a survey of the central government counter fraud 
champions, and semi-structured interviews with a range of counter fraud 
specialists, suggested that the effectiveness of central government civilian 
counter fraud teams are hampered by a fragmented legal landscape and a lack 
of skills, and that further professionalisation and regulation is needed to protect 
professional standards and individual legal rights.  
In particular, it has found that differences in legal powers hamper the ability to 
investigate all different types of external and internal fraud and make 
collaborative working between public service organisations more difficult. This 
research has also identified that a wide range of skills are needed to properly 
implement the investigative and other powers that currently exist and to provide 
other aspects of fraud management such as prevention, detection and 
deterrence. However, there is no collective definition of what these skills should 
be, and no accepted code of conduct or commonly accepted body of 
knowledge, making the identification and acquisition of these skills and 
competencies to a common standard problematic.  
Counter fraud investigations can have significant implications for those subject 
to them. It is thus important that those involved in this work operate to the 
highest levels of professional and personal standards and are supported by 
their employers through adequate levels of governance, investment and the 
application of appropriate polices and procedures. Professionalism and 
regulation have a role in ensuring that these exist, neither of which are present 
at the current time. This has led to inconsistencies in approach and coverage by 
different bodies that may lead to undetected and unpunished frauds, thus 
needlessly increasing financial loss. 
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Implications of research findings 
For counter fraud management 
There is little doubt of the UK government’s determination to deal with fraud 
within the UK economy and the UK public sector. This is expressed through a 
commitment to: a “zero tolerance” culture; to the prevention of fraud through 
well-designed and secure systems and procedures; the disruption of fraudulent 
activities; the apprehension and prosecution of offenders; and the recovery of 
stolen proceeds. However, this research has cast doubt about whether central 
government bodies have the appropriate legal powers and the range of skills to 
bring this about. It also identified that there is a case for regulating their 
activities. 
The focus on zero tolerance for the public sector (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011a, 
p.4) presents issues for government bodies. While consistent with the careful 
and responsible stewardship of public assets and finances, the term zero 
tolerance has not been clearly defined and thus, there is no common 
benchmark against which to apply it. Some might, for example, interpret it as 
signifying that all frauds must be investigated and dealt with. Others may 
implement the definition of zero tolerance contained in the Fraud Review Final 
Report: “where the known losses to, and risks of, fraud outweigh the costs of 
preventing and detecting that fraud, then action should be taken” (AGO, 2006, 
p.122). Whatever approach is taken, there is no common set of powers against 
which to deliver it. This will inevitably lead to dissimilar policies and agendas, 
which may militate against the collaborative working envisaged by the UK 
government. 
It is unlikely that the UK government will signal a move away from the zero 
tolerance approach outlined in 2011, because to do so would be to tacitly 
recognise that it cannot exercise effective stewardship over all the assets that it 
owns on the nation’s behalf. However, while outwardly espousing a zero 
tolerance approach, interviewees’ testimonies suggest that what they support is 
more of a “managed risk” approach. Indeed, in 2004, the Home Office issued a 
circular to police forces in England and Wales which set down guidelines on 
which types of fraud should be investigated and which should not (Home Office, 
2004).  
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Despite the steps taken by the UK government to make central government 
staff aware of fraud, and fraud related issues, and strengthen counter fraud 
resilience (such as the establishment of the counter fraud champions’ network 
and the provision of an e-learning course) much remains to be done. The low 
take-up of the Audit Commission Changing Organisational Culture Toolkit 
outside the local government arena suggests that many central government 
bodies have yet to fully address fraud awareness issues (Audit Commission, 
2005; A. Bryce, Personal Communication, 20 July 2012). Furthermore, the 
Cabinet Office reported, in 2012, that 7 out of 15 departments reporting to them, 
were not detecting any fraud at all (Cabinet Office, 2012, p.17) suggesting that 
much more needs to be done to raise the profile of fraud within central 
government. Furthermore, the UK government notes “there has been too little 
focus on prevention” and that “when vulnerabilities are detected as part of risk 
assessment, they should be designed out”, and among such strategies “there 
will be stronger systems and controls” (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011b, p.16, 
p.18, p.21). There is, therefore, to be a greater emphasis on preventing fraud 
from occurring in the first place.  
The public service is well placed to implement those measures needed to make 
fraud as hard as possible to commit. The UK government’s proposals recognise 
that this requires an understanding of the risks and threats posed by fraudsters 
and the controls and procedures needed to counter these (Cabinet Office & 
NFA, 2011a, p.14). However, this requires internal audit and other professional 
groups working within the UK public sector to be aware of, and focus upon, 
fraud issues. To assist this, the NFA produced fraud risk assessment guidance 
for UK public sector bodies in March 2012 (Cabinet Office, 2012, p.13). 
While this research suggests that not all civilian counter fraud teams possess 
the risk management, systems analysis and audit skills needed to “fraud proof” 
central government operations, others do. The UK central government sector 
contains internal audit units with the skills and experience needed to assess 
projects, systems and procedures and ensure that their use, data and outputs 
are properly controlled and managed (National Audit Office, 2012, p.7). 
However, a review of government internal audit standards and competencies 
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suggests that fraud related issues should be given greater prominence 
(HM Treasury, 2011a). 
What is needed is a collaborative approach between risk management, counter 
fraud and internal audit teams within, and between, government bodies. This 
collaborative approach need not necessarily involve creating large audit, review 
and investigation structures. What is needed is for a properly trained, full-time 
and experienced senior civil servant, whose primary responsibility is the 
delivery of an effective counter fraud service for their employing organisation, to 
decide on those areas in need of intervention and/or review, identify the skills 
and resources needed and then source these from across their entire 
organisation. Information from interviewees suggests that such a role is not 
widespread within central government. This may partially explain why the 
Cabinet Office have concluded that public sector fraud measurement and risk 
assessment activities are in need of improvement and that they require 
guidance on how to achieve this (Cabinet Office, 2012, p.17). 
The UK government has also signalled an improvement to their fraud 
prevention capability through a switch away from a “pay first check later” culture 
to a “check now pay later” culture. They have supported this through the 
introduction of analytic IT routines, such as FEAST, to screen out fraudulent 
and problematic applications at the start of the process (Cabinet Office, 2012, p. 
14). Such use of analytics is not new: the financial sector have been using tools 
such as Experian’s Hunter II for a number of years (Experian, 2004). However, 
while these have been used in other areas, such as procurement, this has not 
been prevalent within central government to detect potential fraud (Cabinet 
Office, 2012, pp.15-16).  Until the move to the “check first” rationale is 
completed, and unless those with the relevant skills undertake fraud risk 
assessments and measurement exercises regularly and to a consistent 
standard, the measures taken to protect a central government organisation’s 
assets may not prevent fraud in the way envisaged. Care, however, needs to be 
taken to ensure that key fraud prevention initiatives, such as “check-now pay-
later”, are not diluted by other initiatives such as the UK government’s prompt 
payment policy. 
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Preventing fraud requires knowledge of how and when frauds are committed, 
so that detection systems can be tailored appropriately. Cabinet Office reports 
that only 8 out of 15 departments submitting quarterly returns to them had 
detected any fraud at all (Cabinet Office, 2012, p.17) suggest that more needs 
to be done by some public bodies to understand, respond to and detect fraud. 
This may be why the 2012 Cabinet Office report recognises the importance of 
shared intelligence and states that this “must be the basis of a common defence 
as the criminals who attack us do not operate in silos” (p.13). It therefore 
proposes to create a common intelligence sharing architecture that will co-
ordinate intelligence management, share information on fraud threats across 
sectors and support the “check now pay later” approach (Cabinet Office, 2012, 
p.13). However, work by Gilbert (2011) has shown that barriers to data sharing 
remain, thereby casting doubt about whether the UK government’s plans, as 
outlined in their publication Tackling Fraud and Error in Government: A Report 
of the Fraud, Error and Debt Taskforce, are achievable in the short to medium 
term (Cabinet Office, 2012). Thus, the benefits that flow from improved 
intelligence and detection will take time to come to fruition. The traditional ethos 
of many public sector organisations is to operate independently. This means 
that many have incompatible IT systems and processes which, coupled with 
protectionist attitudes towards policy making (Gilbert, 2011), mean that the 
culture change needed will take substantial time and investment to achieve. 
Investigation of detected anomalies is an essential part of fraud management 
since not all frauds can be prevented because some people will be motivated to 
commit fraud (Marcus, 1995; Gill, 2005; Gill, 2011). The UK government’s 
intention to develop their enforcement capability, by further disrupting fraudulent 
and corrupt activities, is therefore to be welcomed (Cabinet Office & NFA, 
2011b, pp. 17-18). However, there are a number of significant barriers that will 
prevent this from being achieved in the short to medium term. The most 
important of these is the fact that fraud is not a policing priority. At the present 
time, the police and other law enforcement agencies, faced with cuts to their 
budgets (Doig & Levi, 2013, p.147), do not appear to be in a position to 
increase their fraud investigative capacity. The UK government intends to deal 
with this through “developing innovative, partnership solutions, working across 
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police forces, the NCA and its Economic Crime Command (ECC), other law 
enforcement organisations and the public, private and voluntary sectors” 
(Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011b, p.20). 
However, this research casts doubt on whether the public service has the legal 
authority, skills and resources to bring this about. Thus, the UK government 
faces a choice: to provide the police and other law enforcement agencies with 
the resources to expand their capacity to investigate more financial crimes; 
provide central government bodies with the powers and skills needed to combat 
fraud effectively; or, acknowledge that not all frauds can be tackled effectively 
and therefore accept a certain level of fraud loss, by moving from a zero 
tolerance approach, to that of a managed risk approach. 
In the current climate of austerity, the UK government is unlikely to provide law 
enforcement with sufficiently more resources to tackle fraud and other financial 
crime particularly as, in addition to the police, other law enforcement 
organisations such as the SFO have had their budgets cut in recent years 
(Masters, 2011; Pidd, 2012). Similarly, while there has been some movement 
towards increased powers for tackling tax and benefit fraud (Department for 
Work and Pensions, 2011) the UK government has, to date, been relatively 
silent on increasing public sector bodies’ legal powers to deliver the improved 
enforcement response sought (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011b, p.17, p.25). Even 
where a change to existing legislation is tacitly recognised, for example in 
dealing with data sharing, the policy is silent on when and how this will be 
tackled (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011a, p.13). An increase in public bodies’ legal 
powers to tackle fraud is therefore unlikely in the short to medium term. 
Similarly, it is unlikely that the UK government will signal a move away from 
zero tolerance, for this would be to tacitly recognise that it cannot exercise 
effective stewardship over the assets that it owns and manages on the nation’s 
behalf. 
Perhaps a way forward is for the UK government to decide on what constitutes 
a base line set of powers to tackle fraud and ensure that every central 
government body has access to these. These should only be available to those 
charged with delivering counter fraud services. This need not represent a 
significant incursion into civil liberties, as some central government bodies 
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report that they already have at least some of the legal powers needed. What is 
needed is greater clarification of the legal position and the specification of 
common boundaries within which departments and other public sector bodies 
can work with confidence. 
Joint working between law enforcement and civilian counter fraud professionals 
will therefore be a key component of any effective counter fraud service 
particularly as there are some powers, such as arrest and detention, which are, 
and should only be, reserved for the police or other authorised law enforcement 
agencies. Such joint working will also help to address the shortage of police 
capacity to deal with fraud and other economic crime. The professionalisation of 
civilian counter fraud services within government, and the enforcement of 
relevant standards, will help to bring this about, promote confidence in the 
service by law enforcement and improve medium to longer term outcomes. 
A growing disparity between identified and detected fraud has ramifications for 
the UK government’s current deterrence strategy. The shortage of investigative 
capacity within both civilian counter fraud teams and law enforcement will 
undermine the increasing emphasis on prevention, with some interviewees 
noting that successful investigation is an integral part of fraud prevention and 
deterrence. Fraudsters are always looking for new ways of committing fraud 
that will bypass existing controls and thus are in a position to “set the agenda” 
and, while public sector bodies and others can be proactive in protecting 
themselves from such risks, it is very difficult to anticipate all new potential 
exposures and how these will be exploited. This perhaps explains why the UK 
government concluded, “not all frauds can be prevented” (Cabinet Office & 
NFA, 2011b, p.17).  
Therefore, by drawing attention to the complex nature and scale of problem, 
and failing to deal with the issues which prevent an enforcement response that 
keeps pace with this, the detection and punishment rate may decline as a 
proportion of total crime (Gannon & Doig, 2010, pp.50-52). This will make it 
increasingly difficult for the UK government to fulfil their promise that “we will be 
tougher on fraudsters by disrupting and punishing them more efficiently and 
effectively” (Cabinet Office & NFA, 2011b, p.25). The implication of this is that 
current policies and practices may not be able to fully deter fraud and thus the 
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emphasis on fraud prevention may be undermined. Prevention is more than 
controls and processes. It is also dependent on the knowledge that there is a 
high probability that a fraud will be effectively detected and investigated. In the 
absence of this, fraudsters may be incentivised to commit fraud, as shown by 
Cressey’s fraud triangle (Wells, 2002, p. 106). 
Finally, the UK government announced their intentions to “punish fraudsters 
more efficiently and effectively” and “use civil litigation … to bring some 
fraudsters to justice and deny them access to their criminal assets” (Cabinet 
Office & NFA, 2011b, p.20, p.25). The lack of civilian investigative powers and 
skills, and a shortage of law enforcement capacity, casts some doubt on the 
extent to which this can be achieved. Moreover, given that many survey 
respondents reported that they lacked the authority to obtain the information 
needed to investigate suspected fraud, it is unlikely that they can obtain the 
evidence needed to assess accurately their losses. 
There are, therefore, a number of issues that prevent the UK government’s 
fraud management strategy from being fully achieved in the short to medium 
term. There is too little investigative capacity within the police and counter fraud 
teams, and the civilian counter fraud capability that currently exists is being 
constrained by the absence of a lack of legal powers and skills and the absence 
of a fully developed anti-fraud culture. However, providing a number of 
independently operating civilian counter fraud teams within government with 
increased legal powers and skills to work with law enforcement to tackle fraud 
carries risks. Two of the most prevalent risks mentioned by interviewees being 
abuse of position and an inconsistent quality in the standard of work provided. If 
civilian counter fraud teams are to develop, and receive further support from 
government in terms of additional powers, skills and resources, then this needs 
to be accompanied by a professional approach which is subject to adequate 
supervision. 
For counter fraud professionalisation 
Using the criteria listed by Green & Gates (2014, p.77), civilian counter fraud 
services have yet to achieve professional status. This is because there is no: 
registration system; no common code of conduct; no commonly accepted body 
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of professional knowledge; no training programme which delivers the range of 
skills required; and no independent process through which appeals and 
discipline can be administered, and in some cases there is a lack of autonomy.  
Action needs to be taken to deal with these issues. Calls for licensing are likely 
to increase following a decision to apply this to any private investigators from 
2015 who “are involved in any surveillance, inquiries or investigations” (Security 
Industry Authority, 2014). Such provisions apply to civilian counter fraud 
specialists as they carry out some or all of these functions on behalf of their 
employing organisations. While there are differences in accountability between 
public servants (who are answerable to both ministers and Parliament), and 
private sector investigators (who are not), this difference is insufficient to justify 
such a disparity. Both have the opportunity to contravene an individual’s privacy 
and cause them significant personal and economic distress as a result of poor 
quality work. 
While experience from the accountancy profession shows that harmonisation of 
the different professional bodies is not a precursor to professionalisation, 
membership of a professional body and appropriate training (following a period 
of academic study and practical training) are. Thus, the UK government might 
wish to engage further with the ACFE, the Institute of Counter Fraud Specialists 
(ICFS) and others (with whom membership is voluntary), to examine how some 
form of compulsory training, education and licensing system might work (ICFS, 
2011). Once established within government, this could then be rolled out to both 
the private and voluntary sectors. 
Defining what constitutes an accepted body of knowledge should not prove too 
difficult, as accrediting and/or training bodies, such as the Counter fraud 
Professional Accreditation Board, the CIPFA Counter Fraud Centre and the City 
of London Fraud Training Academy, already exist. What is needed is 
agreement on exactly what the core competencies for a civilian counter fraud 
professional are, their relative importance and how they should be acquired. 
There is some evidence that current training programmes remain to be aligned 
with current government policies and provide a better balance between each of 
the six elements of the fraud management model (Figure 2.1). For example, the 
Counter Fraud Professional Accreditation Board syllabus for the ACFS 
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qualification needs to expand its training provision to include more than 11 
competencies for fraud awareness, prevention, detection and deterrence 
(CFPAB, 2014). 
For counter fraud regulation 
The enforcement of quality standards and discipline is a crucial issue. It is clear 
that central government bodies have strong internal control over their counter 
fraud operations and take care to manage the risks arising from this type of 
work. However, such control is difficult to enforce to a consistent standard when 
left to individual organisations and one interviewee expressed concern about 
the level of professional understanding that their supervising senior staff, who 
were not counter fraud professionals, held. 
Having a formal counter fraud inspectorate - with the costs and overheads that 
this represents - to supervise individual counter fraud specialists is not 
recommended. The sheer number of people involved would make regulation at 
the individual level difficult to enforce in practice, and particularly if extended to 
other sectors of the economy. Instead, civilian counter fraud services might 
follow the lead given by other professions and require membership of a 
professional body which, following safeguards for those already in the industry, 
could only be achieved following a period of study and work experience around 
an agreed knowledge base and behavioural standards. This membership, 
which would in effect constitute a licensing facility, would also apply discipline 
codes to those individuals whose work or conduct falls below predefined 
standards.  
Professionalisation through accredited institutes is also consistent with 
government bodies’ current internal supervisory arrangements that are 
considered to be robust. Professional regulation through accredited institutes 
need not conflict with, or duplicate, the current internal supervisory 
arrangements put in place by central government bodies, although such 
institutes could provide inspection arrangements if necessary. However, for this 
model to work, central government will need to make membership of one of 
these institutes compulsory. Other sectors could also be encouraged to comply 
with this regulatory regime through the “Fighting Fraud Together” taskforce. 
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However, professionalisation on its own is insufficient to deal with the issues 
currently facing the delivery of counter fraud services within central government. 
There also needs to be a commitment from departments and other public sector 
bodies to meet their responsibilities to counter fraud in terms of: governance 
structures; resources; the implementation of appropriate policies and 
procedures; and the way in which these are governed and controlled. In the 
absence of appropriate commitment, investment and senior management 
support, professionalisation will have, at best, a limited effect. Consequently, 
while the CIPFA Voluntary Code of Practice (CIPFA, 2014) for employers is a 
welcome development, this needs to be superseded by a requirement from the 
Cabinet Office that all central government organisations will comply with this 
and report the results of their counter fraud work in their annual governance 
statements. Where necessary, any poor practice by individuals that becomes 
evident from an internal or external review and inspection, can lead to an 
enforcement notice for improvement to the employer and, if necessary, a 
referral of an individual or individuals to the relevant professional body.  
The successful implementation of the CIPFA Code of Practice should be 
introduced over a three-year period to allow for the necessary cultural changes 
to occur. Senior management within central government will need educating 
about the need for effective counter fraud services and the value that these 
add. This education programme needs to emphasise that civilian counter fraud 
services provide complementary services to those provided by internal audit, 
and that both have an equally important role to play in effective governance and 
the protection of the finances and assets of central government organisations. 
To allow for this cultural change, each department, agency and non-
departmental public body should be required to undertake a fraud risk 
assessment and the measurement of the monetary effect of these fraud risks. 
Once these bodies have identified and quantified their fraud risks they should 
be required to develop a fraud management programme and put in place the 
supporting infrastructure needed to manage these in a proportionate manner 
which reflects their identified operational and financial risks. To ensure 
consistency between central government organisations, the fraud risk 
assessment and measurement exercises should be undertaken within a 
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framework set by the Cabinet Office that should also approve all proposed fraud 
management programmes. 
There was general agreement between interviewees that counter fraud 
operations need some form of oversight. However, the form that such regulation 
should take generated a variety of views. While most were in favour of some 
form of external regulation, a significant minority were not. This does not 
necessarily imply that one set of arguments is more persuasive than another. 
Both sets of argument have their merits and there needs to be some form of 
dialogue within government to arrive at a consensual position.  
The extent to which civilian counter fraud services are currently regulated has 
been compared to Clarke’s (1994) concept of regulatory grasp in Table 7.2. 
This shows that regulatory control over civilian counter fraud services in central 
government is, on balance, weak, despite strengths in some areas. Those who 
participated in this research process had differing views on how regulatory 
control could be improved, from self-regulation to external regulation. On 
balance, the arguments for external regulation are more persuasive because 
they better support the need for a greater level of professionalisation, and for a 
greater level of accountability than at present.  
Recommendations 
There is a substantial programme of work needed to bring about these 
changes. There are, however, 10 key actions that central government could 
take to help the process make a positive start. These are as follows: 
(a) Determining a base level of legal powers to support civilian counter fraud 
operations, to tackle both internal and external fraud. These should be 
agreed by ministers and Parliament; given to all central government 
organisations; and form a clear boundary within which to conduct counter 
fraud operations. These should only be available to those working within 
counter fraud. 
(b) Central government organisations who have a higher than normal 
exposure to external fraud (for example the DWP and HMRC) should 
continue to enjoy additional legal powers as at present. 
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(c) The UK government should work with the relevant professional institutes 
to develop an agreed code of conduct, a base level of professional 
knowledge and an accredited training and learning regime. 
(d) All counter fraud professionals should be required to belong to a 
professional institute. Membership of this institute should be through 
formal examination and demonstration of practical experience with 
safeguards for those already working in this field. 
(e) All central government organisations should be required to implement 
the CIPFA Code of Conduct over a three year period and be subject to 
external regulation to ensure that they enforce basic standards of 
governance, supervision, delivery and behaviour. 
(f) The base level of professional knowledge underpinning counter fraud 
services should give appropriate prominence to all six parts of the fraud 
management model. 
(g) The agreed knowledge base should be expressed as a series of 
competencies which are delivered through formal training strategies by 
both professional institutes and employing organisations. 
(h) There should be compulsory licensing arrangements, with accredited 
institutes, for all counter fraud professionals – in much the same way that 
accountants are currently licensed by their institutes. 
(i) There should be a discipline system through which aggrieved parties can 
take complaints. This should be delivered by the professional institutes 
for individual counter fraud specialists and through an external regulator, 
such as the SIA, for employers. 
(j) Delivering a different counter fraud model based around collaboration 
between the different skills sets available to a public service organisation. 
This should be co-ordinated by a full time member of the senior civil 
service and include risk management, counter fraud and internal audit. 
Such collaboration could also extend to inter-departmental co-operation 
and particularly where scarce skills, such as IT Forensics, are needed. 
It is not possible to calculate precisely what the cost of these recommendations 
is likely to be, as each government organisation will be faced with a different 
risk and cost profile. Furthermore, government organisations’ counter fraud 
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teams are at different stages of development and have access to different types 
of infrastructure. Consequently, each central government body will face differing 
levels of incremental costs. Some specimen costs have been produced in 
Table 8.1 to test the extent to which the recommendations made are likely to 
provide a cost efficient solution. This shows that, based upon this standardised 
cost profile, recoveries of 1.6 per cent of estimated losses from non tax and 
benefit frauds, are needed to cover the associated costs. While 100 per cent 
cost recovery is likely to be very difficult to achieve it should be possible for 
effective counter fraud management to recover more than 1.62 per cent of 
estimated losses, and thus generate the Exchequer a surplus. 
Table 8.1: Indicative costing for a counter fraud team 
Staffing 
    
  
SCS1 1  91,650  
  
  
G7 1  64,438  
  
  
SEO 2  106,758  
  
  
HEO 4  149,600  
  
  
EO 2  70,870  
  
  
AO 1  28,307   511,623  
 
  
Staffing Uplift (Employer Pension and NI)  179,068  
 
  
Consultancy Support 
 
 150,000  
 
  
Internal Audit Enhancement 3xSEO  112,200  
 
  
Legal Support 
 
 50,000  
 
  
Information Technology 
 
 75,000  
 
  
Statistics and IT Support for Data Analytics  50,000  
 
  
Equipment 
  
 10,000  
 
  
Storage Costs (Seized Material etc.)  40,000  
 
  
Training Costs 
 
 30,000  
 
  
Travel and Subsistence 
 
 40,000  
 
  
Regulatory Charge and Professional Fees  50,000  
 
  
Other Costs 
  
 20,000  
 
  
  
  
 1,317,891  
 
  
No of counter fraud champions 
  
32 
Total cost to government 
   
42,172,512  
NFA 2013 Estimate of central government fraud loss 
 
 2,600,000,000  
Break Even Percentage 
   
1.62% 
Sources: NFA; Civil Service Jobs; Training Provider Costs 
These losses will, however, take time to recover. For the most significant and 
complex cases, recovery times from the point of detection may take as long as 
three years. To deal with this time lag, it is recommended that counter fraud 
teams are funded in full for the first three years from the date by which their 
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fraud risk and threat assessments have been completed and then have their 
support tapered off over the following two years, so that by year six counter 
fraud teams are self-financing. From this point, counter fraud teams should be 
set cost recovery targets that generate net surpluses for the Exchequer. 
To conclude, central government, through their zero tolerance policy and 
accompanying guidance, have made a definitive commitment to tackle fraud 
where it occurs and taken steps to prevent and deter fraud through appropriate 
and proportionate levels of corporate governance and operational control. 
However, such bodies do not currently have the legal powers needed to tackle 
all forms of fraud to which they are subject and do not have access to the full 
range of skills needed implement all forms of fraud management effectively. 
The position on the regulation of civilian counter fraud teams and specialists is 
more complex; with valid arguments for both external and internal management 
regulation of these activities. However, there is a case for the introduction of 
external regulation into these services due to:  
(a) The impact that counter fraud enquiries can have on civil liberties;  
(b) The harm that poorly conducted investigations can have on the accused;  
(c) The need to bring counter public sector counter fraud services in line with 
proposed regulatory activity in other parts of the public sector and the 
private sector; and 
(d) The need for both individual teams and their employers to have their 
activities subject to expert scrutiny. 
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Appendix 1: Literature review search plan 	
Null	Hypothesis:	That	the	current	legal	powers,	skills	and	regulation	available	to	civilian	counter	fraud	staff	are	having	no	effect	on	their	ability	to	tackle	fraud	
Summary	In	2011,	£73	billion	was	lost	to	fraud;	of	which	£21	billion	related	to	the	public	sector	(Cabinet	Office	and	the	NFA,	2012,	p.	7).	In	addition	to	effective	corporate	governance	and	control	regimes,	fraud	prevention	and	deterrence	is	also	dependent	on	potential	fraudsters	knowing	that	illegal	activities	will	be	detected,	investigated	and	punished.	This	literature	review	seeks	to	establish	the	extent	to	which	others	have	researched	this	topic	over	the	last	20	years	
Key	words:	White-Collar	Crime,	Fraud,	Theft,	Bribery,	Embezzlement,	Corruption,	Fraud	and	the	Law,	Eliminating	Fraud,	Fighting	Fraud,	Financial	Crime,	UK	Fraud	Review,	Fraud	and	Organised	Crime,	Mortgage	Fraud,	Benefit	Fraud,	Healthcare	Fraud,	Fraud	and	Business,	Fraud	and	Multinational	Corporations,	Fraud	and	the	police,	Policing	Priorities,	Fraud	Regulation,	IPCC,	Fraud	Training,	ACFS,	Fraud	Indicators,	Fraud	Surveys,	Fraud	Measurement,	Fraud	Losses,	Counter	fraud	Strategies,	Fraud	Management	Systems,	Counter	fraud	Training,	Fraud	Awareness,	Fraud	Culture,	Fraud	Prevention,	Susceptibility	to	Fraud,	Enterprise	Risk	Management	Systems,	Risk	Management,	Continuous	Auditing	and	Assurance,	Fraud	Controls,	Separation	of	Duties,	Fraud	Detection,	Fraud	Detection	Models,	Customer	Relationship	Management,	Dynamic	Databases,	Fraud	Key	Performance	Indicators,	Fraud	Algorithms,	National	Fraud	Investigation	Bureau,	Action	Fraud,	Analytic	Procedures,	Fraud	Investigations,	Case	Acceptance	Criteria,	Fraud	Investigation	Powers,	Fraud	Investigation	Codes	of	Practice,	Data	Sharing,		Fraud	and	PEACE,	Investigative	Interviewing,	Fraud	Deterrence,	Fraud	Redress,	Fraud	Prosecution,	Fraud	Sanctions,		Profession,	Professionalisation,	Professionalisation	and	Risk;	Professional	Characteristics,	Occupational	Professionalisation;	Professionalisation	Enforcement;	Regulation,	Self-Regulation,	Effective	Regulation;	Professional	Regulation;	and	Regulation	Enforcement.	
WWW	search	engines	
§ Google	Scholar	
§ Google	
§ Yahoo	
§ Ask	 	
Bibliographic	databases	
§ Ebsco	
§ Emerald	
§ Nexis	
Websites	–	general	
§ Cabinet	Office	
§ Ministry	of	Justice	
§ Home	Office	
§ National	Fraud	Authority	
§ Attorney	General’s	Office	
§ HM	Revenue	and	Customs	
§ Department	for	Work	and	Pensions	
§ BBC	
Websites	
§ Information	Commissioner’s	Office	
§ Fraud	Advisory	Panel	
§ UK		Data	Archive	
§ British	Computer	Society	
§ NHS	Connecting	for	Health	
§ Audit	Commission	
§ National	Audit	Office	
§ Experian	
§ CIFAS	
§ CIPFA		
§ UK	Payments	Administration				
Key	Journals	
§ Accounting,	Organisations	and	Society	
§ Acta		Sociologica	
§ Behavioural	Sciences	and	the	Law	
§ British	Journal	of	Criminology	
§ British	Medical	Journal	
§ Computer	Law	and	Security	
§ Crime	Prevention	and	Community	Safety:	An	International	Journal	
§ International	Journal	of	Information	Management	
§ International	Journal	of	Law,	Crime	and	Justice	
§ International	Journal	of	Police	Science	and	Management	
§ International	Journal	of	Public	Science	and	Management	
§ International	Journal	of	Public	Sector	Management	
§ International	Journal	of	the	Sociology	of	Law	
§ Internet	Journal	of	Criminology	
§ JIOS	
§ Journal	of	Economic	Perspectives	
§ Journal	of	Financial	Crime	
Key	Journals	(Cont)	
§ Journal	of	Financial	Regulation	and	Compliance	
§ Journal	of	Information	Science		
§ Journal	of	Policy	Analysis	and	Management	Journal	of	Public	Administration	Research	and	Theory	
§ Journal	of	Strategic	Information	Systems	
§ Law	and	Human	Behaviour	
§ Managerial	and	Decision	Economics	
§ New	Information	Perspectives	
§ People	and	Policy		
§ Police	Quarterly	
§ Policing	
§ Policing	and	Society	
§ Proceedings	of	the	IEEE	
§ Public	Administration	
§ Public	Sector	Management	
§ Social	Policy	and	Administration	
§ Statistical	Science	
§ Science	Direct	
§ The	Lancet	
§ Transforming	Government,		
§ Washington	University	Law	Quarterly	
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Government	
Reports	–			Social	Security	Fraud	Act	Code	of	Practice	2002	Public	Sector	Data	Sharing	Guide	2003	Fraud	Review	Final	Report	2006	The	National	Fraud	Strategy	2008	Making	the	UK	the	hardest	target	for	fraudsters	2009	The	work	of	the	Counter	Fraud	Strategy	Forum	2010	NHS	Case	Acceptance	Criteria	2010	Tackling	Worklessness:	Good	Practice	in	Data	Sharing	2010	Fighting	Fraud	Locally	2011	Eliminating	Public	Sector	Fraud	2011	Fighting	Fraud	Together	2011	Applying	Behavioural	Insights	to	Reduce	Fraud,	Error	and	Debt	2012	National	Fraud	Initiative	Reports	2008	to	2012		
Key	Research	Steps	–	in	order		
§ Look	up	fraud	terms	in	Oxford	Hand	book	of	Criminology		
§ Search	bibliographic	databases	
§ Search	Google	Scholar	
§ Access	Office	of	Information	Commissioner	Web	site	
§ Access	Home	Office	and	Ministry	of	Justice	Website	
§ Identify	key	journals	and	papers	
§ Identify	key	issues	
§ Conduct	key	word	search	
§ Identify	additional	journals	and	papers	
§ Read	journals	
§ Search	against	key	authors	–	from	identified	journals	/	papers		
§ Settle	on	key	issues	
§ Peruse	academic	literature	looking	for	linkages	and	conflicts	
§ Identify	key	themes	and	texts	
§ Place	key	themes	and	texts	in	mind	map	
§ Summarise	ideas	and	write	review	
Research	Reports		Problems	faced	by	the	Criminal	Justice	System	in	addressing	fraud	committed	by	multinational	corporations	2005	Mind	the	Gap	–	Assessing	the	UK	Central	Government	Counter	Fraud	Capacity	2007	Decades,	Direction	and	the	Fraud	Review	2008	Fighting	Fraud	and	Financial	Crime	2010	Investigating	and	Prosecuting	Cases	of	Serious	and	Complex	fraud	(2011)	Detecting	Fraud	in	the	Real	World	(n.d.)	
Key	Books	Criminal	Behaviour	Systems	A	Typology:	Clinard	and	Quinney	1967	White	Collor	Crime:	Croall	1992	The	Smartest	Guys	in	the	Room:	McLean	and	Elkind	2003	Fraud	and	Corruption	in	Public	Services:	Jones	2004	The	Struggle	Against	Corruption:	A	Comparative	Study:	ed.	by	Johnson	2004	Fraud:	Doig	2006	The	Fraud	Act	2006	(Blackstone’s	Guide):	Farrell,	Yeo	and	Ladenburg	2007	Trusted	Criminals:	White	Collar	Crime	in	Contemporary	Society:	Freidrichs	2007	Anatomy	of	a	Fraud	Investigation:	Pedneault	2010	A	Short	Guide	to	Fraud	Risk:	Samokiuk	and	Iyer	2010	How	to	be	a	successful	Frauditor:	Tickner	2010	Too	Big	To	Fail:	Dorkin	2010	Studying	Fraud	as	White	Collar	Crime:	Smith	et	al.	2011	Managing	Fraud	Risk:	Giles	2012	Fraud	The	Counter	Fraud	Practitioner’s	Handbook:	Doig	2012	Invisible	Harms	and	Social	Crimes:	Davies	et	al.	2014	Accredited	Counter	Fraud	Specialist	Handbook:	Tunley	et	al.	2015		
Other	
§ Fast	moving	field	–	concentrate	on	papers	from	200	
§ Identify	paper	prior	to	this	to	examine	how	issues	have	developed		
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Appendix 2: Survey questionnaire 
 
University of Portsmouth - Doctoral Studies in Criminology 
 
Survey of civilian counter fraud powers, skills regulation and redress 
 
Undertaken as a part of a doctoral assignment by 
 
Mr Michael Colin Gilbert     Student No 440422 
 
Supervising Tutor      Dr Alison Wakefield 
	
This	questionnaire,	which	is	designed	for	a	windows	computer	running	MS	Word,	has	been	sent	
to	you	as	a	part	of	a	doctoral	research	project	for	the	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies	at	the	
University	of	Portsmouth.	
	
The	results	of	this	survey	will	be	used	to	identify	the	legal	powers	and	skills	available	to	counter	
fraud	professionals	within	central	government	when	 investigating	allegations	of	fraud.	 It	also	
seeks	 to	 identify	 the	 type	of	 regulation	such	professional	 teams	would	prefer,	 if	any,	and	the	
remedies	available	to	third	parties	should	any	of	those	associated	with	an	investigation	feel	the	
need	to	seek	redress.	
	
In	 this	 context,	 civilian	 counter	 fraud	 teams	 refer	 to	 those	 charged	 with	 delivering	 counter	
fraud	 and	 counter	 corruption	 services	 to	 the	 programme	 and	 administrative	 income	 and	
expenditure	 of	 a	 central	 government	 department.	 However,	 it	 excludes	 	 those	 charged	with	
investigating	 tax	 and	 benefit	 fraud	 and	 those	 whose	 main	 remit	 is	 law	 enforcement	 –	 for	
example	the	Serious	Fraud	Office	and	the	Serious	and	Organised	Crime	Agency.	
	
It	would	 be	 EXTREMELY	HELPFUL	 IF	 YOU	COULD	COMPLETE	 THIS	QUESTIONNAIRE	 to	 ensure	
that	 the	 results	 are	 valid.	 I	 would	 be	 grateful,	 therefore,	 if	 you	 could	 complete	 this	
questionnaire	 and	 return	 it	 to	 myself	 at	 icj80391@myport.ac.ukby	 06	 June	 2012.	 The	
questionnaire	takes	a	maximum	of	15	minutes	to	complete.	
	
Anonymity:	 It	 is	 University	 of	 Portsmouth	 policy	 to	 assure	 anonymity.	 Names	 and	 e-mail	
addresses	 are	 only	 requested	 so	 that	 I	 know	 who	 to	 follow	 up	 with	 to	 deal	 with	 any	
clarifications	that	may	be	necessary	to	answers	provided.	Only	myself,	and	my	academic	tutor	
from	the	Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies	of	the	University	of	Portsmouth,	will	have	access	
to	individually	completed	questionnaires.		All	survey	responses	will	be	stored	securely	and	then	
destroyed	when	no	longer	required.	This	may	follow	the	publication	of	a	Journal	article,	which	
is	likely	to	take	place	in	2014.	
	
All	 information	 received	will	 be	aggregated	 for	 research	purposes	 so	 that	no	organisation	or	
individual	 will	 be	 separately	 identified	 in	 the	 doctoral	 assignment	 report	 or	 in	 any	 journal	
article	produced	from	the	information	supplied.	For	those	that	wish	it,	an	advance	copy	of	any	
journal	article	will	be	sent	to	them	prior	to	submission	so	that	they	can	ensure	that	the	right	to	
confidence	has	been	fully	and	properly	maintained.	
 
Mike Gilbert 
xx April 2012 
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Initial Survey Design 
 
Section 1: Respondent Information 
 
Q1. Name of Organisation………………………………………………………….. 
 
Q2. Contact Name 
(Optional)…………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Q3. Contact e-mail 
(Optional)…………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
Section 2: About your Organisation 
 
Q4. Which of the following classifications is the most appropriate for your organisation? 
Please select 1 (by double clicking on the check box and selecting the checked option) 
as shown here  
 
 
 Central Government Department 
 
Central Government Department Agency 
 
Non-Departmental Public Body 
 
Government Regulator 
 
NHS Body 
 
Local Authority 
 
 Voluntary Sector 
 
 Other – Please specify………………………………………………… 
 
 
Q5. How large is your organisation? Please select 1. 
 
 
0-50 employees 
 
51 – 100 employees 
 
101-500 employees 
 
501-1000 employees 
 
More than 1000 employees 
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Section 3: Counter Fraud Investigation Powers 
 
Q6. Please indicate which investigative powers are available to your organisation’s 
civilian counter fraud team. 
 
No Question YES NO 
The authority to investigate 
6.1 The authority to conduct fraud and other investigations to the civil and criminal standard   
The authority to conduct surveillance 
6.2 The authority to conduct Directed Surveillance with and without RIPA registration   
6.3 The authority to monitor staff e-mails and phone calls while working in official premises   
6.4 The authority to monitor contractor e-mails and phone calls while working on official premises 
with or without a warrant or RIPA registration 
  
The authority to obtain and share information 
6.5 The authority to issue third parties with a notice under s29(3) of the Data Protection Act 1998 
when seeking information in a fraud or corruption enquiry 
  
6.6 The authority to share data with law enforcement and private sector security and civilian 
counter fraud teams 
  
The Authority to Interview 
6.7 The authority to interview and take witness statements   
6.8 The authority to interview under caution   
6.9 The authority to compel staff, contractors and other individuals to attend for interview with self 
incrimination safeguards 
  
6.10 The authority to compel staff, contractors and other individuals to attend for interview without 
self incrimination safeguards 
  
The Authority to Obtain Evidence 
6.11 The authority to obtain a search and seize warrant   
6.12 The authority to obtain production / other information gathering orders   
6.13 The authority to obtain and review financial and finance related documents   
6.14 The authority to enter third party premises (e.g. contractor Head Office, Personal Homes) to 
seize documents, computers and other evidential material with a warrant 
  
6.15 The authority to receive information and  or documents and / or evidence from a source when 
permission from the document / evidence owners has not been granted 
  
6.16 The authority to compel staff and third parties (e.g. contractors) to supply documents and other 
required evidence with self incrimination safeguards 
  
6.17 The authority to compel staff and third parties (e.g. contractors) to supply documents and other 
required evidence without self incrimination safeguards 
  
6.18 The authority to search an individual while on official premises   
6.19 The authority to search an employee’s desk, locker, work bin etc within official premises without 
a warrant / other court order 
  
6.20 The authority to search a contractor’s desk, locker, work bin etc within official premises without 
a warrant / other court order 
  
6.21 The authority to forensically examine and copy an employees work computer with or without a 
warrant / other court order 
  
6.22 The authority to forensically examine and copy a contractor’s computer system without a 
warrant / other counter order 
  
The Authority to Apprehend and Detain 
6.23 The authority to arrest an individual when suspected of fraud and / or corruption against your 
organisation 
  
The Authority to Prosecute 
6.24 The ability to bring prosecutions in the organisation’s own right for fraud and  
corruption cases – rather than through law enforcement and the CPS 
  
The Authority to Redress 
6.25 The authority to issue a formal caution   
6.26 The authority to make a compensation claim under the civil law for losses suffered   
6.27 The authority to make a compensation claim under the criminal law for losses suffered 
The authority to recover sums paid in salary and other benefits, while employed or on 
suspension, if the case against the accused is proven 
  
6,28 The authority to recover investigation costs   
6.29 The authority to issue an administrative penalty   
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Section 4: Future plans 
 
Q7. Do you consider that you are making the best use of the legal powers available to 
you? Please answer Yes or No. 
 
 
  Yes 
 
  No 
 
 
If your answer is Yes, please proceed to Q13. 
 
 
 
Q8. If you answered No to Q7, which of the powers available to you could be used 
more effectively? Please shade all that apply as shown here  Q6.1. 
 
 
Q – 6.1,  6.2,  6.3,  6.4,  6.5,  6.6,  6.7,  6.8,  6.9,  6.10,  6.11,  6.12,  6.13,  6.14,  
 
       6.15,  6.16,  6.17,  6.18,  6.19,  6.20,  6.21,  6.22,  6.23,  6.24,  6.25,  6.26,  
 
       6.27,  6.28,  6.29 
 
 
 
Q9. Do you intend to amend your working practices to make better use of the powers 
available to you? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
If your answer is No, please proceed to Q13. 
 
 
 
Q10. Over what time period do you intend to make these changes? 
 
 
 Less than 12 months 
 
 Between 1 and 3 years 
 
 Between 4 and 5 years 
 
 Greater than 5 years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Professional	Doctorate	in	Security	and	Risk	Management																													Michael	Colin	Gilbert:	Student	440422		
August 2015 
						 	 Page 
 
191	
 
Q11. In which areas are these changes most likely to fall? Please tick all that apply. 
 
 Fraud Awareness and Prevention 
 
Fraud Detection 
 
Fraud Investigation 
 
Fraud Deterrence 
 
Fraud Sanctions  
 
 Fraud Redress 
 
 
Q12. What are the three key changes are you likely to implement to make better use of 
your existing powers. Please limit your answers to a maximum of 25 words 
 
Change 1 …………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Change 2 …………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Change 3 …………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
Section 5: Liability 
 
 
Q13. In the event that an investigated person seeks redress for damages against your 
organisation following an acquittal or inconclusive investigation, is liability: 
 
  Corporate 
 
  Personal 
 
  Both 
 
 
Section 6: About your team 
 
 
Q14. How many staff are employed by your organisation’s counter fraud team? No… 
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Section 6: About your team (continued) 
 
Q15. How many members of your team have one or more of the following 
qualifications? Please tick all that apply and add the numbers of staff with the relevant 
qualifications: 
 
Accredited Counter Fraud Specialist     No…. 
 
Association of Accredited Fraud Examiners   No…. 
 
BA / BSc in criminology or a field related to counter fraud No…. 
 
MA / MSc in criminology or a field related to counter fraud No…. 
 
CCAB qualified accountant     No…. 
 
 Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) qualified   No…. 
 
Qualification in computer forensics    No…. 
 
POCA qualified / accredited financial investigator  No…. 
 
 
Section 5: Regulation 
 
Q16. Do you believe that civilian counter fraud teams are effectively regulated? 
 
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
 
If the answer to Q16 is Yes please proceed to the end of the survey 
 
 
Q17. What kind of regulation would you like to see? 
 
Regulation by Government Body 
 
Regulation by Professional Body 
 
Self-Regulation through an approved Code of Conduct 
 
 Other – Please Specify………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Date questionnaire completed……………………………………………………………. 
 
Thank you for your time in completing this questionnaire. It would be very helpful if you 
could return this questionnaire to: Mike Gilbert at: icj80391@myport.ac.uk 
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Appendix 3: Initial survey letter 	
Counter Fraud Champion    Address 
 
 
        
       Date:      xx April 2012 
Dear Sir / Madam 
 
Request to participate in a research questionnaire 
My name is Mike Gilbert and I am a Doctoral student with the Institute of 
Criminal Justice Studies at the University of Portsmouth. My topic of interest 
centres on how civilian counter fraud teams conduct their business and, in 
particular, investigations. To this end, I am conducting a limited piece of 
research, through an e-mailed survey, into the following: 
 
(a) The powers available to central government bodies to investigate 
allegations of fraud; 
(b) The skills available to counter fraud teams; and, 
(c) The means by which the work of such teams is quality assured and 
subject to both internal and external regulation. 
This research will result in an internal assignment for my university tutors of 
which the primary focus is on research methods. When completing the 
assignment report, the research results will be anonymised, aggregated and 
summarised. No organisation or individual will be capable of being identified.   
 
I also guarantee that only my tutor and myself will have access to the complete 
questionnaires – and these will be deleted when no longer needed.  
It is also possible that the research results will be written up into a journal 
article. If this occurs, the guarantee of anonymity will be carried forward to this 
article. For those organisations that wish it, the initial draft text of any journal 
article will be sent to them prior to submission so that they can be assured that 
their confidence has been maintained. 
 
I have prepared two versions of the questionnaire – one for Apple Mac users 
and one for MS Windows users. Please select the most appropriate. I expect 
the questionnaire to take around 15 minutes to complete and have designed it 
so that, for the vast majority of questions, all that needs to be done is check a 
check box. It would be helpful if I could have a reply by 4 May 2012.  
 
I look forward to hearing from you in due course 
 
 
Mike Gilbert 
Mike Gilbert
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Appendix 4: Specimen follow up survey letter 
 Address 
  
  
  
 xx June 2012 
Dear Counter Fraud Champion 
 
Doctoral Research Survey: Mr Mike Gilbert – University of Portsmouth 
 
On 24 April and 7 May 2012, following notification from the Cabinet Office 
Fraud, Error and Debt department, I wrote to you asking if it would be possible 
for you to kindly complete a short survey on counter fraud powers, regulation 
and skills by 6th June 2012.  
 
This survey forms a part of my doctoral studies at the University of Portsmouth. 
The focus of my research is how the losses due to fraud, which are currently 
estimated at £73 billion by the National Fraud Authority, can be tackled; and, in 
particular, the £20 billion lost annually to the public sector that have remained 
static for the past two years.   
 
The problem is particularly complex and has a multitude of root causes. My 
research is focussing on the type of response that is likely to have the greatest 
resonance to central government departments; who provide a wide range of 
services that are subject to fraud threats from many different sources and actors 
with varying motives, resources and methodologies. 
 
Getting the most of the powers that departments have to tackle the fraud 
problem is one central issue. However, strategies to achieve this are difficult to 
formulate in the absence of an inventory of these powers. Similarly, the reaction 
to local authority use of RIPA powers has shown that professionalism, 
competence and proportionality in the use of these powers are essential to 
maintaining confidence in the counter fraud process and the co-operation that 
flows from this. This is why I have asked some questions on regulation and 
counter fraud skills. 
 
I have yet to receive a response from your department. I would be grateful if 
you would kindly take another look at the survey and ask a colleague to 
complete it by 6th July 2012. This should only take around 15 minutes. Apple 
Mac and Windows versions of my short survey are attached. Please complete 
which ever of these surveys is the most relevant. 
 
Thank you for your time 
 
Mike 
Mike Gilbert 
Student 440422 
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Appendix 5: Semi-structured interview template 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF PORTSMOUTH 
 
The conduct and control over civilian counter fraud activities 
 
Preamble 
This interview template has been constructed to allow for the simple 
transcription and analysis of meetings with counter fraud professionals in 
support of the following Professional Doctorate Research Project: 
Is the current legislative, professional and regulatory environment, within 
which civilian counter fraud operates in the UK, conducive to an effective 
response to 21st century fraud? 
 
 
Background 
 
1. May I have your name and position within the organisation? 
 
Text 
 
2. May I confirm your e-mail address (for the transcript to be sent to)? 
 
Text 
 
3. How long have you worked in civilian counter fraud? 
 
Text 
 
4. Which areas of counter fraud do you have direct experience of? 
(Awareness, Prevention, Detection, Deterrence, Investigation and 
Sanctions). 
 
5. Could I please confirm that you have been sent the participant  
     information sheet and that you have signed the consent form? 
 
Text 
 
6. Do you have any concerns about this research and your role in it? If  
     so, what are they? 
 
Text 
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Counter Fraud Legal Powers 
 
7. What are the core legal powers, if any, you need to conduct 
effective Investigations? 
 
Text 
 
8. Do you have all of these powers? If not, which of these powers are 
not available to you? 
 
Text 
 
9.    If you lack one or more of the powers you need, what effect has this 
had on your ability to deliver an effective counter fraud service? 
 
Text 
 
10. How might any shortfall in powers be addressed? 
 
Text 
 
11.  How long is any such shortfall likely to take to address? 
 
Text 
 
 
Counter Fraud Skills 
 
12. Have you conducted a counter fraud competencies review? 
 
Text 
 
13. If not, what are the reasons for this and do you have any plans to 
conduct such a review? 
 
Text 
 
14. What do you consider to be the top 10 core skills needed to deliver 
an effective counter fraud service? 
 
Text 
  
15. Do you currently possess each of these skills. If not, which ones do 
you currently lack? 
 
Text 
 
16.  What steps do you intend to take to address any skills gaps? 
 
Text 
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Counter Fraud Regulation 
 
17. Do you believe that your counter fraud team should be subject to 
some form of control? Could you please provide the rationale behind 
your answer? 
 
Text 
 
18. Do you currently impose some form of senior management 
governance over your counter fraud team? If not, why is this? If the 
answer is yes, how do you ensure that your governance 
arrangements are effective? 
 
Text 
 
19. Do you think that there is a need for some form of external regulation 
over civilian counter fraud teams? If so, what form do you think this 
should take: by Government, by professional bodies, or some other 
form? 
 
Text 
 
20. Could you provide the main reasons for your views on external 
regulation? 
 
Text 
 
 
Thank you very much 
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Annex A: Desired Counter Fraud Powers  
No Question YES NO 
The authority to investigate 
A.1 The authority to conduct fraud and other investigations to the civil and criminal standard   
The authority to conduct surveillance 
A.2 The authority to conduct Directed Surveillance with and without RIPA registration   
A.3 The authority to monitor staff e-mails and phone calls while working in official premises   
A.4 The authority to monitor contractor e-mails and phone calls while working on official premises with or 
without a warrant or RIPA registration 
  
The authority to obtain and share information 
A.5 The authority to issue third parties with a notice under s29 (3) of the Data Protection Act 1998 when 
seeking information in a fraud or corruption enquiry 
  
A.6 The authority to share data with law enforcement and private sector security and civilian counter fraud 
teams 
  
The Authority to Interview 
A.7 The authority to interview and take witness statements   
A.8 The authority to interview under caution   
A.9 The authority to compel staff, contractors and other individuals to attend for interview with self 
incrimination safeguards 
  
A.10 The authority to compel staff, contractors and other individuals to attend for interview without self 
incrimination safeguards 
  
The Authority to Obtain Evidence 
A.11 The authority to obtain a search and seize warrant with safeguards   
A.12 The authority to obtain production / other information gathering orders   
A.13 The authority to obtain and review financial and finance related documents   
A.14 The authority to enter third party premises (e.g. contractor Head Office, Personal Homes) to seize 
documents, computers and other evidential material with a warrant 
  
A.15 The authority to receive information and or documents and / or evidence from a source when 
permission from the document / evidence owners has not been granted 
  
A.16 The authority to compel staff and third parties (e.g. contractors) to supply documents and other 
required evidence with self incrimination safeguards 
  
A.17 The authority to compel staff and third parties (e.g. contractors) to supply documents and other 
required evidence without self incrimination safeguards 
  
A.18 The authority to search an individual while on official premises   
A.19 The authority to search an employee’s desk, locker, work bin etc. within official premises without a 
warrant / other court order 
  
A.20 The authority to search a contractor’s desk, locker, work bin etc. within official premises without a 
warrant / other court order 
  
A.21 The authority to forensically examine and copy an employees work computer without a warrant / other 
court order 
  
A.22 The authority to forensically examine and copy a contractor’s computer system without a warrant / 
other counter order 
  
The Authority to Apprehend and Detain 
A.23 The authority to arrest an individual when suspected of fraud and / or corruption against your 
organisation 
  
The Authority to Prosecute 
A.24 The ability to bring prosecutions in the organisation’s own right for fraud and  
corruption cases – rather than through law enforcement and the CPS 
  
The Authority to Obtain Redress 
A.25 The authority to issue a formal caution   
A.26 The authority to make a compensation claim under the civil law for losses suffered   
A.27 The authority to make a compensation claim under the criminal law for losses suffered   
A.28 The authority to recover sums paid in salary and other benefits, while employed or on suspension, if 
the case against the accused is proven 
  
A.29 The authority to recover investigation costs   
A.30 The authority to issue an administrative penalty   		
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Annex B: Perceived Counter Fraud Powers  
No Question YES NO 
The authority to investigate 
A.1 The authority to conduct fraud and other investigations to the civil and criminal standard   
The authority to conduct surveillance 
A.2 The authority to conduct Directed Surveillance with and without RIPA registration   
A.3 The authority to monitor staff e-mails and phone calls while working in official premises   
A.4 The authority to monitor contractor e-mails and phone calls while working on official premises with or 
without a warrant or RIPA registration 
  
The authority to obtain and share information 
A.5 The authority to issue third parties with a notice under s29 (3) of the Data Protection Act 1998 when 
seeking information in a fraud or corruption enquiry 
  
A.6 The authority to share data with law enforcement and private sector security and civilian counter fraud 
teams 
  
The Authority to Interview 
A.7 The authority to interview and take witness statements   
A.8 The authority to interview under caution   
A.9 The authority to compel staff, contractors and other individuals to attend for interview with self 
incrimination safeguards 
  
A.10 The authority to compel staff, contractors and other individuals to attend for interview without self 
incrimination safeguards 
  
The Authority to Obtain Evidence 
A.11 The authority to obtain a search and seize warrant with safeguards   
A.12 The authority to obtain production / other information gathering orders   
A.13 The authority to obtain and review financial and finance related documents   
A.14 The authority to enter third party premises (e.g. contractor Head Office, Personal Homes) to seize 
documents, computers and other evidential material with a warrant 
  
A.15 The authority to receive information and or documents and / or evidence from a source when 
permission from the document / evidence owners has not been granted 
  
A.16 The authority to compel staff and third parties (e.g. contractors) to supply documents and other 
required evidence with self incrimination safeguards 
  
A.17 The authority to compel staff and third parties (e.g. contractors) to supply documents and other 
required evidence without self incrimination safeguards 
  
A.18 The authority to search an individual while on official premises   
A.19 The authority to search an employee’s desk, locker, work bin etc. within official premises without a 
warrant / other court order 
  
A.20 The authority to search a contractor’s desk, locker, work bin etc. within official premises without a 
warrant / other court order 
  
A.21 The authority to forensically examine and copy an employees work computer without a warrant / other 
court order 
  
A.22 The authority to forensically examine and copy a contractor’s computer system without a warrant / 
other counter order 
  
The Authority to Apprehend and Detain 
A.23 The authority to arrest an individual when suspected of fraud and / or corruption against your 
organisation 
  
The Authority to Prosecute 
A.24 The ability to bring prosecutions in the organisation’s own right for fraud and  
corruption cases – rather than through law enforcement and the CPS 
  
The Authority to Obtain Redress 
A.25 The authority to issue a formal caution   
A.26 The authority to make a compensation claim under the civil law for losses suffered   
A.27 The authority to make a compensation claim under the criminal law for losses suffered   
A.28 The authority to recover sums paid in salary and other benefits, while employed or on suspension, if 
the case against the accused is proven 
  
A.29 The authority to recover investigation costs   
A.30 The authority to issue an administrative penalty   
Note: The initial and follow up letters for the semi-structured interview programme 
were the based upon those used for the survey  
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Appendix 6: Ethics self-assessment form 
 
Record	of	ethical	considerations	in	planning	your	research	proposal	and	
dissertation	in	ICJS	Postgraduate	Programme	Area.	
 
The information below should be supplied with your research proposal and will be passed to your 
dissertation supervisor. 
Student number: 440422.        Date: 27June 2013 
 
Proposed research topic (please print clearly):  
 
A short survey into the legal powers and skills available to counter fraud 
teams in central government and the ways in which their work in quality 
assured and regulated 
 
Background/preparation (student to complete as self-assessment) 
 
1 Student has read the relevant section in the unit handbook (Part 3, Section 5) 
Yes [x] No [  ] 
 
2 Student has read the British Society of Criminology ethical guidelines  
 (see www.britsoc.org/ethics.htm) 
Yes [x]  No [  ] 
 
3 Student has attended the taught research ethics session (campus only) 
           Yes [   ]     No [   ]   Not applicable   [ x ] 
 
4 Will the research involve the collection and analysis of primary or secondary data? 
Primary data   Yes [x] No [  ] 
Secondary data   Yes [x] No [  ] 
 
If ‘no’ to both parts of Q4, outline any ethical issues that may arise in your research at the end of 
the questions below (e.g. political considerations in taking a critical stand on a sensitive issue). 
If ‘yes’ to either primary or secondary data collection, go on to answer ALL the following 
questions. 
 
5  Does proposed research involve face-to-face contact with members of the community? 
 Yes [x]  No [  ] 
 
6 Is access to personal or confidential data sought? 
 Yes [   ]  No [x] 
 
7 Are you aware of the need to ensure anonymity and confidentiality of research participants? 
 Yes [x]  No [  ] 
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8 Are there potential risks (to you or research subjects) in the research? (Specify which in the 
space provided) 
 
Physical  Yes [   ]  No [x] . 
...........................……………. 
Psychological  Yes[   ]  No [x]  
............................……………. 
 
Compromising situations                         Yes [    ]  No [ x ]  See below 
............................……………. 
 
I will ensure that respondents are aware of both the professional and academic uses to 
which the research will be put. 
 
9 Are there data protection issues?  Yes [ x ]  No [  ] 
 
10 Do you believe you need to deceive research subjects? (e.g. by not being clear about the 
purpose of your research) 
 Yes [   ]  No[x ] 
11 Is there any likely harm to participants involved in the research?     Yes [   ]            No[x ] 
 
12 Is there any potential role conflict for you in the research?               Yes [ x ]            No[   ]  
See Q8 above 
 
13 Is participation in the research voluntary?  Yes [x ]  No[   ] 
 
14 Have you considered how you are going to obtain informed consent from research 
participants? 
 Yes [x ] No[   ] 
 
15 Are there any other potential sources of ethical issues or conflict in the proposed research? 
 Yes [ ]                 No [ x ] 
See ethics part 
 
Any other ethical issues? (e.g. political considerations, sensitivity of the topic) 
 
This is a sensitive topic on which there has already been some previous academic and official 
work. This research will bring this up to date and draw key issues together into a central 
repository for further analysis. If the results show a lack of legal powers, skills and regulation then 
there is the possibility of adverse comment. It may also encourage potential fraudsters. However, 
if the law enforcement / civilian partnership in tackling fraud is to be improved such issues need 
to be surfaced and addressed in an informed and constructive manner. It could also be argued 
that, as this survey will be based on information that is largely in the public domain, albeit in a 
disparate form, then no harm will result from the publication of the survey results. 
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Appendix 7: Letter of ethical approval 
Mr	Michael	Gilbert		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Professional	Doctorate	Student		
Institute	of	Criminal	Justice	Studies		
University	of	Portsmouth		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
REC	reference	number:	12/13:31	
Please	quote	this	number	on	all	correspondence.		
	
18th	September	2013		
	
Dear	Michael,		
	
Full	Title	of	Study:		Is	the	current	legislative,	professional	and	regulatory	environment,	within	
which	civilian	counter	fraud	operates	in	the	UK,	conducive	to	an	effective	response	to	21st		
century	fraud?		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Documents	reviewed:		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Consent	Form		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Interview	Question	Sheets		
Participant	Information	Sheets		
Protocol		
Surveys		
	
Further	 to	 our	 recent	 correspondence,	 this	 proposal	 was	 reviewed	 by	 The	 Research	 Ethics		
Committee	of	The	Faculty	of	Humanities	and	Social	Sciences.	I	am	pleased	to	tell	you	that	the		
proposal	was	awarded	a	favourable	ethical	opinion	by	the	committee.		
	
Please	 note,	 however,	 that	 we	 cannot	 give	 a	 retrospective	 favourable	 opinion	 for	 the		
research	that	was	undertaken	for	the	pilot	study,	but,	in	my	opinion,	based	on	your	reflective		
review,	it	was	undertaken	ethically.		Given	this	opinion	it	is	a	matter	for	the	supervisor	to		
decide	whether	 to	 include	 this	 element	 of	 research	 as	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 thesis	 or	 just	
simply	refer	to	it	in	the	thesis,	as	a	discrete	piece	of	work	already	undertaken.	
	
	
Kind	regards,		
	
FHSS	FREC	Chair		
David	Carpenter	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Members	participating	in	the	review:		
	
David	Carpenter		
Richard	Hitchcock		
Jane	Winstone
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Appendix 8: Declaration of compliance with ethical requirements 	
 
FORM	UPR16	
Research	Ethics	Review	Checklist	
	
Please	complete	and	return	the	form	to	Research	Section,	Quality	Management	
Division,	Academic	Registry,	University	House,	with	your	thesis,	prior	to	examination	
 
 
 
Postgraduate Research Student (PGRS) Information 
 
 
Student ID: 
 
440422 
 
Candidate Name: 
 
 
Michael Colin Gilbert 
 
Department: 
 
 
ICJS 
 
First Supervisor: 
 
Alison Wakefield 
 
Start Date:  
(or progression date for Prof Doc students) 
 
 
18 September 2013 
 
 
Study Mode and Route: 
 
 
Part-time 
 
Full-time 
 
ü 
 
q 
 
MPhil  
 
MD 
 
PhD 
 
 
 
q 
 
q 
 
q 
 
Integrated Doctorate  
(NewRoute) 
 
Prof Doc (PD) 
 
 
q 
 
ü 
 
 
 
If you are unsure about any of the following, please contact the local representative on your Faculty Ethics 
Committee for advice.  Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the University’s Ethics Policy and 
any relevant University, academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study 
Although the Ethics Committee may have given your study a favourable opinion, the final responsibility for 
the ethical conduct of this work lies with the researcher(s). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Title of Thesis: 
Is the current legislative, professional and regulatory environment, within 
which civilian counter fraud operates in UK central government, conducive 
to an effective response to 21st century fraud? 	
 
Thesis Word Count:  
(excluding ancillary 
data) 
 
		
50,460 
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UKRIO Finished Research Checklist: 
(If you would like to know more about the checklist, please see your Faculty or Departmental Ethics 
Committee rep or see the online version of the full checklist at: http://www.ukrio.org/what-we-do/code-of-
practice-for-research/) 
 
 
a) Have all of your research and findings been reported accurately, honestly 
and within a reasonable time frame? 
 
     YES 
 
 
b) Have all contributions to knowledge been acknowledged? 
 
     YES 
 
 
c) Have you complied with all agreements relating to intellectual property, 
publication and authorship? 
     YES 
 
 
d) Has your research data been retained in a secure and accessible form 
and will it remain so for the required duration?  
     YES 
 
 
e) Does your research comply with all legal, ethical, and contractual 
requirements? 
 
     YES 
 
*Delete as appropriate 
 
 
 
 
Candidate Statement: 
 
 
I have considered the ethical dimensions of the above named research project, and have successfully 
obtained the necessary ethical approval(s) 
 
 
Ethical review number(s) from Faculty Ethics Committee (or from 
NRES/SCREC): 
 
 
12/13:31 
 
 
 
Signed: 
(Student)     M C Gilbert 
 
Date: 18/08/2015 
 
If you have not submitted your work for ethical review, and/or you have answered ‘No’ to one or 
more of questions a) to e), please explain why this is so: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed: 
(Student) 
 
Date: 
		 	
. 
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Appendix 9: Interview participant consent form 
		
	
	
Study Title: Is the current legislative, professional and regulatory environment, 
within which civilian counter fraud operates in the UK, conducive to an effective 
response to 21st century fraud? 
REC Ref No:12/13:31 
 
Name of Researcher:  Michael Gilbert     
 Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have received a letter inviting my organisation to participate in  
a semi-structured interview programme. I am content to participate in this 
research programme 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason prior to the end of the research  
phase 
 
3. I understand that data collected during the study, may be looked at by  
staff from the University of Portsmouth and their internal and external markers. 
I give permission for these individuals to have access to my data 
 
 
4. I agree to my interview being either video or audio recorded.  
 
 
 
5. I agree to a written transcript of my interview being prepared from notes taken 
during the interview.  
 
 
6. I agree to review a draft note of the meeting to ensure that its contents are  
complete, accurate and a proper reflection of my views 
 
 
7. I agree to take part in the above study 
 
 
Name of Participant:   Date:   Signature: 
Name of Person taking consent :  Date:   Signature: 
Institute of Criminal Justice 
Studies Ravelin House Museum 
Road Portsmouth Hampshire PO1 
2QQ  United Kingdom	Consent	Form	
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Appendix 10: Interview participant information sheet 
			
	
	
Study Title: Is the current legislative, professional and regulatory environment, 
within which civilian counter fraud operates in the UK, conducive to an effective 
response to 21st century fraud? 
 
REC Ref No: 12/13:31 
 
I would like to invite you to take part in this doctoral research study. Before you 
decide I would like you to understand why the research is being done and what it 
would involve for you. Talk to others about the study if you wish. Please ask me if 
there is anything that is not clear 
 
What is the purpose of the study?  
This research is primarily designed to meet the requirements for a professional 
doctorate dissertation in Criminal Justice Studies at Portsmouth. However, as a 
professional doctorate, this research is also designed to examine the 
management of fraud from new perspectives and provide recommendations and 
other outcomes that will be useful to practitioners in this field. 
 
Why have I been invited?  
You have been invited to participate in this research because your organisation is 
an active participant in the fight against fraud in the public sector. In particular, 
this research would like to capture your views so that a balanced and 
comprehensive picture of the issues emerges and leads to pragmatic and 
meaningful tools and recommendations that practitioners can take forward. 
 
Do I have to take part?  
Participation in this research is entirely voluntary. If you are interested I am happy 
to explain the research study in more detail to you at the start of the interview. If, 
after this introduction, you agree to take part I will then ask you to sign a consent 
form – as required by the University. 
 
 
 
 
 
Institute of Criminal Justice 
Studies Ravelin House Museum 
Road Portsmouth Hampshire P
O1 2QQ  United Kingdom	
Participant	Information	Sheet	
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What will happen to me if I take part?  
Nothing - other than the donation of a small amount of your time. The interview 
will take around 60 minutes – and at the end of this I will write up a summary that 
I agree with you. My text will only be based upon this agreed text – to provide you 
with control over how the information you provide to me will be used. It will 
probably take you a further 30 minutes to read the draft transcript and notify me 
of any changes. All interview transcripts will be held securely on an encrypted 
laptop and only shared with designated university staff within the Institute of 
Criminal Justice Studies. Complete anonymity is guaranteed unless you provide 
explicit and written permission for your identity to be revealed. 
 
Expenses and payments  
I will travel to you to conduct the interviews. Consequently, you should not incur 
any cash expenses in participating in this study. Compensation for your time is 
not available. 
 
What will I have to do?  
All that you will need to do is to provide 1 hour of your time to deal with an 
interview and around 30 minutes to read and agree the resulting transcript. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
There are not thought to be any personal risks to taking part in this research. 
There may be some residual organisation risks if the research identifies that fraud 
management is poorly managed and in need of change – although anonymity will 
reduce the any direct risk to your organisation. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
There will be no direct personal benefits to participating in this research. 
However, over the longer period, the identification of fraud management issues, 
and the implementation of recommendations made, may improve your 
governance over this important area and lead to either increased recoveries or 
reduced losses. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
Your participation in this research will be kept confidential unless you give explicit 
permission in writing to be identified. However, there is one exception to this. My 
university tutors, and examiners, will need access to the data you provide, and 
any notes, to check that the research is being conducted properly and in 
accordance with best practice. Therefore, if you join the study, it is possible that 
some of the data collected will be looked at by authorised persons from the 
University of Portsmouth and its accredited examiners. All will have a duty of 
confidentiality to you as a research participant and we will do our best to ensure 
that they meet this duty.  
 
Confidentiality will be maintained as follows. By: 
(a) Only using my university e-mail address for communications relating to 
this research; 
(b) Storing all information on an encrypted laptop; 
(c) Transcribing all paper notes into electronic form and shredding the notes 
immediately afterwards 
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(d) Using coded pseudonyms in the research report – e.g. interviewee A, B 
etc.; and, 
(e) All data will be deleted at the end of the research project – which is due to 
be completed in 2015. 
 
As stated earlier, you will have the opportunity to review interview transcripts and 
correct any inadvertent errors etc. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?  
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary and you can withdraw at any time. 
If you decide to withdraw all data supplied to the research programme will be 
destroyed / deleted if you request this. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
If a problem arises with this research, you can complain to my tutor at 
Portsmouth University in the first instance by either e-mail or telephone. Her 
name is Alison Wakefield and her contact details are as follows: 
 
Dr Alison Wakefield, University of Portsmouth, St Georges’ Building, 141 High 
Street, Portsmouth, PO1 2QY. 
 
Telephone number 023 92 843942 
 
Email: Alison.wakefield@port.ac.uk 
 
She will do her best to answer your questions.  
 
If you are still dissatisfied, and wish to complain formally, you can contact the 
Head of the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies Dr. Phi Clements, Head of Dept 
of ICJS, University of Portsmouth, Ravelin House, Ravelin Park, PO1 2QQ 
 
Email: Phil.clements@port.ac.uk 
 
Telephone: 032 92 845069  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the research will be analysed and written up in the final research 
report. Certain parts of the research may form the basis of academic journal 
articles that will be submitted for publication. However, the confidentiality of all 
research participants will be maintained at all times. All drafts of journal articles 
will be submitted to my University Tutor to ensure that full anonymity is 
maintained at all times. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research?  
This research has no specific sponsor. Instead, this is an independent piece of 
academic research undertaken as a part of a formal academic course at 
Portsmouth University. 
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Who has reviewed the study? 
Research in the University of Portsmouth is looked at by independent group of 
people, called a Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study 
has been reviewed and given a favourable opinion by the Institute of Criminal 
Justice Studies Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Further information and contact details  
This research is being conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines 
published by the British Society of Criminology ethical guidelines  (see 
www.britsoc.org/ethics.htm) 
 
Concluding statement 
Thank you for considering to participate in this research study. If you decide to 
participate you will be given a copy of this information sheet to keep and your 
formal written consent will be sought. 
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Appendix 11: Core counter fraud skills listed by interviewees 
No Top 10 skills Core? % Absent 
Innate Skills 
1 Well developed analytic skills Be able to work with, and analyse meaningfully, qualitative and quantitative data 23 88% 5 
3 Objectivity and independence Work must be free from bias, reflect the facts and lead to balanced conclusions 17 65% 5 
6 Tenacity and resilience Tactfully follow through all tasks to completion without being deflected by others 15 58% 2 
7 Influencing skills Ability to present views to senior managers and represent organisation credibly 14 54% 8 
10 Judgement and proportionality Recognise where fraud risk is in organisational priority and devise apt response 5 19% 0 
12 Honesty / integrity / impartiality Evidence based work which from which personal bias is absent 5 19% 0 
13 Excellent written skills The ability to write reports and other documents clearly, concisely & persuasively 5 19% 2 
15 Commitment to ethical values All work must subscribe to the seven Nolan Principles of Public Life 4 15% 0 
16 Communication skills Ability to bond effectively with all – e.g. managers, victims, witnesses & suspects 4 15% 1 
19 An enquiring mind and intensive critical thinking Ability to know where fraud exposures are / will be and devise workable solutions 3 12% 0 
20 Innovative mind set Ability to think of new ways to tackle both current and new issues 3 12% 2 
21 Adaptability Ability to apply personal and professional skills to a variety of situations 3 12% 1 
26 Numeracy Able to understand and analyse numbers & data patterns and apply these properly 2 4% 2 
27 Listening skills Showing others active listening through verbal and non verbal queues 2 8% 0 
28 Discretion / tact / diplomacy Maintain complete confidentiality over all intelligence, investigations & other material 2 8% 0 
29 Strength of character / perseverance Ability to not take things at face value or be fobbed off 2 8% 0 
30 Be a team player Ability to work with colleagues effectively and make best use of their skills 2 8% 0 
36 Versatility Ability to deliver, in an integrated way, the six parts of the fraud management model 1 4% 1 
37 The need to self question and reassess To set and frequently question hypotheses and be able to change tack when needed 1 4% 0 
38 An interest in, and aptitude for, the subject New entrants must be attracted to the work and have the intrinsic skills needed 1 4% 0 
39 Openness and transparency Ability to inspire confidence throughout the body through well understood procedures  1 4% 1 
41 Open mind and an even handed attitude Ability to ensure that conclusions are rooted in evidence, timely and balanced 1 4% 0 
42 Inquisitive and questioning approach Ability to think outside the box and apply methods in way that fits employer’s culture 1 4% 0 
43 Ability to deal with stress Being capable of dealing with high pressure workloads and challenges from suspects 1 4% 0 
44 Suspicious mind Know/ suspect where the system weaknesses are and how these can be exploited 1 4% 0 
45 Presentation skills Ability to present output of counter fraud work in court and to other audiences 1 4% 1 
46 Decisiveness Have the authority and evidence needed to make clear evidence based decisions 1 4% 1 
47 Empathy Ability to treat the vulnerable and others with care, tact and diplomacy 1 4% 1 	
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No Top 10 skills Core? % Absent 
Technical Skills 
2 Interpersonal and interviewing skills The ability to strike positive relationships with others and interview effectively 22 85% 6 
4 Technical and legal knowledge The ability to progress tasks according to the law and best industry standards 17 65% 7 
9 Strong process mapping and analysis skills Ability to document, analyse and assess systems and processes 8 31% 2 
17 Accuracy in record keeping and attention to detail Keep meticulous and accurate file records and notes in a methodical manner 4 15% 0 
24 Ability to pull together and summarise evidence  Ability to present evidence in a logical, coherent, consistent and objective manner 3 12% 0 
25 Case building and management skills Taking ownership of a case from start to finish which meets pre-set objectives 3 12% 1 
33 Overview analysis Ability to see the bigger picture and relate this to counter fraud strategies 2 8% 1 
34 A set of firm procedures to work to Ability to work to a set of approved standards and apply them appropriately 2 8% 0 
35 Effective management control Managers must know of, and be able to control, all aspects of counter fraud work 2 8% 1 
40 Behavioural awareness and understanding Be able to recognise and detect fraud motivators; act tactfully without causing upset 1 4% 1 
54 Resource, investigation and project management skills Delivery of projects to standard, time cost by the right people with the right tools 1 4% 1 
55 Intelligence handling and prioritisation Being able to assess and prioritise allegations and other data for action 1 4% 0 
56 Well developed investigative skills Ability to identify and focus on the important and direct lines of enquiry to these 1 4% 0 
57 Thoroughness and preparation Ability to pay attention to detail, spot inconsistencies and apply the right procedures 1 4% 0 
58 A strong knowledge of the subject area under investigation Ability to understand evidence in context & make appropriate links  & conclusions 1 4% 0 
59 Capability awareness Knowledge of where to go, an when, for specialist skills 1 4% 0 
60 Good understanding of data protection / sharing legislation Well developed knowledge of data sharing legislation 1 4% 0 
61 Being able to understand and process large amount of information Ability to review large data sets, understand their significance an apply the right tools 1 4% 0 
62 A holistic approach based around fraud management model Ability to see the bigger picture and make links to other parts of the fraud model 1 4% 1 
63 Knowledge of whistle blowing / freedom of information legislation Counter fraud staff must be familiar with this legislation and how to apply it 1 4% 0 
64 Rapid, effective and efficient investigative procedures Ability to progress fully complaint investigations as quickly as possible 1 4% 1 
65 Provision of value for money Counter fraud teams must demonstrate the value they add to their organisations 1 4% 0 
66 Information / data sharing Ability to share data legally, safely, completely and meaningfully 1 4% 1 										
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No Top 10 skills Core? % Absent 
Organisational Skills 
11 Collaborative working Ability to work in partnership with other internal and external departments / bodies 6 23% 3 
14 Awareness of legal and technical limitations Knowing what is legally and technically allowed and remaining within these limits 5 19% 1 
22 Understanding of the sources of data and applying detection techniques Knowledge of MIS systems and how to interrogate these for anomalies 3 12% 1 
23 Knowledge of the fraud landscape Knowledge of the organisation’s business and likely fraud exposures 3 12% 1 
31 Organisational knowledge Awareness of the polices & procedures breached and where to look for evidence 2 8% 0 
48 Commercial and outcome awareness To understand the outcomes that an employing body needs from counter fraud 1 4% 0 
49 Intelligent client commissioning work from others Ability to work with commercial partners and apply procurement procedures properly 1 4% 0 
50 A proper legal basis for counter fraud work Counter Fraud specialists must stay within the limits of organisation’s enabling laws 1 4% 0 
Professional Skills 
5 Strong risk assessment and management skills Ability to identify, assess and assist others to control fraud risks 17 65% 6 
8 Strategic assessment Ability to see the big picture and draft strategies to deal with identified fraud risks 9 35% 7 
18 Well developed IT and cyber skills Understand IT fraud risks and the measures needed to detect and combat these 4 15% 2 
32 Audit and finance skills Auditing and accounting skills to identify system weaknesses and apply controls 2 8% 1 
51 Forensic IT, audit and accountancy skills Ability to identify when technical forensic skills are needed & understand the output 1 4% 1 
52 Policy and system analysis Ability to quickly understand unfamiliar policies, programmes, systems & projects 1 4% 0 
53 A good understanding of human motivation An understanding of those factors which trigger fraudulent behaviours 1 4% 1 
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Appendix 12: List of possible counter fraud competencies to underpin a professional knowledge base 
    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Legislation           1 An understanding of the employing organisation’s 
legislation including Acts of Parliament, Statutory 
Instruments and any other laws and regulations and how 
this applies to their counter fraud operations 
L C  ✔ ✔     1 
2 An understanding of the difference in the following 
standards of proof "on the balance of probabilities" and 
"beyond reasonable doubt" 
L C   ✔     3 
3 An understanding of when to apply the different standards 
of proof L C   ✔     3 
4 A well developed knowledge of the organisation’s 
investigative powers and when to use these. L C       ✔ 1 
5 An understanding of the implications of the Data 
Protection Act 1998 and other privacy legislation on 
counter fraud and counter corruption work and 
investigations 
L C   ✔    ✔ 3 
6 A well developed knowledge of the Codes of Practice of 
the Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act and the 
Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act (CPIA) 1996 
L C   ✔     1 
7 An understanding of the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 
2002 and how it applies to investigations L S   ✔     3 
8(1) An understanding of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 and how it applies to investigations L S         
9 Knowledge of the main provisions of the Bribery Act 2010 L C   ✔     3 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Legislation (continued)           
10 An awareness of how the money laundering regulations 
apply to the regulated and unregulated sectors F S   ✔     3 
11 A knowledge of the key provisions of the Companies Act 
and an understanding of the terms 'fraudulent trading' and 
'wrongful trading' 
L S   ✔     3 
12 An understanding of employment tribunal procedures and 
how these differ from criminal court procedures L S   ✔ ✔    3 
13 An understanding of the powers of arrest and the powers 
of search and seizure when carrying out an investigation L S   ✔     1 
14 An understanding of the financial and legal implications of 
decisions made during the course of an investigation L C   ✔ ✔    3 
15 An understanding of any legal requirements of the review 
dates for any fraud and corruption policy, documentation 
and guidance 
L C    ✔    3 
16 An understanding of the legal requirements for how long 
different types of intelligence and information should be 
retained, how it should be kept and the correct method of 
disposal 
L S   ✔     3 
17 An understanding of the relevant legislation when seeking 
redress in respect of money lost to fraud and corruption L S   ✔     3 
18 A working knowledge of the way in which the courts 
system operates in England and Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland 
L C   ✔     3 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Policy           
19 An understanding of the broader policy context and the 
need to balance measures to combat fraud and 
corruption with other policy objectives 
P M       ✔ 3 
20 Knowledge of current initiatives by Government, 
Professional Institutes and others to tackle fraud and 
corruption 
C C     ✔  ✔  
21 A well developed knowledge of the seven elements of the 
fraud management model - fraud awareness, prevention, 
detection, investigation, deterrence, sanctions and 
redress and how each of these relate to one another 
P C    ✔ ✔   3 
22 An understanding of the two principal approaches to 
managing fraud and corruption: zero tolerance and 
managed risk 
P C    ✔ ✔   3 
23 A working knowledge of the structures through which 
economic crime is managed in the UK - and especially 
the roles of the Cabinet Office, the Home Office, the 
National Crime Agency, the Police and the Serious Fraud 
Office  
P C    ✔ ✔   3 
24 A knowledge of the current issues affecting those 
delivering economic crime management within the UK P C   ✔  ✔   1 
25 The ability to identify all strategic counter fraud and 
counter corruption objectives for the organisation P M       ✔ 3 
26 The ability to link and assess all organisational counter 
fraud and counter corruption strategic objectives  P M       ✔ 3 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Policy (continued)           
27 An understanding of the complex nature of organisations, 
and groups of organisations, and how they evolve and 
interact with each other 
P M       ✔ 3 
28 An understanding of how to ensure that public funds are 
solely used to meet the organisation's strategic objectives 
and are not lost to acts of fraud and corruption 
P M       ✔ 3 
29 An understanding of how counter fraud and counter 
corruption techniques are key elements of policy, 
programme and system design 
P M  ✔      3 
30 The ability to ensure that counter fraud and counter 
corruption controls are considered at appropriate points of 
the policy, programme and system development process 
P M  ✔      3 
31 The ability to produce a counter fraud policy, strategy and 
response plan P M         
32 The ability to produce and intelligence management and 
fraud and corruption detection policy P M      ✔ ✔ 3 
33 The ability to produce an investigations policy P S         
34 The ability to produce a sanctions and redress policy P S      ✔ ✔ 3 
35 The ability to produce a prevention and deterrence policy P S      ✔ ✔ 3 
36 The ability to constructively implement all approved 
counter fraud policies across the employing organisation P M         
37 An understanding of the ethical principles that underpin 
counter fraud and counter corruption objectives set within 
the organisation 
G C   ✔    ✔ 1 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Governance           
38 The ability to apply the responsibilities and powers of a 
counter fraud specialist and investigator ethically, 
appropriately, consistently and proportionately 
G C   ✔  ✔ ✔  1 
39 Knowledge of the role of the Audit Committee and 
Internal Audit and the ability to produce and deliver 
complementary programmes of work which support 
effective governance 
G C     ✔   1 
40 An understanding that fraud and corruption often crosses 
organisational and process boundaries G C      ✔  3 
41 An understanding of how to develop a 'learning 
organisation' culture by analysing and addressing those 
control failures and other weaknesses which allowed 
fraud and corruption to occur 
G C       ✔ 1 
42 The ability to influence all, including the use of peer group 
pressure, to create a culture throughout the organisation 
which rejects the idea that fraud and corruption is 
acceptable 
G M    ✔  ✔  3 
43 The ability to promote counter fraud counter corruption 
practices and arrangements across the organisation - 
including to all external suppliers, corporate partners and 
grant recipients 
G M      ✔ ✔ 3 
44 The ability to contribute to the maintenance of a strong 
counter fraud and counter corruption culture by 
identifying, analysing and addressing control failures and 
other weaknesses 
G S   ✔  ✔ ✔  1 
45 An understanding of how fraud and corruption is deterred G C   ✔     3 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Governance (continued)           
46 The ability to effectively present and explain counter fraud 
and counter corruption work to achieve the greatest 
deterrent effect 
G C     ✔ ✔  3 
47 An understanding of the best ways of publicising 
deterrents to those committing, or considering 
committing, fraud and corruption - including publicity for 
successful fraud and corruption convictions 
G S       ✔ 3 
48 An understanding of how to influence all stakeholders to 
cascade fraud and corruption policies and practices 
throughout the organisation and beyond 
G M    ✔  ✔  3 
49 An understanding of how to improve future compliance for 
those previously having fraud and corruption committed 
against them 
G S  ✔     ✔ 3 
50 An understanding of how to improve future compliance for 
those previously detected as having committed fraud and 
corruption 
G S  ✔    ✔  3 
51 An understanding of how judgements and assessments 
are made at all stages of a counter fraud or counter 
corruption project or a fraud or corruption investigation 
G C      ✔ ✔ 3 
52 An understanding of how to evaluate all aspects of fraud 
and corruption investigations to identify best practice and 
identify any faults in the investigation process 
G S       ✔ 3 
53 An understanding of how to evaluate all cases of redress 
to help identify best practice and improve control over 
existing polices, programmes systems and procedures 
G M       ✔ 3 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
T Fraud and corruption theory and practice           
54 Understand, and be able to define, the concepts of fraud 
and corruption T C   ✔    ✔ 3 
55 Knowledge of the importance of intent, deception and the 
concepts of gain and loss to fraud and corruption 
offences 
T    ✔     3 
56 Understand the difference between fraud and error T    ✔     3 
57 The ability to distinguish between fraud committed for 
personal benefit and fraud committed by individuals on 
behalf of their employing organisation 
T C   ✔    ✔ 3 
58 Understand the concept of “white-collar” crime and how 
this relates to fraud and corruption T C   ✔    ✔ 3 
59 Understand the key theories about why people commit 
crime and how these relate to fraud and corruption. 
These should include: biological and psychological 
positivism; the impact of gender, age, social class and 
race; sociological and ecological factors; and, the 
following criminological theories: strain, rational choice, 
routine activity and crime patterns. 
T C   ✔    ✔ 3 
60 Understand the key internal and external threats which 
lead to fraud and corruption such as: pressure to deliver 
corporate objectives; increased reliance on technology; 
and, the rising use of the internet 
T C   ✔    ✔ 1 
61 An understanding of how fraud and corruption are 
perceived by managers, employees, contractors and third 
parties and the impact of different views on corporate 
culture and individual behaviour  
T C   ✔    ✔ 1 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Fraud and corruption theory and practice           
62 Understand the reasons why people commit fraud which 
should include: Sutherland’s theory of differential 
association; Cressey’s fraud triangle and Wolfe and 
Hermanson’s fraud square or diamond) 
T C   ✔    ✔ 3 
63 Understand the pressures on individuals that lead them to 
commit fraud such as: organisational culture, debts and 
disaffection 
T C   ✔    ✔ 1 
64 Have a developed understanding of the signs which 
indicate that fraud may be occurring such as: unexplained 
wealth; a failure to take leave; and, resistance to audit 
and inspection 
T C   ✔    ✔ 1 
65 An understanding of the effect of fraud and corruption on 
different groups: Societal; Organisational; and, Individual T C   ✔    ✔ 3 
66 An understanding of the financial and reputational effect 
of fraud to the employing organisation and its impact on 
governance structures 
T C   ✔    ✔ 2 
67 An understanding of the effect of fraud on individuals in 
emotional, financial and reputational terms T C   ✔    ✔ 1 
68 Knowledge of fraud and corruption that has occurred in 
the past and the lessons that these examples  T C   ✔    ✔ 1 
69 An understanding of which counter fraud and counter 
corruption polices are the most effective F M       ✔ 3 
70 The ability to link policy with practice to ensure that the 
most effective counter fraud and counter corruption 
measures are successfully implemented 
F M       ✔ 3 
71 The ability to focus resources on, and deliver, the most 
effective counter fraud and counter corruption measures F M    ✔  ✔ ✔ 3 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Counter fraud delivery           
72 The ability to maintain effective links between operational 
feedback and policy design to support a 'learning culture' 
and reduce fraud and corruption to an absolute minimum 
F M       ✔ 3 
73 The ability to represent the organisation in raising 
awareness of all aspects of fraud and corruption F M       ✔ 3 
74 An understanding of all relevant government initiatives in 
the management of fraud and corruption - e.g. the 
National Fraud Initiative and how to deliver these 
F C       ✔ 1 
75 An understanding of the merits of liaising with external 
organisations involved with counter fraud and counter 
corruption activities in both the public and private sectors 
- including the National Anti Fraud Network (NAFN) 
F C       ✔ 1 
76 An understanding of how to use all communication 
channels to promote counter fraud and counter corruption 
awareness and issue suitable and refreshed guidance  
F C       ✔ 3 
77 A knowledge of the role of external audit F C   ✔     2 
78 A knowledge of the role of internal audit F C   ✔     2 
79 An understanding of the concept of “Assurance” and the 
contribution that counter fraud and counter corruption 
activities can make to this. 
F M    ✔    1 
80 The ability to draft a protocol which sets out the 
respective responsibilities of external audit, internal audit 
and counter fraud and how these three teams should 
work together for the benefit of the organisation 
F M     ✔   3 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Counter fraud delivery (continued)           
81 Knowledge of the PRINCE 2 project management cycle 
and the ability to apply this to internal projects and to 
those parts of the organisation under review 
F S       ✔ 3 
82 The ability to conduct a risk assessment across all major 
parts and functions of the employing organisation F S ✔       3 
83 The ability to use quantitative and qualitative risk analysis 
to assess all current and potential risks of fraud and 
corruption, in order to produce, maintain and refresh a 
fraud and corruption control policy, with regular evaluation 
of risk and appropriate responses to any identified threats 
F S ✔       3 
84 An understanding of which areas of the business are 
most at risk of fraud and corruption - including any 
specialist teams 
F S  ✔ ✔     3 
85 A well developed knowledge of the different types of 
controls (preventive, detective and corrective) and the 
ability to apply these appropriately to both IT and manual 
systems and procedures 
F C ✔       3 
            
86 The ability to prevent fraud and corruption by designing, 
and redesigning, policies, procedures and systems which 
mitigate the risk and impact of fraud and corruption 
F S  ✔ ✔     3 
87 The ability to incorporate streamlined counter fraud and 
counter corruption measures into organisational polices, 
programmes, systems and processes 
F S  ✔ ✔     3 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Counter fraud delivery (continued)           
88 Understand, and actively inform, the introduction of 
measures to prevent and deter fraud within new systems 
and procedural changes 
F S ✔       3 
89 The ability to create a fraud and corruption detection plan F S      ✔ ✔ 3 
90 An understanding of how to detect, as soon as possible, 
any new identified fraud and corruption F S   ✔  ✔   3 
91 The ability to use IT software / hardware which may help 
in the detection of fraud and corruption, ensuring that all 
relevant staff training has taken place 
F S    ✔ ✔   2 
92 The ability to use all relevant processes, including data 
mining and neural networks, to identify any possible fraud 
and corruption trends and patterns - especially in dealings 
with external parties 
F S    ✔ ✔   2 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Information management           
93 A knowledge of the different types of fraud and corruption 
faced by the organisation D C       ✔ 1 
94 A detailed knowledge of the information held by the 
business which can detect when each identified fraud and 
corruption type is likely to crystallise 
D S    ✔ ✔   1 
95 An understanding of what information and evidence can 
be used to detect and investigate fraud and corruption in 
a lawful and appropriate manner 
D C   ✔     3 
96 An understanding of where all information relevant to 
fraud and corruption types can be found in the 
organisation’s management information systems 
D C     ✔   2 
97 The ability to use any corporate systems which may help 
in the management and detection of fraud and corruption D C     ✔   2 
98 The ability to access and extract (in a lawful and 
appropriate manner) information and evidence from the 
widest possible range of sources 
D C     ✔   2 
99 Knowledge of how to use related information from 
different sources to gain a complete picture of the fraud, 
corruption or investigation landscape 
D S     ✔ ✔  3 
100 The ability to use intelligence tools / databases and their 
analytic capability D S   ✔   ✔   
101 The ability to collate, analyse and review all management 
information on each fraud type to gain an understanding 
of fraud and corruption patters and frequencies  
D S     ✔ ✔  3 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Information management (continued)           
102 An understanding of statistical modelling and sampling to 
produce a reliable estimates of fraud and corruption 
losses - at both the organisational and investigation level 
D E  ✔ ✔     3 
103 Knowledge of data types (parametric and non-parametric) 
and which techniques to apply to these data sets D E  ✔ ✔     3 
104 Knowledge of the six different types of sampling and 
when to apply them (Judgement Sampling; Simple 
Random Sampling; Stratified Sampling; Cluster Sampling; 
Quota Sampling; Systematic Sampling; Probability 
Proportionate to Size Sampling; Multi-Stage Sampling; 
and Convenience Sampling)  
D E  ✔ ✔     3 
105 The ability to extract a sample using appropriate tools – 
such as IDEA D E  ✔ ✔     3 
106 Knowledge of the concepts of sampling bias and 
sampling error and an understanding of the effect that 
these can have on statistically derived results  
D E  ✔ ✔     3 
107 The ability to interpret the results of sampling exercises 
and an understanding of what confidence levels, 
sampling precision mean 
D E  ✔ ✔     3 
108 The ability to create a set of fraud and corruption rules for 
use by detection programmes D S ✔       1 
109 The ability to create and maintain a warnings index which 
contains data likely to assist in the detection of fraud D S ✔       1 
110 The ability to apply fraud rules and warning index data to 
application screening and other software to assign risk 
scores to individual transactions 
D S ✔       2 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Information management (continued)           
111 The ability to interpret the output from application 
screening and other software to select cases and items 
for investigation 
D S     ✔ ✔  2 
112 Knowledge of how to manage whistle blowers and 
correctly apply the relevant provisions of the Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 1998 
D C   ✔   ✔  3 
113 A detailed knowledge of how to manage Covert Human 
Intelligence Sources (CHIS) in accordance with the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
D S   ✔  ✔    
114 The ability to identify when an intelligence opportunity has 
occurred and log this appropriately D C     ✔  ✔ 3 
115 A well developed understanding of the National 
Intelligence Model (NIM) D C   ✔   ✔  3 
116 The ability to write a cogent 5x5x5 Intelligence Report D C   ✔  ✔   3 
117 The ability to be able to analyse all types of intelligence in 
the detection and investigation of fraud and corruption D S     ✔ ✔  3 
118 The ability to identify, continually develop and refresh 
sources of information which inform the prevention and 
detection of fraud and corruption 
D S     ✔ ✔  3 
119 An understanding of the correct level of confidentiality of 
all soft and hard intelligence D S     ✔   3 
120 The ability to protect information of all classifications 
appropriately D C    ✔    1 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 The acquisition of evidence           
121 The ability to make a RIPA compliant surveillance 
application. It must contain: the reason for the application; 
an explanation of the need for the application; a 
demonstration that this is proportionate; the identify of the 
person(s) subject to surveillance; the evidence being 
sought; details of any collateral intrusion; and, details of 
any confidential information that may be discovered 
A C    ✔ ✔   1 
122 The ability to approve a RIPA compliant surveillance 
application A M    ✔ ✔   1 
123 The ability to conduct foot based surveillance A B ✔       0 124 The ability to conduct car based surveillance A B ✔       0 
125 Knowledge of the restrictions placed by RIPA on the 
conduct of intrusive or covert surveillance. It applies to 
residential properties and private vehicles and usually 
involves the presence of a person or a device. This can 
only be undertaken by public bodies listed in schedule 1 
to RIPA and is restricted to: national security; the 
prevention and detection of serious crime; and, the 
interests of the economic well-being of the UK 
A B ✔       0 
126 The ability to conduct covert surveillance for those 
organisations that are allowed to carry this out A B ✔       0 
127 The ability to create and maintain a surveillance log A B ✔       0 
128 The ability to use surveillance equipment appropriately A B ✔       0 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 The acquisition of evidence (continued)           
129 Knowledge of the Telecommunications (Lawful Business 
Practice) (Interception of Communications) Regulations 
2000 that provide a lawful basis for organisations to 
intercept business communications without consent. 
These apply to on-line and other forms of communication 
including: e-mails; post; fax; and, telephones 
A C   ✔  ✔   1 
130 The ability to issue a section 29(3), section 31(3) or 
section 35 notice under the Data Protection Act 1998 A S     ✔  ✔ 3 
131 The ability to draft and obtain a Production Order A B ✔       0 
132 The ability to draft and obtain a search warrant A B ✔       0 
133 Knowledge and use of PACE powers of entry A S   ✔  ✔   1 
134 Knowledge of the search powers available under the civil 
law A S   ✔  ✔   1 
135 Knowledge of any restrictions on conducting a work place 
search where employee fraud is suspected A S   ✔ ✔    1 
136 Knowledge of the seizure provisions of s2 of the Criminal 
Justice and Police Act 2001 A S   ✔     1 
137 The ability to conduct searches of individuals A E   ✔  ✔   2 
138 The ability to conduct searches of premises A E   ✔  ✔   2 
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 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Interviewing           
139 The ability to conduct a business meeting or interview 
effectively I C    ✔   ✔ 3 
140 Knowledge of the seven key principles of investigative 
interviewing (accurate and reliable accounts; objective 
and unbiased approach; testing of interviewee accounts 
to factual evidence; freedom to ask a range of questions; 
recognise positive impact of an early admission; 
interviewers do not have to accept the first account given; 
and, interviewers have a right to question those who 
exercise a right to silence) 
I C   ✔     3 
141 A recognition of the importance of listening skills I C   ✔     3 
142 A recognition of the importance of interpreting body 
language and Neuro Linguistic Programming (NLP) in the 
interview process 
I C   ✔    ✔ 3 
143 An understanding of the PEACE interview process 
(Planning; Engagement; Account and Clarification; 
Closure; and Evaluation. 
I C   ✔     3 
144 The ability to apply the PEACE interview process to 
investigations I C   ✔     3 
145 An understanding of the different types of interview and 
when these should be applied - for example managed 
conversations for suspects and free recall for witnesses 
I C   ✔     3 
146 An understanding of how to appropriately challenge 
suspect accounts during the interview process I C   ✔     3 
            
Professional	Doctorate	in	Security	and	Risk	Management																																																																																																																																																																							Michael	Colin	Gilbert:	Student	440422			
August 2015 
						                                                                                                      Page 
 
230	
    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Interviewing (continued)           
147 The ability to explain the reasons for complying with 
PACE I S   ✔  ✔   1 
148 The ability to take a witness statement I C   ✔  ✔   2 149 Knowledge of the definition of an interview as contained 
in PACE I C   ✔  ✔   1 
150 Knowledge of pre interview disclosure requirements I C   ✔  ✔   1 
151 Knowledge of the formal caution and the ability to use it I C   ✔  ✔   1 
152 The ability to interview under caution I C   ✔  ✔   1 
153 The ability to interview vulnerable suspects and witnesses 
in accordance with all legal requirements I C   ✔  ✔   1 
154 An understanding of how to deal with suspects and 
witnesses in an ethical non-discriminatory manner and 
without prejudice 
I C   ✔  ✔   1 
155 The ability to take interview note and transcripts I C   ✔  ✔   1 
156 The ability to record interviews using audio and visual 
equipment I C   ✔  ✔   1 
157 The ability to recognise and deal with a significant 
statement I C   ✔  ✔   1 
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 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Evidence management           
158 A well developed knowledge of the different types of 
evidence and their significance: primary; real; secondary; 
documentary; circumstantial; presumptions; opinion; 
corroborative; and, hearsay 
E C   ✔     3 
159 Knowledge of the five core principles of evidence 
gathering – Provenance; Continuity; Security; Integrity; 
and, Inventory 
E C   ✔     3 
160 Knowledge of the best evidence rule – where possible 
evidence should be produced rather than be described. E C   ✔     3 
161 A recognition of the difference between direct and 
circumstantial evidence E C   ✔     3 
162 The ability to define hearsay evidence: a “statement not 
made in oral evidence in the proceedings, which is 
admissible as evidence of any matter stated” (s. 114(1) 
Criminal Justice Act 2003). 
E C   ✔     3 
163 Knowledge of the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 in respect of hearsay evidence. To be admissible, 
hearsay evidence must; meet one of the statutory 
provisions; be available in public records; be in the best 
interests of justice; or, be subject to all party agreement. 
E C   ✔     3 
164 Knowledge of the rules relating to opinion evidence (lay 
and expert and bad character evidence (evidence of, or a 
disposition towards, misconduct that is not related to the 
case in question).  
E C   ✔  ✔   3 
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 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Evidence management (continued)           
165 An appreciation of the concepts of: competence, 
compellability; unfair evidence; entrapment; and, legal 
privilege. 
E C   ✔     3 
166 An understanding of the different roles within an 
investigation - Senior Investigation Officer, Investigator 
and Disclosure Officer 
E C   ✔  ✔   3 
167 Knowledge of how evidence is gained in a proper and 
legal manner and recorded accordingly E C   ✔  ✔   3 
168 The ability to log, document, label and account for 
evidence appropriately E C   ✔  ✔   3 
169 An understanding of the disclosure rules and how these 
should be applied to an investigation E C   ✔  ✔   3 
170 An understanding of what constitutes sensitive 
information / evidence E C   ✔  ✔   3 
171 Knowledge of how to compile a schedule of sensitive 
information E C   ✔  ✔   3 
172 An understanding of the difference between used and 
unused information E C   ✔  ✔   3 
173 The ability to record and manage all used and unused 
evidence appropriately when conducting fraud and 
corruption investigations 
E C   ✔  ✔   3 
174 The ability to conduct searches of external databases 
such as electoral rolls and those holding credit details E B ✔       0 
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 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Evidence management (continued)           
175 Knowledge of the four principles that underpin computer 
based evidence. It: should not be changed; should only 
be obtained by properly trained and competent persons; 
be subject to a full audit trail; and, the officer in charge 
should ensure compliance with these principles 
E C ✔  ✔     3 
176 Knowledge of how to safely seize a computer and 
preserve the integrity of any evidence contained within it E B ✔  ✔     0 
177 Knowledge of how best to preserve digital evidence 
contained within mobile devices E B ✔  ✔     0 
178 Knowledge of the way in which photographic and other 
media can be used as evidence  E B ✔  ✔     0 
179 The ability to conduct forensic checks on paper and 
electronic documents E B ✔  ✔     0 
180 Knowledge of why an N1 notebook (pocketbook) is 
necessary and knowledge of best practice in its use E C   ✔  ✔   3 
181 An understanding of how to package and store any 
physical items related to an investigation with no risk of 
contamination 
E C   ✔  ✔   3 
182 The ability to manage and collate evidence with proper 
regard for the rules of evidence E C   ✔  ✔   3 
183 Knowledge of how to present evidence to support legal 
and disciplinary proceedings and other outcomes E S   ✔  ✔   3 
184 The ability to assess evidence against the full range of 
any appropriate sanctions E S   ✔  ✔   3 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Case progression           
185 The ability to carry out an investigation in accordance with 
the appropriate legislation C C   ✔  ✔   1 
186 An understanding of the investigator's responsibilities and 
powers as they relate to the organisation C C     ✔ ✔  2 
187 An understanding that the investigator must remain 
impartial throughout their enquiries and not take part in 
any investigation where there is any risk of a conflict of 
interest 
C C   ✔   ✔  1 
188 The ability to pursue a case by means of a criminal 
prosecution where appropriate C S   ✔  ✔   3 
189 The ability to pursue a case by means of civil litigation 
where appropriate C S   ✔  ✔   3 
190 The ability to conduct disciplinary enquiries C S    ✔   ✔ 3 
191 An understanding of the needs and requirements of a 
decision maker as a part of the disciplinary process C S   ✔  ✔   3 
192 The ability to use an approved and accredited case 
management system C C     ✔  ✔ 3 
193 An understanding of how to conduct a legally compliant 
risk assessment for all parts of an investigation C S   ✔  ✔   3 
194 The ability to initially evaluate all allegations of fraud and 
corruption received C S   ✔ ✔ ✔   3 
195 An understanding of which other agencies and 
organisations to liaise with when carrying out 
investigations 
C M   ✔    ✔ 3 
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    Principal Training Provision  
 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Case progression (continued)           
196 An understanding of when to use professional services 
including lawyers, accountants, IT and document 
specialists in fraud and corruption investigations 
C C     ✔  ✔ 3 
197 An understanding of when to use computer forensics  C C   ✔     3 
198 An understanding of when to use forensic accountants  C C   ✔     3 
199 Knowledge of when to use computer forensic tools to 
support investigations C C   ✔     1 
200 Knowledge of when and how to analyse a set of financial 
statements C S   ✔     1 
201 A knowledge of when and how to use forensic accounting 
techniques in support of investigations C S   ✔     1 
202 An understanding of the skills of all available investigators 
to determine who is best suited for individual 
investigations and tasks 
C S      ✔ ✔ 3 
203 An understanding of when it Is necessary to involve 
external investigators C S    ✔  ✔  3 
204 An understanding of the different sources of information 
available to support a particular investigation and when 
these can be used 
C C   ✔    ✔ 3 
205 An understanding of the resources that are required to 
conduct a particular investigation C C   ✔     3 
206 The ability to produce a fit for purpose investigation plan C M   ✔  ✔   3 
207 The ability to effectively brief investigation teams C M   ✔  ✔   3             
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 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Case progression (continued)           
208 Knowledge of the IIMARCS briefing system - Information, 
Intention, Methods, Administration, Risk, Communications 
and Safety 
C C   ✔  ✔   3 
209 The ability to positively influence those being investigated 
throughout the investigation process C M      ✔ ✔ 3 
210 The ability to adapt to changing circumstances as the 
investigation proceeds C C   ✔    ✔ 3 
211 Knowledge of when to seek advice from qualified lawyers C C       ✔ 3 
212 A detailed understanding of the investigation cycle C C   ✔     3 
213 The ability to open and maintain a case file C C   ✔  ✔   3 
214 Knowledge of how and when to make and record case 
decisions C C   ✔  ✔   3 
215 The ability to keep proper accurate investigation records 
which meet legislative requirements with particular 
reference to the correct level of confidentiality 
C C   ✔  ✔ ✔  3 
216 Qualification as a financial investigator as defined by the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 C E   ✔     3 
217 The ability to evaluate the outcomes of an investigation C S   ✔  ✔   3 
218 The ability to compile a prosecution folder using MG 
forms where appropriate C S   ✔  ✔   3 
219 The ability to make an arrest in accordance with the 
relevant legislation and codes of conduct C S   ✔  ✔   1 
220 Knowledge of police station custody procedures C S   ✔    ✔ 1 
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 Competency Identifier Status BUY REC EX IN DT M CPD CPD Cycle 
 Case progression (continued)           
221 The ability to present evidence at court hearings and 
tribunals C S   ✔   ✔  1 
222 The ability to evaluate the conduct and outcome of an 
investigation to learn lessons and improve the future 
response 
C S   ✔  ✔ ✔  1 
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 Sanctions and redress           
223 An understanding of the ways in which redress can be 
sought and of the evidential requirements R C   ✔    ✔ 2 
224 An understanding of the effectiveness of all types of 
sanctions used in counter fraud and counter corruption 
activities including criminal prosecution, civil litigation and 
the recovery of assets and cash 
R S   ✔    ✔ 2 
225 The ability to select and apply the most appropriate 
sanctions and recovery route to each specific 
circumstance 
R M   ✔    ✔ 1 
226 An understanding of which teams to liaise with when 
seeking redress R M       ✔ 3 
227 An understanding of the specialist support needed by 
organisations seeking redress R S       ✔ 3 
228 The ability to take appropriate action and apply realistic 
sanctions to people and organisations when fraud and / 
or corruption is detected 
R B ✔       0 
229 The ability to calculate the correct level of recoveries due 
following the successful conclusion of an investigation R S   ✔  ✔   3 
230 The ability to apply to the court for the restitution of losses 
suffered as a result of fraud and corruption R S   ✔  ✔   3 
 Audience management and presentation skills           231 The ability to present to large and small audiences A P      ✔ ✔ 3 
232 The ability to manage meetings appropriately A P      ✔ ✔ 3 
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 Report writing skills           
233 The ability to write clear letters, e-mails and other items of 
correspondence W P    ✔  ✔  3 
234 The ability to take accurate minutes of meetings which 
are of an appropriate length and list all agreed action 
points 
W P    ✔  ✔  3 
235 The ability to draft a report clearly, concisely and 
accurately W P   ✔ ✔  ✔  3 
236 The ability to present counter fraud and counter 
corruption awareness, prevention and investigation 
findings to all relevant parties 
W P    ✔  ✔  3 
237 Recognise the importance of targeting a report to a 
specific audience W P   ✔ ✔  ✔  3 
238 Identify any specific legal requirements needed by a 
report W P    ✔  ✔  3 
239 The ability to identify good practice when setting out 
report findings W P   ✔ ✔  ✔  3 
 IT skills           240 The ability to use MS Office and other IT related tools O P     ✔   3 
241 The ability to use IT software / hardware which may help 
in the detection of fraud and corruption ensuring that all 
relevant staff training has taken place 
O S     ✔   3 
242 A knowledge of cyber crime and how to research, identify 
and trace suspects O S     ✔   3 
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 Training           
243 The ability to identify any external training which will 
enhance the identification and management of fraud and 
corruption e.g. Professional in Security Training (PINS) 
and / or the Accredited Counter Fraud Specialist 
Qualification  
K S     ✔  ✔ 3 
 Personal skills           244 The ability to manage upwards effectively through an 
appreciation of how to meet senior management needs 
B P 
    ✔ ✔ ✔ 1 
245 The ability to motivate junior staff and colleagues B P     ✔ ✔ ✔ 1 246 The ability to foster good team relations B P     ✔ ✔ ✔ 1 247 The ability to work with professionals in other areas of the 
organisation and from other disciplines 
B P 
    ✔ ✔ ✔ 1 
248 The ability to act constructively on feedback B P 
    ✔ ✔ ✔ 1 
249 The ability to be empathetic to both colleagues and 
persons dealt with in the normal course of business 
B P 
    ✔ ✔ ✔ 1 
250 The ability to positively influence others of all grades B P     ✔ ✔ ✔ 1  
Professional	Doctorate	in	Security	and	Risk	Management																																																																																																																																																																							Michael	Colin	Gilbert:	Student	440422			
August 2015 
						                                                                                                      Page 
 
241	
Key 
Skill	Identifiers	 Training	Status	 Training	Provision	
	 	 	 	
	 	
L	 Legislation	 C	 Core	 BUY	 Buy	skill	in	
P	 Policy	 M	 Managerial	 REC	 Recruit	skill	in	
G	 Governance	 S	 Specialist	 EX	 External	training	course	
T	 Fraud	and	corruption	theory	and	practice	 E	 Elective	 IN	 Internal	training	course	
F	 Counter	fraud	delivery	 R	 Recruited	 DT	 Desk	training	
D	 Information	management	 B	 Bought	In	 M	 Mentoring	
A	 The	acquisition	of	evidence	 P	 Personal	 CPD	 Continuous	professional	development	
I	 Interviewing	
	 	
	 	
E	 Evidence	management	
	 	
	 	
C	 Case	progression	
	 	
	 	
R	 Sanctions	and	redress	
	 	
	 	
A	 Audience	management	and	presentation	skills	
	 	
	 	
W	 Report	writing	skills	
	 	
	 	
O	 IT	skills	
	 	
	 	
K	 Training	
	 	
	 	
B	 Personal	skills	
	 	
	 	
 
Source: (An interviewee who participated in the semi-structured interview programme, personal communication, July 2015)(2) 
References: Association of Chief Police Officers, (n.d.); Doig, 2006; Shawyer & Walsh, 2007; Tickner, 2010; Smith et al., 2011; Giles, 
2012; Gill & Goldstraw-White, 2012; Low, 2012; Phillips, 2012; Williams, 2012; Barnes, 2012; Jolly, 2012; Green, 2012; Hutchinson, 2012; 
Counter Fraud Professional Accreditation Board, 2012 & 2014; Button & Gee, 2013; Tunley et al., 2015. 
 
Notes: (1) All items shaded in green were added to the original list by the researcher 
  (2) In drawing up their list, this organisation, who wish to remain anonymous, researched the topic widely and drew on a number of      
different sources. To provide the relevant pseudonym in this reference may lead to their anonymity being compromised. 
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Appendix 13: Counter fraud competency analysis 
Competency C/S/P FRAUD MGT MODEL STAFF SOURCE 
  A P D1 D2 I R D SM M CFS BI RE EX IN DT M CPD CPD cycle 
Legislation 
An understanding of the employing organisation’s 
legislation including Acts of Parliament, Statutory 
Instruments and any other laws and regulations and how 
these apply to counter fraud operations 
C 
✖    ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖  ✖ ✖    
 
1 
A well developed knowledge of the Codes of Practice of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence (PACE) Act and the Criminal 
Procedures and Investigations Act (CPIA) 1996 
C 
    ✖   ✖ ✖ ✖   ✖    
 
1 
Prevention 
The ability to conduct a risk assessment across all major 
parts and functions of the employing organisation 
S  ✖      ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖       3 
Understand, and actively inform, the introduction of 
measures to prevent and deter fraud within new systems 
and procedural changes 
S 
✖ ✖  ✖    ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖      
 
3 
Interviews 
A Recognition of the importance of listening skills C ✖ ✖   ✖        ✖     3 
An understanding of the PEACE Interview process C     ✖        ✖     3 
Evidence Management 
A well developed knowledge of the different types of 
evidence and their significance 
C     ✖        ✖     3 
Knowledge of how evidence is gained in a proper and legal 
manner and recorded accordingly 
C     ✖        ✖  ✖   3 
Case Progression 
The ability to use an approved and accredited case 
management system 
C  ✖   ✖          ✖  ✖ 3 
The ability to open and maintain a case file C     ✖    ✖ ✖   ✖  ✖   3 
Innate skills 
The ability to present to large and small audiences P ✖ ✖   ✖  ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖      ✖ ✖ 3 
The ability to draft a report clearly, concisely and accurately P ✖ ✖  ✖ ✖  ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖   ✖ ✖  ✖  3 
Key: C Compulsory, S Specialist, P Personal. A Awareness, P Prevention, D1 Deterrence, D2 Detection, I Investigations, R Redress and Sanctions. D Director,  
        SM Senior Manager, M Manager, CFS Counter Fraud Specialist. BI Buy in, RE Recruit In, EX External Course, In Internal Course, DT Desk Training, M Mentoring,     
       CPD Continuous Professional Development, CPD Cycle (Annual 1, Biannual 2, Triennial 3) 
Source: (Counter Fraud Professional Accreditation Board, 2014; an interviewee from the semi-structured interview programme) 
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Appendix 14: Principal tasks for an external regulator 
 
Table 7.1: Reasons for external regulation 
Reason Number  
The setting of technical and behavioural standards 20 
Providing a forum for appeals and discipline 19 
Providing a standard training regime which licences individuals and promotes confidence 
that those working within the profession have a base level of theoretical and practical 
knowledge – in much the same way that the accountancy bodies do for this profession 
17 
Providing a central research facility which keeps their members up to date 11 
Underpinning the accountability and transparency needed to ensure public confidence in 
civilian counter fraud operations 
8 
Consistency of treatment for all who are dealt with by counter fraud 6 
Providing strategic direction and to represent the profession to Government and other 
important groups. Influence is diluted and lost when there are numerous bodies and 
people involved each of whom have different agendas. 
6 
Forging links with other relevant bodies (e.g. police, Home Office, SIA) and act as a voice 
for the counter fraud community when Government and others are formulating policy in 
this area 
6 
Advocating for the counter fraud community to Government and other important groups 6 
Preventing abuses by counter fraud professionals 6 
Identifying and deal with poor practice 3 
Overseeing continuous professional development. This ensures that current professionals 
are provided with the support needed to keep up to date and develop their knowledge 
and skill base 
2 
Controlling entry to the counter fraud specialism 2 
Preventing undue influence by senior managers 2 
Ensuring that all outcomes result from a professional process and are evidence based 2 
Developing a homogenous Code of Conduct against behavioural and technical conduct is 
judged 
1 
Providing technical advice to practitioners 1 
Promoting natural justice in terms of treatment etc. 1 
Providing the data needed to benchmark counter fraud teams and identify and deal with 
poor and unethical / unprofessional work 
1 
Knowledgeably enforcing minimum standards 1 		
  
 
